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ABSTRACT  
This thesis had two major study components, Study I 
was concerned with an evaluation of educable mentally retarded 
children's responses and cognitive processes in hypothetical 
temptation to steal situations, whilst Study II examined the 
effectiveness of treatment programs in modifying the children's 
behaviour in such situations. 
Justification for this research emanated from the 
problems faced by the community in relationship to stealing. 
In Study I the sample, which consisted of 83 eleven 
to sixteen year old children, I.Q. 50-75, was randomly selected 
from a population of 108 children in special schools in Tasmania. 
The children were administered a series of tests including 
Jackson's Hypothetical Temptation to Steal Test (JHTST) and 
real life temptation measures. The major findings indicated 
that there was a significant discrepancy between the children's 
resistance responses on the behavioural ('did do') measure 
.compared to the moral judgement ('should do') measure of the 
JHTST. The cognitive operations were analysed in terms of 
extrinsic, intrinsic and right/wrong cognitive processes. It 
was found that extrinsic yielding processes were used 
significantly more than intrinsic processes on both the 'did 
do' and 'should do' measures. A significantly greater number 
of children used right/wrong resistance processes on the 
'did do' measure compared to extrinsic or intrinsic processes. 
There was no difference between right/wrong and extrinsic 
processes on the 'should do' measure. 
As a result of the findings from Study I a treatment 
program was designed. An evaluation of this treatment program 
constituted the basis for Study II. The treatment derived its 
main aspects and content from Jackson's (1968) model of cognitive 
processing in hypothetical temptation to steal situations. The 
content and format of the treatment owed much to a study done by 
Haines, Jackson and Davidson with normal children in 1980. 
Study II, which was based on the same population pool 
of 108 children Study I drew from, employed a four group design 
with one group receiving a direct instruction program (DIP). 
A second group, serving as an alternative treatment condition 
received a general instruction procedure (GIP), while a third 
group (no treatment control) experienced no specific intervention. 
The fourth group was a post-only control group employed to test 
for sensitization of testing effects. 
An analysis of the data from Study II indicated that 
the DIP group used both resistance responses and intrinsic 
resistance processes significantly more than the GIP and no 
treatment control groups on the behavioural measure of the 
JHTST. A three month follow-up probe indicated that the gains 
made by the DIP group were maintained. 
The implications of the study for the prevention of 
stealing were considered. 
1. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Stealing is a steadily increasing problem in the community 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1978; Challinger, 1977). 
Detected theft has been identified as the most prevalent class 
of juvenile delinquency (Belson, 1975). Also self-report 
measures used amongst the general population of juveniles have 
indicated that almost all juveniles recall having stolen at 
least once in their lives (Belson, 1975; Jackson, 1975). 
Although a breakdown of the statistics on juvenile theft 
into retarded and non-retarded offenders has not been readily 
available for analysis, researchers have indicated that both 
groups of children are represented in the juvenile court records 
(Challinger, 1974). Also it has been established from a two year 
longitudinal study, that there is approximate equivalence in the 
moral conduct of non-retarded and retarded children of comparable 
mental age (Moore and Stephens, 1974). These data suggest that 
the temptation to steal is a problem common to both non-retarded 
and retarded children. 
The consequences of the retarded adolescent stealing and 
being dealt with in the courts may prove to be far reaching. 
It has been suggested that the retarded offender is confronted 
with special problems in the juvenile courts. The agents of the 
system have received little if any training in mental retardation. 
Consequently in lieu of a competent justice system being 
administered the "system may become incompetent due to lack of 
knowledge and expertise, and the mentally retarded individual 
2. 
may not be properly served" (Schilit, 1979). Further many 
retarded juveniles have suffered the grave inadequacies of a 
system that has permitted their exclusion from any appropriate 
rehabilitation programing (Rowan, 1976). 
In a study of delinquent youths reported by Rowan (1976), 
it was shown that mentally retarded offenders had a lower self-
concept than their more intellectually advanced delinquent peers. 
The data also indicated that the mentally retarded youths used 
an external locus of control in that they tended to look to 
others for approval and "were more likely to see what happened 
to them not as a result of their own actions, but as a result of 
chance or the whims of others: (p. 655). The study concluded 
that a vast number of mentally retarded youths who would 
otherwise become juvenile offenders could avoid the fact if 
they were given responsibility training and sufficient skills 
to meet the complexities of daily living. It has also been 
suggested that such training should make use of individualised 
behavioural objectives, precision teaching techniques, and 
positive reinforcement systems (Rowan, 1976). It follows that 
retarded children should be taught the skills to cope with 
problems, such as stealing. 
This study has grown out of an awareness of the above 
research findings as well as a number of other concerns and 
observations of which the following are perhaps the most 
significant : 
(i) Parents, teachers, and trainers of the retarded 
have expressed the view that stealing presents a considerable 
f 
problem. 
3. 
(ii) The nature of stealing has not been clearly or 
systematically delineated and as a consequence the modification 
of stealing behaviour has been hindered. 
(iii)Unwittingly individuals involved with the retarded 
have devised ad hoc programs which may exacerbate a stealing 
problem. 
(iv)The most cogent reason for a detailed understanding 
of retarded children's responses in temptation to steal 
situations is that programs relating to such behaviours may be 
built into curriculum development programs. This of course 
would necessitate some form of objective evaluation of these 
kinds of programs before they could be implemented on a wider 
scale. 
From the above concerns and observations it can be 
deduced that an investigation of the nature of stealing should 
logically precede the construction of treatment programs. 
An analysis of the nature of stealing reveals that stealing 
consists of two phases : 
(a) The temptation phase - wherein the child is in a 
state of conflict as to whether to resist or yield. The 
resolution of the conflict often involves a complex set of 
interacting variables, including developmental and learning 
history factors, social influences, psychological and 
physiological needs, and the immediate parameters of the 
situation. As many of these variables have not been studied 
with respect to retarded children and resistance to temptation, 
it is hoped that this research will add to and encourage such 
investigations. 
4. 
(b) The outcome phase. The cognitive activity generated 
during the temptation phase leads to certain outcomes. Since 
the outcomes may be positive (resistance) or negative (yielding), 
an investigation of the pre-outcome activity as well as the 
outcomes per se is essential. 
Jackson (1968) using hypothetical temptation to steal 
situations has reported this type of investigation with a sample 
of normal children. Study I in this research will involve the 
analysis of the responses and cognitive operations of educable 
mentally retarded children in hypothetical temptation to steal 
situations. The data from Study I will be examined with a view 
to the development of a resistance to stealing program. Study 
II in this thesis will involve the actual construction and 
evaluation of such a resistance program with educable mentally 
retarded children. 
To date there has been a paucity of research in the area 
of the prevention and treatment of stealing in the retarded. A 
few studies have reported the treatment of profoundly retarded 
persons who have stolen food in an institutional setting 
(Azrin and Armstrong, 1973; Azrin and Wesolowski, 1974; Barton, 
Guess, Garcia and Baer, 1970). However, a community based program 
for teaching retarded children resistance to stealing in a 
variety of everyday situations does not appear to have been 
constructed. The majority of attempts at the treatment of 
stealing have dealt with normal persons. Such attempts have 
included social reprograming (Reid and Patterson, 1976), 
contingency management programs (Switzer, Deal and Bailey, 1977) 
numerous programs generated from within the corrective services 
5. 
domain (Wax, 1977), and cognitive-behaviour modification 
programs (Guidry, 1975; Stumphauzer, 1976). 
As theft is a difficult behaviour to detect, programs 
which offer the child cognitive strategies to guide his 
decision making processes and subsequent behaviour independent 
of external supervision would appear to be highly appropriate. 
In support of this statement research within the framework of 
resistance to temptation has reported the use of cognitive 
intervention strategies in the effective facilitation of 
resistance in delay of gratification situations with pre-school 
children (Patterson and Mischel, 1976). Research has also shown 
that self instruction has been effective in modifying a range of 
behaviours including 'cognitive impulsivity' (Finch, Wilkinson 
and Nelson, 1975), 'behaviour problems' (Moore and Cole, 1978) 
and problem solving skills with retarded children (Ross and 
Ross, 1973, 1978). These findings suggest the applicability of 
cognitive intervention strategies with retarded children. 
Furthermore a cognitive-behavioural program, drawing from 
Jackson's (1968) content analysis of children's cognitive 
operations in temptation to steal situations and put into a 
direct instructional format by Haines, Jackson and Davidson 
(1980), was shown to be significantly more effective than a 
general instruction program in facilitating normal children's 
resistance behaviour. Also, research in other areas of skill 
development with retarded children has demonstrated the greater 
efficacy of direct instruction teaching methods relative •to more 
general methods of instruction (Becker and Carnine, 1978). 
6 
These data add to the feasibility of implementing a 
cognitive-behavioural program to increase resistance to 
stealing in the retarded. Such a program forms the aim of 
Study II in this research. 
IN SUMMARY this thesis will be divided into two studies : 
1. Study I will consist of an exploration of the responses 
and cognitive processes of educable mentally retarded children 
in hypothetical temptation to steal situations. 
2. Study II will consist of the generation and evaluation 
of a treatment program designed to increase the resistance to 
the temptation to steal among educable mentally retarded 
children. 
Educable mentally retarded children have been referred to 
as those who can be taught the basic academic subjects and have 
been classified as within the IQ range, 50 to 75 (Hallahan and 
Kauffman, 1978). This IQ criterion has been applied to 
children engaged in the present research. 
As a consequence of the two study format of the thesis 
the literature related to each study will be reviewed separately. 
LITERATURE REVIEW TO STUDY I 
7. 
8. 
CHAPTER 2 
DEFINITION AND NATURE OF STEALING 
2.1 DEFINITION OF STEALING 
Stealing can be defined from a legal, social, or moral 
perspective. Legally, stealing is regarded as a violation of 
the law. Socially it is a form of rule-breaking, or non-
conformity to socially accepted behaviour in society. From a 
moral perspective stealing is viewed in terms of universal human 
rights (Kohlberg, 1976a). For example, the right to life takes 
precedence over property rights, and if a person thinks it is 
right to steal in order to save his friend's life then this 
action may be regarded as morally correct, but legally and 
socially incorrect. In many cases, however, legal and social 
rules are based on what is considered to be morally right. 
Nevertheless, some researchers have criticised findings 
from resistance to temptation studies arguing that they indicate 
children's social conformity rather than morality (Aronfreed, 
1974; Kohlberg, 1976a). Jackson (1968) referred to this issue 
in a study on children's behaviour in hypothetical temptation to 
steal situations. He suggested that children's resisting or 
yielding responses were motivated by either intrinsic or 
extrinsic concerns. Intrinsic concerns related to a considera-
tion of the other person and so could be regarded as moral 
responses. Extrinsic concerns were characterised by self-
gratificatory and self-protective responses, and accordingly 
could not be referred to as strictly moral. 
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While recognising the morality/conformity issue, Jackson 
(1968) delineated the parameters of his study by operationally 
defining stealing. Similarly, the current study will present 
an operational definition of stealing : 
'Stealing is defined as taking something that does not 
belong to you without the permission of the owner'. 
2.2 THE NATURE OF STEALING 
One way to view the temptation to steal paradigm is to 
see it as a problem situation. The first phase of the problem 
can be conceptualised as the temptation phase, and the second, 
as the outcome phase. 
The Temptation Phase  
The context of a valid temptation to steal situation has 
been delineated by Jackson (1968, 1978a). He suggested four 
ingredients : 
" (i) a person who desires an object or goal; 
(ii) the goal must be difficult to acquire legitimately; 
(iii) a prohibition has to exist on either (a) reaching 
the goal other than by legitimate means; or (b) 
the goal state even though it may be legally 
sanctioned, for example, killing in tines of war; 
(iv) the person should not be unreasonably coerced to 
act immorally. For example, being told to steal 
on pain of death if he does not." (1978a, p.108). 
In this kind of temptation situation the child is confronted 
with a double approach-avoidance conflict. Both alternatives, 
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"either yield to temptation or resist temptation, appear as 
approach tendencies, but the necessity of relinquishing one of 
the alternatives in order to pursue the other may instigate a 
tendency to avoid the one which is approached" (Grinder, 1961, 
p. 680). 
During the temptation phase, the resultant conflict 
builds up tension in the child's system. He experiences a 
heightened state of cognitive activity which involves him in the 
processing and evaluation of the factors related to the 
temptation. A reduction in the state of tension in the child is 
achieved when he reaches a decision to resist or yield. 
The Outcome Phase  
This phase is a direct result of the cognitive activity 
generated in the temptation phase, and is represented by the 
child's final response to steal, or resist the urge to steal. 
As the outcome phase is functionally related to the temptation 
phase, an analysis of the factors influencing the child's 
thinking during the temptation phase is essential. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FACTORS RELATED TO RESISTANCE TO TEMPTATION AND THE 
TEMPTATION TO STEAL 
The findings from the literature on resistance to temptation 
and the temptation to steal, per se, will be discussed in 
relation to : 
(i) Developmental factors 
(ii)Demographic variables 
(iii)Parental and personal variables 
(iv)Sex differences 
(v) Observation of models 
(vi)Cognitive factors and self-control 
(vii)Context specific factors, 
(viii)An argument for generality 
3.1 DEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS 
Cognitive developmental theorists have conceived of moral 
development as proceeding through a step-wise, invariant, 
irreversible sequence of stages, each characterised by a separate 
type of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976a; Piaget, 1977). In 
contrast, social learning theorists have described moral learning 
as progressing from a simple set of rules to a more complex set 
of rules (Bandura, 1977; Zimmerman, 1978). The fundamental 
importance of skills or rule hierarchies is that they are 
teachable to children including the retarded. 
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Stephens and her colleagues at Temple University 
conducted a two year longitudinal study to assess retarded and 
non-retarded children's moral development. This series of 
studies used primarily Piagetian measures to assess moral 
judgement, and real-life temptations, including the temptation 
to steal, to assess moral conduct. The overall findings of 
these studies indicated the developmental nature of moral 
judgement (Mahaney and Stephens, 1974), and moral conduct 
(Moore and Stephens, 1974) in both retarded and non-retarded 
children. However, there were oscillations in the performances 
of both groups. 
It was also found that there was approximate equivalence 
between the performances of retarded and normal children of 
similar mental age. Taylor and Achenbach(1975)produced a 
comparable finding when they assessed cultural familial retardates 
and normal children. In contrast to these findings, Kohlberg and 
Gilligan (1971) have suggested that, as moral functioning is 
based on a combination of cognitive and social factors, then it 
could be assumed that retarded children should be functioning at 
a somewhat higher moral level than normals of the same MA. 
Kahn (1976) attempted to design a study with non-retarded, and 
mildly and moderately retarded children to test this assumption. 
The results from the study were ambiguous, lending support to 
Kohlberg and Gilligan's (1971) assumption and to the findings 
reported in the Taylor and Achenbach (1975) study as well as 
Stephen's research conclusion. Accordingly the issue requires 
further research. 
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In sum, the developmental variables of chronological age 
and mental age are functionally related to some extent to moral 
behaviour, including resistance to temptation. In particular it 
has been established that cognitive competency (as measured by 
mental age and IQ tests) tends to be among the best indicators 
of 'honesty of conduct' (Hartshorne and May, 1928; Mischel and 
Mischel, 1976). However, other researchers report that the 
developmental change is in the direction of greater consistency 
and stability rather than greater virtue (Wright, 1971). Further 
longitudinal studies are suggested. 
3.2 DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
A substantial amount of evidence has indicated that crime 
rates are higher among the working class (Challinger, 1971). 
Also it has been found that children's capacity to accurately 
decide right from wrong was related to social class and 
stealing (Jackson, 1979). The relationship between social class 
and theft however appears to be complex and must be treated with 
caution. For example, Belson (1975) using a self-report 
methodology tapped what he referred to as 'actual as distinct 
from 'detected' theft among boys. His findings indicated that 
stealing occurred to a substantial degree right across the 
occupational spectrum. A similar result emerged from an 
analysis of educational levels to stealing. 
A significant study attempting to sort out social class 
from parental factors was conducted by Kitano (1967). He found 
that family interactions could operate as the major source of 
stress. This finding is consistent with others reported in the 
literature (Bandura and Walters, 1963; Reid and Patterson, 1976). 
3.3 PARENTAL AND PERSONAL VARIABLES 
Parental variables  
During the early parent-child disciplinary encounters, 
the parent of the normal or retarded child transmits many 
physical and verbal messages to inform the child how he should 
or should not behave. The disciplinary techniques parents 
employ do not appear to be unidimensional, but typically contain 
elements of power assertion, love withdrawal, and occasionally 
induction (Hoffman, 1977). It has been suggested that the most 
effective disciplinary encounter would include a degree of 
power assertion and love withdrawal as a motive-arousal mechanism 
to get the child to halt what he is doing, attend to the parent, 
and process the information contained in an inductive message. 
Accordingly an optimum-arousal/cognitive information model has 
been suggested. 
Jackson (1979) has also referred to a similar kind of 
emotive/cognitive informational type theory in explaining his 
findings, of greater resistance in temptation to steal situations 
by girls compared to boys. He suggested that differential 
parental disciplinary patterns may account for the significant 
difference in resistance between the sexes. He found boys 
reported significantly more than girls that their parents 
shouted and smacked them when they offended. Whereas girls 
perceived that their parents talked quietly and explained the 
14. 
15. 
implications of their actions when they offended. Jackson (1979) 
inferred from these findings that the parents were "giving the 
girls simultaneously a more intelligent cognitive map to guide 
their behaviours ... and a more stable emotional equilibrium ..." 
(p.22). As the boys experienced 'emotional noise', due to being 
shouted at and smacked, it could be expected that the cognitive 
clarity of any disciplinary message directed to them would be 
reduced. 
It would seem from Hoffman's and Jackson's theoretical 
analyses that inductions ordinarily achieved the best balance 
of emotional and cognitive factors and therefore represent an 
effective technique in the discipline encounter. 
Research has suggested that the normal child could be 
expected to have acquired sufficient cognitive skills by 
approximately five years of age to benefit from induction 
(Baumrind, 1975). Parents of retarded children could also 
employ inductive disciplinary techniques, but as with the 
parents of the normal child would have to delay their implementa-
tion until the child was able to comprehend them. 
Personal variables  
The data on normal children have thrown up a number of 
personal factors strongly related to stealing. These included: 
permissiveness of stealing, a desire for 'fun' and excitement, 
truancy, and a belief by the child that he would not get caught 
(Belson, 1975). Also the ability to accept blame for having 
done a wrong act has been correlated with low stealing scores 
(Jackson, 1979). Those children who felt that getting caught 
was bad luck yielded significantly, while those children who 
engaged in restitutional behaviour, and felt sorry and apologised 
tended to minimise their stealing. Personal variables are 
further influenced by sex differences. 
3.4 SEX DIFFERENCES 
From a review of the findings from a number of studies 
Wright (1971) reported that some experiments showed no sex 
differences, others were in favour of girls. Jackson (1979), as 
mentioned, indicated that girls resisted the temptation to steal 
significantly more than boys. Hoffman (1975) claimed that 
females gave strong evidence of having a more internalised moral 
orientation than males. 
Other studies have shown however, that there is a trend 
for females to 'steal' more than was previously reported 
(Fielding 1977; Haines, Jackson and Davidson, 1980). That is, 
the gap between male and female stealing is lessening, although 
males still steal more than females. 
3.5 OBSERVATION OF MODELS 
There has been an absence of reported studies on the 
relationship between the retarded and the influence of yielding 
and resisting models on their resistance to temptation behaviour. 
Early studies with normal subjects found little support 
for the hypothesis that resistance to temptation could be 
facilitated by observing a resisting model. In fact, Stein 
(1967) found that the inhibiting effects of observing a yielding 
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model were more potent than the inhibiting effects of witnessing 
a resisting model. 
Effects of inconsistent models have been explored by 
Stein and Bryan (1972). In this study, third and fourth grade 
girls viewed a televised ten year old model who verbally 
encouraged either conformity or violation of rules governing 
self-reward and who actually conformed to or violated the 
rules. Subjects who witnessed a model who 'espoused' as well as 
adhered to the rules exhibited greatest resistance to inappropriate 
reward, while those who viewed a model who 'espoused' conformity 
but practised rule transgression showed an intermediate degree 
of rule violation. Subjects who had viewed a model who preached 
cheating but practised rule adherence and vice versa demonstrated 
lowest resistance to temptation. 
Thus behavioural transgression increased over the rate 
established for either consistent rule violation or rule 
adherence when children witnessed inconsistency between verbal 
and behavioural communications. 
A series of more recent studies has attempted to demon-
strate a clearer effectiveness of observing a resisting model 
(Bussey and Perry, 1977; Grusec, Kuczynski, Rushton and Simutis, 
1979; Perry, Bussey and Perry, 1975; Toner, Parke and Yussen, 
1978). Bussey and Perry (1977) revealed that a resisting-model 
was effective, but whenever a responsible alternative behaviour 
was modelled or made available to the subject the resisting-
model effect was diminished. Although Perry et al (1975) have 
shown that resisting-models facilitate inhibition, their studies 
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do not address the problem of the disinhibiting strength of 
yielding models. 
Grusec et al (1979) designed two experiments with 
yielding and resisting models. In the first study, four to 
five year old children were tempted to deviate by 'Charlie, 
a talking table'. 'Charlie', a tape recorder located under a 
table laden with toys tempted each child to abandon an assigned 
task and play with the toys. Overall the measures used 
lent support to the position that resisting models can be as 
influential in modifying behaviour as are yielding models. In 
the second study with subjects of five to eight year old 
children, a young woman was used to tempt the children. The 
results for the resisting model were not consistent and depended 
on the measure employed. The addition of a rationale was 
necessary to improve conformity ratings. The rationale consisted 
of the model verbalising when he thought he should continue 
performing his set task. 
This finding suggests that the power of resisting models can 
be increased if they use a 'rationale' to guide their responding. 
Similar findings have been found in the literature on punishment 
strategies (Parke and Murray, 1971) and self-control in 
children (Bosserman and Parke, 1973; Mischel and Patterson, 1976). 
3.6 COGNITIVE FACTORS AND SELF-CONTROL 
Mischel and Mischel (1976) and Aronfreed (1968, 1976) 
have stressed the ways representational thought and related 
affective processes can establish control over conduct. The 
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resistance to temptation literature similarly substantiates 
the executive role which cognitive processes, coupled with their 
affective loadings, play in directing a normal child's decision-
making processes and controlling his behaviour. 
Indeed a growing body of research has attempted to study 
resistance to temptation within a self-control model ( Fry and 
Preston, 1979; Karoly and Briggs, 1978). The ways these attempts 
relate to the treatment of stealing will be examined in Study II 
of the thesis. The discussion which follows will focus on 
resistance to temptation and self-regulatory strategies. 
In resistance to temptation situations of the delay of 
gratification kind, the individual may be faced with strong 
temptations and situational pressures for long periods, and 
without the aid of any obvious external rewards or supports 
(Mischel and Mischel, 1976). In order to cope with the dilemma 
the individual could decide to activate self-regulatory 
strategies to help organise rules or plans for the sequencing 
and terminating of complex behavioural patterns necessary for 
achieving his goal. 
The functions of self-regulatory systems in delay of 
gratification situations can be referred to within a two stage 
model (Kanfer, 1976; Mischel, 1974). In the first stage, which 
Kanfer referred to as 'decisional' self-control, a choice is 
made to seek larger delayed rewards or to obtain immediately 
available smaller rewards. If a decision is made to seek larger 
delayed rewards, then the second stage, protracted self-control, 
emerges. With reference to this two stage model of 
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self-regulation and the retarded Litrownik, Franzini, Geller 
and Geller (1977) stated that, "if we attempt to develop more 
independence (self-regulation) in retarded children, we must 
include training in both decisional and protracted self-control" 
(p. 149). 
The Concept of Self-Control and The Retarded  
It should be noted that the terms 'self-control', 
'resistance to temptation', 'immediate versus delayed gratifi-
cation', and 'self-regulation', present overlapping concepts 
with a common meaning in certain situations. Indeed Pressley 
(1979) has defined delay of gratification as a form of 
resistance to temptation. Also self-control has been described 
as a process through which a person becomes the principal agent 
for regulating his own behaviour (Goldfried and Merbaum, 1973). 
Accordingly the aforementioned terms would appear relevant when 
discussing temptation to steal situations. 
The intellectually retarded person has been typically 
characterised as being unable to control his own behaviour 
(Kurtz and Neisworth, 1976). Instead he has been represented 
as being dependent on others (Mahoney and Mahoney, 1976), and 
as adopting an outer-directed problem solving orientation 
(Zigler, 1966). Litrownik et al (1977) attempted to examine 
decisional self-control in a group of retarded adolescents in a 
sheltered workshop. An important aspect of the study was to 
improve the retardates' comprehension of time perspectives. 
This aspect was included because research has shown that an 
accurate time perspective facilitates self-control Olischel, 
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1974; Schack and Massati, 1973). 
In the study each subject was presented with two choices 
(verbal and actual) at four delay conditions. The decisional 
options involved a choice between a smaller immediate reward 
and a larger delayed reward. The eight delay choices were 
presented to the subject one per day after they had spent one 
to two minutes completing a simple sorting task. The choices 
were verbal or actual and were presented the same way, "Would 
you rather have (1,10,30,60) minutes"? Each subject in a time 
experience group was told, "I'll be back to get you in (1,10, 
30,60) minute(s)". The experienced interval on each day was 
always the same as the delay interval involved in the choice 
situation for that day. The results suggested that decisional 
self-control can be reliably and validly assessed via verbal 
reports and that this aspect of self-control, which is a 
prerequisite of self-regulation, can be facilitated through 
prior clearly labeled experience with delay intervals. The 
results, however, did not determine definitely whether improved 
time comprehension and/or belief that the rewards would be 
obtained were responsible for the increases in decisional self-
control. The program was an appropriate first step to develop 
self-control skills (i.e. delay of gratification). There has 
been some evidence (Magy, 1975) suggesting that temporal 
experiences might also facilitate waiting (i.e. protracted self-
control). In a later series of studies Litrownik et al (1977, 
1978) also demonstrated that trainable mentally retarded 
children could learn self-monitoring, and self-reinforcement 
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skills. Both types of skills have been shown to facilitate the 
self-regulation process (Bandura, 1977). 
Within the resistance to temptation framework self-
regulation implies a certain consistency of responding across 
situations. However, the characteristics of the situation may 
override an individual's self-regulatory strategies and be the 
major determinant of his responding. 
3.7 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITUATION 
The major finding of the classic Hartshorne and May (1928) 
studies indicated that children's responses were characterised 
more by their specificity than generality. Mischel and Mischel 
(1976) have reported that correlational and experimental studies 
also suggest the discriminative nature of behavioural responding. 
In accord with these findings, Jackson's (1968) data on children's 
behaviour in hypothetical temptation to steal situations 
demonstrated the variability of children's responses across 
situations. Penner, Summers, Brookmire and Deptke (1976) using 
a lost dollar as a temptation stimulus in a laboratory and field 
settings, revealed that significantly more subjects returned the 
dollar in the laboratory situation. 
Situational ;influences in resistance to temptation 
contexts have also included the degree of positive regard for 
the loser of an item (Gross, 1975; Hornstein, Masor, Sole and 
Heilman, 1971), the status of the owner (Brickman, 1974), the 
size of an organised business (Smigel, 1970), the degree of 
detectability and the costs to the subject in terms of a 
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negative personal evaluation (Penner et al, 1976), and so on. 
From the foregoing analysis of resistance to temptation 
data it would appear that children's responses are determined 
by a complex interaction of person and situation type variables. 
Further, the weight of evidence has suggested that situational 
variables account for a greater proportion of the variance of 
responding than do person variables. Despite the overwhelming 
nature of these findings an argument can be constructed to allow 
for a re-evaluation of the influence of person variables. 
3.8 AN ARGUMENT FOR THE GENERALITY OF RESPONDING 
The mounting theoretical and empirical evidence for the 
influence of cognitive processing over behavioural responding 
has led to a review of the specificity versus generality debate. 
Burton (1963) factor analysed the six most reliable cheating 
tests in the Hartshorne and May (1928) study and found some 
support for a 'generality' dimension. He also found an 
increase in generality with age. In offering a theoretical 
perspective to his finding, Burton suggested that the degree of 
generality found could be explained in terms of a learning model. 
This model refers to two gradients, (a) a cognitively mediated 
generalisation gradient wherein the greater the cognitive, 
especially verbal, association between two kinds of situations, 
the greater will be the probability of the same response. Hoffman 
(1977) suggests that in very young children generalisation 
takes place on the basis of common stimulus elements. However, 
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after four or five years of age, when cognitive mediation 
becomes possible, generalisations begin to occur on the basis 
of conceptual similarity. 
Although Mischel and Mischel (1976) have demonstrated 
the specificity of behaviour, their theoretical position also 
offers a basis for the degree of generality found in responding. 
For instance, these authors have implied that the degree of 
generality a person displayed may, in part, be facilitated by 
his 'enduring expectancies', 'cognitive consistency' and 
'self-regulation' skills. 
The notion of enduring expectancies suggests a degree of 
consistency of responding across situations. Mischel and 
Mischel (1976) maintained that if consideration for others is 
practised in both moral and wider social contexts then such 
responding would serve to generate enduring expectancies  
regarding the positive consequence of mutually helpful behaviour 
and thus increase the probability of its occurrence. 
The construction of cognitive consistency referred to 
the way individuals encoded and categorized events. The explana-
tion for this phenomenon may be found in the way people tend to 
reduce cognitive inconsistency, and in general, to simplify 
information so that they can deal with it. It would appear 
that cognitive consistency is facilitated by selective 
attention and coding processing which integrates new information 
into existing cognitive structures. After the information has 
been integrated with existing cognitive structures and become 
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part of the long term memory it remains enduringly available 
and exerts further stabilizing effects. 
Also Mischel and Mischel (1976) believed that the 
individual was capable of using his cognitive structures to 
help him develop self-regulatory systems. By virtue of the 
nature of a self-regulatory system it would be reasonable to 
expect that if a person could form plans for behaving, and 
was able to display sufficient self-control then it would be 
possible for him to exert stabilising influences over his 
behaviour, and thereby facilitate a greater degree of 
consistency in responding. 
Researching from within an attribution theory 
perspective Markus (1977) has also referred to cognitive 
structures which help to guide and standardise responses across 
situations. These structures were described as self-schemata, 
and were defined as "cognitive generalisations about the self, 
derived from past experience, that organize and guide the 
processing of self-related information contained in the 
individual's social experiences" (p. 64). 
Specifically the concept of self-schemata implied that 
information about the self in some area (e.g. moral) had been 
categorised or organised and that the result of this organisation 
was a discernable pattern which may be used as a basis for 
future judgements,'decisions, inferences or predictions about 
the self... The research by Markus (1977) has suggested that 
in certain areas, for example, dependence-independence, some 
people have well developed self-schemata and others do not. 
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Furthermore statistically significant behavioural differences 
were shown between those with schemata and those without 
schemata. 
In addition to the above theoretical perspectives 
which indicate in general the possible mechanisms which control 
cognitions and influence responding, empirical evidence from 
resistance to temptation studies has also suggested a degree of 
support for the generality position. 
Support for generality, as well as specificity, was 
obtained by Sears, Rau, and Alpert (1965) and Nelson, Grinder 
and Mutterer (1969), who tested pre-school children under more 
controlled conditions. Sears et al (1965) found correlations 
ranging from 0 to .45 (most statistically significant) among 
six different resistance to temptation measures. Nelson et al 
(1969) also studies six different resistance to temptation 
tests and depending on the statistical procedure employed, 
anywhere from about 15 to 20 percent of the variance in the test 
scores appear to be due to 'persons'. 
Furthermore the Hartshorne and May (1928) studies on 
deceit have demonstrated that a very small minority of children 
behaved honestly (i.e. did not lie, cheat, or steal) in a range 
of real-life situations. Jackson (1968) Using hypothetical 
temptation to steal situations also found a small percentage 
of children resisted across all situations. Similarly, Haines, 
Jackson and Davidson (1980) revealed that a small number of 
children were categorical resisters in a range of hypothetical 
situations, and, also resisted in a real life temptation to 
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steal situation. These data on stealing suggest that there are 
some children who acquire a 'no stealing' rule, and consistently 
behave in accord with their rule(S) in a range of temptation 
situations. 
One of the questions in the first study of this research 
will address the issue of categorical resisters among retarded 
children. Additionally, a detailed review of Jackson's (1968) 
analysis of normal children's cognitive processes in hypothetical 
temptation to steal situations may extend the generality argument 
and suggest a methodology for investigating educable mentally 
retarded children's behaviour and cognitive processes in 
stealing contexts. 
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CHAPTER 4 
JACKSON'S MODEL OF COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN HYPOTHETICAL 
TEMPTATION TO STEAL SITUATIONS 
From an analysis of 120 children's responses in hypo-
thetical temptation to steal situations Jackson (1968) formulated 
a model of cognitive processing in such situations. 
4.1 THE STRUCTURE OF COGNITIVE PROCESSING IN STEALING SITUATIONS 
Jackson (1968) defined cognitive processes as "those 
mental acts generated by the individual for solving the dilemma 
created by the temptation situation" (p.76 ). The structure 
and plan of these 'cognitive processes' were schematically 
represented by Jackson (1968) and are shown in Figure 1. The 
operations delineated in the figure present a temporally ordered 
sequential analysis of the processes encountered by children in 
a temptation to steal situation. Briefly explained these 
processes involve: 
(a) Temptation Problem. This represents the conflict or 
dilemma confronting the child. If the child does not experience 
a feeling of conflict, then by definition no temptation problem 
exists. 
(b) Sense of Dilemma. This process is characterised by 
the child selectively focusing on the problem, while simulta-
neously excluding all extraneous activity. For example, "I 
paused a moment". 
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(c) Reflection/Self-Discussion. This stage implies 
that the child has a notion of the correct response and has 
cognitive resources to assist in decision-making. Also, that 
these cognitive processes are held in storage and must be 
retrieved. Self-discussion was referred from responses like, 
"I said to myself". 
(d) Reference (Cognitive) Schemata. These related to 
the internal frames of reference which the child operated on in 
a temptation situation. Schemata were essentially of two 
types: (i) Extrinsic frames of reference which referred to 
externalised kinds of 'reasons' offered for yielding or 
resisting; an example being, "I did not take it because I might 
get into trouble"; and (ii) Intrinsic frames of reference 
which referred to a 'self-generated dynamic phenomenon'. 
Generally, the child indicated he had considered the other person 
in the situation and the consequences of his behaviour. For 
example, "I did not take it because it was not mine (resisting)" 
or "I took it to help Mum (yielding)". 
(e) Decision. The child's closure on what he will do. 
(f) Post-Decision Responses. Following the decision the 
child may emit some positive or negative affective response, 
"I felt good". Also a physio-motor element may quickly follow 
a decision, such as "I pulled my hand away". 
Jackson (1968) suggested that children do not necessarily 
show evidence of all of these 'cognitive processing' steps. 
He argued that a collapsed form of cognitive processing may 
occur. In such a case the child was unaware of all the steps 
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involved, and could not articulate them, nevertheless the steps 
were alleged to exist. 
In sum, Jackson (1968) concluded that whether abbreviated 
or changed somewhat in form, his model of 'cognitive processing' 
represented the model of responses inherent in resistance or 
deviant behaviour. Although the initial processing steps are 
necessary, the pivotal point in the chain of processes and 
the basis for subsequent decision making rests on the child's 
cognitive schemata or frames of reference. 
4.2 JACKSON'S COGNITIVE SCHEMATA 
Jackson's notion of the way cognitive schemata were formed 
and applied has its underpinnings in social learning theory. In 
this view the individual has been conceived of as continuously 
integrating and organising information, and as a result, 
building up a highly complex system of responses with inter-
related meanings. These centrally stored phenomena or 
categories may usefully be viewed as the basis of cognitive 
strategies used for handling the demands of a situation. The 
relationship between the stimulus situation and the individual's 
cognitively mediated response has been summed in the following 
way : 
"The stimulus determines what strategy or 
strategies will be evoked, the content of 
these strategies is already determined by 
the previous experience of the system" 
(Newell, Shaw and Simon, 1958, p.158). 
This early analysis of how external stimuli interact with the 
individual's cognitive system, in a sense, parallels the theory's 
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later notion of the way stimuli cue rule-production in the 
individual (Yates and Yates, 1978). 
Jackson's application of social learning theory within 
the specific domain of stealing has led to his own particular 
conception of schemata related to the temptation to steal. In 
this stealing specific domain, he has suggested that when the 
individual was confronted with a temptation problem he scanned 
his memory for cognitive categories with information relevant 
to the problem. When he recognised the similarity between the 
demands of the problem and the information in a particular 
storage category or categories he would retrieve information 
which he would use to form the basis of strategies to solve the 
problem. 
In the sense that the individual's cognitive categories 
or schemata are developed through his/her socialisation 
experiences, the quality and nature of the schemata may be age-
related. For instance, a very young child when confronted with 
a temptation to steal situation may reflect on a past experience 
when he was punished for stealing. In Jackson's terminology 
the child would probably focus on a 'consequences' schema; in 
this case the child might say, "I will not take it because I 
might get caught". From this example it becomes clear that 
there is not a one to one correspondence or a 'match' between 
exactly what s/he did in the past and his/her present response. It 
is more the correspondence between the 'concept' of the common 
attributes of similar past situations and his/her present 
response. 
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Jackson (1968) analysed in detail the kinds of 'reasons' 
or schemata involved in yielding or resistance processes. 
Yielding processes will be reviewed next. 
Yielding Processes  
Jackson (1968) in an analysis of the children's yielding 
processes found that they were characterised by a lower order sense 
of dilemma, that is, a concern about getting caught. Only 
relatively few subjects showed a higher order sense of dilemma, 
namely a concern about the propriety of the action. It followed 
from this analysis that, in the next stage of processing there was 
little reflection and discussion. The reflection that did arise 
involved thoughts on how to avoid detection during and following 
stealing. 
The next stage of processing involved extrinsic and 
intrinsic reference schemata. One extrinsic schema was a 
conception that stealing was justified when there was a lack of 
surveillance. Another schema was linked to the magnitude of 
the theft, while still another involved a physical need for, say, 
sweets, or excitement. Other extrinsic schemata included: 
social pressure to be like others, a revenge motive to get even, 
and a feeling that there was social support for stealing, for 
instance, when parents accepted acts of stealing. 
Intrinsic frames of reference were occasionally produced 
by children to justify stealing. Jackson stressed that while 
most reasons for stealing were of an extrinsic nature, it was 
possible to create a conflict situation in which it may be quite 
difficult for the child to decide what was the correct course of 
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action. In a situation where a little brother had lost a 
knife, the subject often justified stealing another knife by 
appealing to the argument that it would prevent his little 
brother getting into trouble. This type of reasoning was 
classified as based on an intrinsic frame of reference because 
it revealed a concern for the other person, a concern which 
was greater than the fear of getting caught. 
The decision stage of yielding processes was deduced from 
the children's selective processing. For instance, only taking 
a few coins and leaving the rest, and by the child's use of 
detailed behavioural sequences, such as deciding to first put a 
hand near a lolly, then deciding to take the lolly slowly, and 
ending the decisional sequence by looking at the lollies and 
pretending to examine them. The final post-decisional stage 
often reflected the deviant subject's awareness that his 
behaviour was not socially accepted. This awareness was 
indicated by physiological correlates following the yielding 
response. For example, "I slipped it into my pocket quickly 
and walked away". 
Resistance Processing  
Resistance processing was characterised by a higher order 
sense of dilemma, and subsequent discussion. A range of 
resistance schemata were identified, and the decision and post 
decision stages reinforced the resistance action. As resistance 
schemata precede a child's decision to resist the temptation to 
steal they will be examined next. 
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Resistance schemata. As with yielding schemata, 
resistance schemata involved an extrinsic and intrinsic 
orientation. Extrinsic schemata included: 'consequences', 
'model', and 'habit'. The developmental literature has 
demonstrated that young children evaluate actions by reference 
to their consequences (Bandura, 1977; Mischel and Mischel, 1976; 
Piaget, 1977). Jackson's (1968) data also revealed that many 
children focused on consequences in making a resistance 
decision. For example, "I didn't want to get into trouble so I 
didn't take it". Recent research has indicated the power of 
resisting models (Grusec et al, 1979). Children were regarded 
as using a model schema when they suggested things like, for 
instance, "I decided to turn away from the toy because my 
father would not take it". Jackson also generated a habit 
schema from the children's data which made some reference to a 
desire to resist the temptation to steal because they did not 
want to develop a bad habit. For example, "I don't want to 
steal because it may become a habit". 
Resistance responses which were motivated by intrinsic 
schemata were held by Jackson (1968), to be the only truly moral 
responses. Intrinsic schemata included: internalised principle, 
right/wrong, self control, guilt, and self image. Internalised 
principle schemata consisted of those responses which were based 
on a notion of reciprocity. This type of response conforms to 
the 'golden rule' which functions as a rationale for 
resistance responding in a temptation to steal situation. An 
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example of a child's use of the 'rule' schema would be, "I 
thought I wouldn't take it because I wouldn't like someone to 
treat me like that". The right/wrong schema does not appear as 
sophisticated as the internalised principle schema, but does 
indicate the child's awareness of the wrongness of stealing. 
This type of schema was represented by such responses as, "I 
decided not to take it because it is wrong to steal". The 
less frequent forms of intrinsic resistance schema involved 
children's reference to: 'self image', for instance, "I would 
not take it because I am not the sort of person who steals'; 
'self control', for example, "I decided to control myself", and 
'guilt' by •responses such as, "I would feel guilty if I took 
it". 
A form of response not anticipated but identified by 
Jackson (1968) was the 'legitimate acquisition response'. 
Some children, instead of resisting in the sense of giving up 
their goal, decided to achieve their objective in a socially 
and morally acceptable manner. This type of response required 
a delay of immediate gratification in order to obtain a long 
term satisfaction and is therefore similar in certain ways to 
Kanfer (1976) and Mischel's (1974) two stage model of self 
control. This is clearly reflected in the following type of 
response, "I would save up my pocket money and get it then 
because what is the use of having a bracelet if you don't wear 
it and if you did, someone would notice". The legitimate 
acquisition response is seen as highly desirable as it means the 
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child utilises his resources to solve the temptation to steal 
problem. As well, this type of response does not necessitate 
absolute self control. 
This model proposed by Jackson has provided a format for 
analysing the responses of normal children and in this study 
has been utilized in a study of the responses of mentally 
retarded children. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN MEASURING THE 
RESPONSES OF CHILDREN IN TEMPTATION TO STEAL SITUATIONS 
Experimenters have attempted to measure three kinds of 
responding in temptation situations: (1) behavioural responses, 
(2) self-report responses, and (3) judgemental responses. 
5.1 BEHAVIOURAL MEASURES 
Two kinds of behavioural responses have been assessed: 
(a) behavioural responses in real-life situations, and (b) 
simulated behavioural responses in quasi-life situations. 
Additionally, in the second category, children's mental 
operations which guide their responding have also been plotted. 
(a) Behavioural Responses in Real-life Situations  
In the classical Hartshorne and May (1928) Character 
Education Enquiry a range of situations were devised wherein 
children made an overt response which indicated resisting or 
yielding. For example, in one classroom cheating situation 
subjects scored their own tests ostensibly because the 
instructor was unable to do so. Unknown to the subjects 
recorded scores on original performance could be compared with 
scores they submitted. Improvements indicated cheating. 
Grinder (1961) generated situations in a similar manner to 
Hartshorne and May (1928). 
The temptation situations employed by Hartshorne and May 
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(1928) and Grinder (1961) may place demands on younger retarded 
children which they cannot meet - for instance, the self-
recording requirements often made in such situations. In 
Grinder's ray-gun game the subject was asked to take 20 shots 
and to record his/her score on a three-column, 20 row score 
sheet (Grinder,1961). Grinder's bean bag game has fewer 
limitations but does require the child to be ambulant and able 
to throw a bean bag some 5 feet. 
The types of situations so far referred to have been 
temptation to cheat situations used with normal children. More 
relevant to the particular focus of this study were Moore and 
Stephens' (1974) self-control or temptation to steal situations 
used with retarded children. In one situation a dish of candy 
and a packet of partially-filled cigarettes were placed on a 
table. During a session between the child and the examiner on 
another issue, the experimenter leaves the room on a pre-
arranged pretext. A count of the candy and cigarettes after 
the child departs indicates a yielding or resisting score. 
Although this type of situation has a relatively high incentive 
goal and has no real task demands, extrapolating from a child's 
yielding or resistance response in one situation to a statement 
about the child's disposition to resist temptation causes some 
concern. Firstly, research data have clearly indicated the 
influence of situational variables on children's responses in 
temptation situations. It would require the assessment of a 
child's behaviour in a range of situations to allow for any 
degree of confidence in a statement about the child's propensity 
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to resist the temptation to steal. Secondly, the context of 
the situation may have a determining influence on responding. 
Despite all precautions to the contrary the child in a dilemma 
like that described by Stephens, has been placed in an artificial 
situation. One which he does not confront from day to day. 
Thirdly, the nature of the temptation stimulus is very 
restricted. The appeal of candy and cigarettes will vary 
between persons and across times. Again a range of temptation 
stimuli would permit a more searching evaluation of a child's 
self-control. In short, assessment of a child's responding in 
a range of everyday familiar situations, with a variety of 
tempting stimuli would give a reasonable indication of his/her 
propensity for resistance in temptation to steal situations. 
(b) Simulated Behavioural Responses'in Quasi-life Situations  
Jackson (1968) devised a Hypothetical Temptation to 
Steal Test (JHTST) to examine the behaviour of children from 
their own perception of events. The test is based on the 
assumption that what the child "thinks is going on can be more 
important in shaping an outcome than what actually goes on" 
(Jackson, 1978b). It follows that to a large degree what a 
child thinks will tend to shape his response to events. The 
JHTST (1968) consists of eight hypothetical everyday stealing 
dilemmas. It was originally a paper and pencil test, and 
required the child to indicate what s/he 'did' in a situation and 
'why' s/he did it. Data from the test therefore allowed for an 
analysis of what Jackson called the . children's mental operations 
41. 
as well as their behavioural responses. Behavioural responses 
on the JHTST were defined as what the child said s/he 'did do' 
in the hypothetical temptation to steal situations. A 'should 
do' probe was recently added to the JHTST. These responses will 
be referred to as 'moral judgement' responses. 
Methodologically the JHTST has several advantages over 
the single situation real-life temptation measures: 
(i) Fewer ethical constraints operate on the JHTST than 
the real-life measures. 
(ii) The JHTST involves a range of everyday dilemmas and 
temptation stimuli. The lack of practical limitations on the 
construction and presentation of a range of situations clearly 
advantages the hypothetical measure. 
(iii) Real-life situations often include an element of 
contrivance and artificiality, whereas with the JHTST the child 
relates to a familiar everyday context. 
(iv) Relative to the real-life situation there are 
fewer fears of detection in the hypothetical situations. 
(v) The JHTST allows for an analysis of the cognitive 
processes guiding the child's response. 
(vi) The JHTST permits the identification of the kinds of 
situations in which a child might yield. 
(vii) The JHTST is presented in the 'first' person. The 
subject is confronted with a dilemma and has to say what s/he 
does, not what he 'should do' (although there is a 'should do' 
version). 
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The most fundamental potential criticism of the JHTST 
would appear to be that it does not measure what the child would 
really do in a set of similar real-life situations. Although 
the situations in the JHTST are hypothetical, Jackson (1978b) 
has reported a series of validity studies which indicated that 
the test, reliably discriminates delinquent from non-delinquent 
samples and distinguishes significantly between what children 
say they 'should do' compared to what they 'did do'. Also, 
it was found that children who resisted on all situations in 
the JHTST, resisted in a real-life situation (Haines, Jackson 
and Davidson, 1980). These data add to the validity of the 
JHTST. 
5.2 SELF-REPORT MEASURES 
Belson (1975) has used a self-report methodology to 
analyse boys' stealing behaviour. An elicitation procedure, 
which was divided into two phases was designed. In the first 
phase, the boy sat on one side of .th? screen and was requested 
to sort a set of 44 cards. Each card consisted of a question 
relating to instances of stealing. For example, "I have pinched 
sweets" (card 13). The boy posted his answer in a slot on the 
screen labelled 'yes' or 'never'. Belson (1975) argued that the 
stealing items represented a 'web of stimuli' in the sense that 
taken together they evoked recall of stealing instances. 
Stringent efforts were made to assure the boys of confidentiality. 
In the second phase, the boy and the interviewer sat face to 
face. Belson indicated that this is what the boys wanted. 
43. 
Three types of information were requested about the admitted 
thefts: the biggest thing of this type taken or done; how 
often the boy had ever done this class of thing; and his age 
when he first did it and his age on the last occasion he did it. 
Reassurance, probing and checking were essential parts of this 
phase. 
A test-retest measure of relaibility on the total number 
of 'yes' responses was acceptable (r = .86). The elicitation 
procedure was not subjected to any validity measures. Belson 
(1975) offered criticism of his own procedure. He suggested that 
a boy's memory of how many times he has done various things 
during his lifetime may be quite unconsciously distorted in 
the direction of over statement or under statement each time 
he is questioned. Clearly, the more dated the information the 
greater the degree of error due to memory overload. Also the 
more recent the information the greater the child's fear of 
disclosure and possible reprisal by the authorities. These 
factors weigh seriously against the validity of Belson's 
measure. 
5.3 JUDGEMENTAL MEASURES 
A number of researchers have assessed children's moral 
reasoning in situations which included stealing dilemmas. It 
should be made clear that the interpretations of responses by 
these researchers do not relate to resistance or yielding, 
per se, but to stage levels or moral reasoning. However, as 
stealing can be defined as one type of moral misconduct it 
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would be expected that excluding the life versus stealing issue, 
children with a high level or moral functioning would be more 
likely to resist stealing than those of a lower level of moral 
functioning. Kohlberg's (1976a) findings that a stronger 
relationship exists between moral judgement and behaviour for 
those higher up the moral stage ladder would tend to support 
this assumption. A brief review of the methodological 
considerations of the measures of moral judgement therefore 
seems appropriate. 
Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Scale was reported originally 
in 1958 and revised in 1976(b). Kurtines and Grief (1974) 
have criticised the validity and reliability of the original 
scale, particularly the scoring system. In the updated version 
an issue scoring system was constructed in order to meet more 
adequately the assumption of the invariant sequence postulate of 
stage theory. Research needs to be applied to Kohlberg's 
latest scoring system. 
From the point of view of test content there remains a 
distinct similarity between the two versions of the scale. 
Leming (1974) has commented on the content of Kohlberg's 
Moral Judgement stories. Leming (1974) has referred to the 
story content as consisting of classical dilemmas because they 
involve situations and characters not easily identifiable by 
the child. He found that practical moral dilemmas, that is, 
those which are familiar, elicited a significantly different 
level of moral reasoning compared to classical dilemmas. In 
discussing the implications for the cognitive developmental 
45. 
approach to moral education it was argued that "for a moral 
education program to be maximally effective it ought to focus 
on naturally occurring situations within the life-space of 
the students" (p.24). Leming (1974) has called for an 
experience-based moral education program. 
Although Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Scale (KMJS) has been 
administered to retarded persons (Taylor and Achenbach, 1975; 
Kahn, 1976; Rackman, 1974), an analysis of the concepts and 
word difficulty used in the stories and probes raises some 
doubts as to the KMJS applicability for younger educable 
mentally retarded children. This question has been empirically 
tested in the present research. 
In contrast, the Piaget type stories used in Stephens' 
Temple University studies (1974) were familiar everyday 
situations using simple concepts and language. In many stories 
a pictorial representation accompanied the verbal presentation. 
Bull (1969) using quasi-life situations tested children's 
moral judgements in a range of five situations: cruelty to 
animals, value of life, cheating, lying, and stealing. 
Children were exposed to pictorially represented stories, and 
asked what the character in the story (third person) 'would do'. 
Responses were classified within a four stage moral develop-
mental scale (anomy, heteronomy, socionomy, and autonomy). 
The 'would' probe was seen as preferrable to the 'should' 
probe because it was related to concrete situations which 
younger children could comprehend. On the other hand both 
Piaget (1977) and Kohlberg (1976b) have used the 'should' 
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probe to assess moral judgement. 
This current study sought to examine the responses of 
educable mentally retarded children in stealing dilemmas, 
however, given the methodological advantages and limitations 
of the measures employed in resistance to temptation research 
it was decided to modify and then pilot a number of these 
measures on a sample of educable mentally retarded children 
to assess their applicability for inclusion in Study I. These 
pilot studies will be briefly mentioned. 
5.4 PILOT STUDIES 
Specifically, the pilot studies were concerned with 
the suitability of the following measures: Kohlberg's Moral 
Judgement Scale (KMJS) (1976b); Jackson's Hypothetical 
Temptation to Steal Test (JUST) (1968); Jackson's Person and 
Parental Reaction Test (JPPRT) (1968); Stephens' Moral Judge-
ment Measures (Mahaney and Stephens, 1974); and a real life 
stealing and cheating test. 
The pilot sample involved a small number of educable 
mentally retarded children randomly chosen from the population 
pool proposed for the study. As a consequence of these pilot 
probes certain modifications to the above tests were found to 
be necessary. In addition it was found that the Kohlberg 
Moral Judgement Scale (1976b) was completely unsuitable for 
these mentally retarded children, therefore it was rejected 
as a suitable measure. The modifications to the other tests 
will be discussed in an appropriate place within the methodo-
logical section of Study I. 
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STUDY I 
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CHAPTER 6 
AN ANALYSIS OF EDUCABLE MENTALLY RETARDED CHILDREN'S 
RESPONSES AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN HYPOTHETICAL 
TEMPTATION TO STEAL SITUATIONS 
As previously indicated, stealing presents a considerable 
problem for the community, educational systems and families. 
Since stealing is an end product type response and management of 
this response is one of the major dilemmas faced by society, an 
examination of the nature of stealing responses should provide 
the essential data for preventative education. 
The nature of stealing has been reviewed as a two phase 
process. Phase 1 represents the temptation or conflict phase and 
is characterised by a high level of cognitive activity. Phase 2 
is the outcome phase wherein the child makes a decision to 
resist or yield. Jackson (1968) using hypothetical temptation 
to steal situations examined the responses and cognitive processes 
of a sample of normal children. The main purpose of Study I was 
to analyse the responses and cognitive processes of educable 
mentally retarded children in hypothetical temptation to steal 
situations, with the view to attempting to understand these 
processes with the further aim in mind to generate preventative 
type programs. 
One of the major findings from Jackson's (1968) study was 
that most children responded differentially across situations. 
He found that the highest proportion of children resisted in 
what he called a "found purse" situation. Similarly, Penner et 
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al (1976), using a lost dollar as a temptation stimulus, found 
that the dollar was returned significantly more when it was 
placed in a labelled wallet than when it was in an officially 
marked envelope, or without any identification. Penner et al 
(1976) attempted to explain this result by referring to the 
relative costs that the subject incurred by keeping the dollar. 
They targeted three main costs which influenced the subject's 
decision; the costs to the owner, the costs to the thief, and 
the cost of a negative personal evaluation. 
It is apparent from these findings that an individual's 
perception of the situation has a direct influence over the type 
of behavioural response he emits. Indeed, studies on moral 
conduct and moral judgement suggest that an individual's 
behavioural and judgement responses across situations are 
characterised more by their specificity than generality 
(Hartshorne and May, 1928; Mischel and Mischel, 1976). 
Although most children do seem to respond differentially across 
situations, Hartshorne and May's (1928) data identify a small 
number of children who behaved honestly (i.e., did not lie, 
cheat or steal) in a range of real life situations. Jackson (1968) 
using hypothetical temptation to steal situations also found that 
a few children resisted across all situations. Similarly, 
Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1980) revealed that a small 
percentage of children were categorical resisters in a range of 
hypothetical situations, and also resisted in a real life 
temptation to steal situation. These data on stealing suggest 
that there are some children who acquire a 'no stealing' rule, 
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and consistently behave in accord with their rule(s) in a range 
of temptation situations. 
In addition to identifying categorical resisters in his 
data, Jackson (1968) also found that some children, instead of 
resisting and giving up their goal, decided to achieve their 
objective in a legitimate way. This kind of responding is 
similar in certain ways to the two stage model of self-control 
proposed by Kanfer (1976) and Mischel (1974). One of the aims of 
this study was to examine educable mentally retarded children's 
resistance responding for the existence of legitimate alternative 
strategies. 
It was decided to use a range of hypothetical temptation 
to steal situations in lieu of a real-life temptation to steal 
situation as the main measure of resistance, because of certain 
methodological and ethical advantages. One of the key 
methodological advantages is that, via an oral/visual presentation 
probe technique, the children's cognitive processes could be 
obtained, recorded and analysed. 
While overt responding is one measure of a response, and 
indeed much of the early resistance to temptation research has 
only monitored this kind of responding (Grinder, 1961; Hartshorne 
and May, 1928), recent resistance to temptation studies have 
described the relationship between covert and overt responding 
(Grusec et al, 1979; Jackson, 1968; Mischel and Patterson, 1974). 
Even these later studies however, with the exception of Jackson 
(1968), have not directly measured the actual cognitive 
processing the child uses in a temptation situation. In his 
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research, Jackson (1968) analysed the cognitive processes of 
children in hypothetical temptation to steal situations and 
subsequently generated a six stage cognitive processing model. 
Data from this model indicated that normal children used 
intrinsic and extrinsic schemata to guide their resistance or 
yielding responses. 
An analysis of the kinds of cognitive schemata educable 
mentally retarded children use in hypothetical temptation to 
steal situations was regarded as an essential component of the 
present study. 
Irrespective of whether children resisted or yielded in 
these hypothetical temptation to steal situations, Jackson (1968) 
stated that they went through a stage which he defined as the 
self-discussion and reflection phase. Since temptation to steal 
situations can be conceptualised as problem solving situations, 
and reflection is an important strategy for problem solving, it 
was argued that reflection may be related to resistance responding. 
It was therefore decided to examine educable mentally retarded 
children's cognitive styles. Kagan's Matching Familiar Figures 
(1964) test was regarded as an adequate measure for this 
dimension. 
In an attempt to determine the kinds of factors which 
influence children's responses in various forms of resistance to 
temptation situations, researchers have examined the relationship 
of a range of cognitive variables, intelligence and moral 
judgement; developmental and demographic variables, age, sex and 
socioeconomic status, as well as person and parental variables, 
to resistance to temptation (Jackson, 1968; Kohlberg, 1976; 
Mischel and Mischel, 1976; Wright, 1971). This study includes 
an examination of the relationship of these kinds of variables 
to resistance to the temptation to steal with a population of 
educable mentally retarded children. 
Specifically, the main aim of the present study was to 
investigate educable mentally retarded children's behavioural 
and moral reasoning responses and cognitive processes in 
hypothetical temptation to steal situations. 
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CHAPTER 7 
METHOD 
7.1 SAMPLE 
The sample consisted of 83 educable mentally retarded 
children between 11 to 16 years of age, I.Q. 50 to 75, randomly 
selected from a population of 115 children attending special 
schools in the two major population centres of Tasmania (Hobart 
and Launceston). Parental permission was obtained for 108 of 
the children to be involved in the study. 
7.2 DESIGN 
Study I had two facets to it. The first part was 
concerned with an examination of educable mentally retarded 
children's behavioural and moral judgement responses in a series 
of hypothetical stealing dilemmas and real-life temptation to 
steal situations. 
The second part of Study I dealt with the cognitive 
processes of such children in the hypothetical stealing dilemmas. 
From data specifically relevant to Jackson's (1968) 
study and other research findings within the resistance to 
temptation framework a number of expectationswere held for Phase 
1 of this study. 
Phase 1 : It was expected that when children make a moral 
judgement, that is 'should do', response, they would exhibit a 
greater frequency of resistance responses than when they gave a 
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behavioural ('did do') response. Also it was anticipated that 
the nature of the temptation situations would significantly 
influence the children's behavioural, but not their moral 
judgement responses. Jackson (1968) found normal children 
resisted more in two situations as compared to the other six 
situations. While situational influences were expected it was 
recognised that other researchers had identified a few children who 
resisted in all situations and were known as categorical resisters 
(Haines, Jackson and Davidson, 1980). A similar result was 
anticipated with the educable mentally retarded children. It 
was further predicted, as was found by Jackson, that some would 
use legitimate alternative responses. • 
Phase 1 of this study sought to examine the following 
hypotheses and predictions. 
Hypotheses for Phase 1  
I. It was hypothesized that there would be a marked 
discrepancy between what children said they 'should do' (moral 
judgement measure) and what they said they 'did do' (behavioural 
measure) in a series of hypothetical stealing dilemmas. 
II. As a consequence of data obtained from studies on 
normal children (Haines, Jackson and Davidson, 1980; Jackson, 
1968) it was predicted that there would be variable responding 
across situations. That is, in some situations, namely 
Situations 1 and 4, they would be more likely to resist. 
III. No difference across situations was however predicted 
for the moral judgement response measure. 
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IV. It was further expected that there would be a 
significant difference between the children's resistance on the 
behavioural measure compared to the moral judgement measure for 
each of the eight situations. 
V. It was predicted from earlier research findings (Haines, 
Jackson and Davidson, 1980; Jackson, 1968) that a number of 
children would resist in all situations on both the moral 
judgement measure and behavioural measure. 
VI. It was expected that a number of children would use 
legitimate acquisition alternatives when resisting and that such 
legitimate acquisition responses would be greater on the moral 
judgement measure than on the behavioural measure. 
Two hypotheses relating to a series of independent 
variables: age, sex, socioeconomic status (SES), I.Q., general 
moral judgement, person and parental variables, and reflection/ 
efficiency, were postulated. 
VII. That the independent variables delineated above would 
all be significantly related to the dependent variable, 
resistance on the behavioural ('did do') measure. 
VIII. That these same independent variables would all be 
significantly related to the dependent variable, resistance on 
the moral judgement ('should do') measure. 
It was also of interest to examine the additive 
contribution that the independent variables would make to the 
dependent variables in Hypotheses VII and VIII. 
In order to examine the children's responses on the real-
life temptation stealing and cheating situations the following 
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hypotheses were tested : 
IX.That there would be a significant relationship 
between the children's resistance on the real-life temptation to 
steal situation, and the hypothetical temptation to steal 
situations. 
X. That there would be a significantly greater number of 
children who cheated compared to those who stole on the real-life 
temptation situations. 
XI. That there would not be a significant relationship 
between children's resistance on the temptation to cheat 
situation and either the real life temptation to steal situation 
or the hypothetical temptation to steal situations. 
Phase 2 : This section was confined to an analysis of children's 
cognitive processes on the JHTST. Jackson's (1968) analysis of 
normal children's cognitive processes in hypothetical temptation 
situations revealed two broad types of processing, intrinsic and 
extrinsic. 
Although Jackson (1968) referred to a right/wrong schema 
as intrinsic in orientation,data from the pilot studies indicated 
that the right/wrong schema may occupy a separate position. 
Therefore, it was analysed as such in this study. 
From a developmental perspective it was assumed that 
children would use extrinsic processes more than intrinsic or 
right/wrong processes on both the behavioural and moral 
judgement measures of the JHTST. 
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Jackson's (1968) profile of children's yielding responses 
revealed that in seven of his eight hypothetical temptation to 
steal situations most children used extrinsic cognitive processes. 
However, in one situation designed to evoke sympathy for the 
subject's little brother, most children used intrinsic cognitive 
processes. This type of finding may also occur with educable 
mentally retarded children. The children's resistance cognitive 
processes within each situation would be difficult to predict as 
the study is the first to quantitatively analyse the three 
different types of resistance cognitive processes. 
As children's yielding responses were expected to be 
greater on the behavioural measure than the moral judgement 
measure, and yielding responses are commonly motivated by 
extrinsic cognitive processes, it was assumed that the children 
would use more extrinsic processes on the behavioural measure 
compared to the moral judgement measure. Also since greater 
resistance was expected on the moral judgement measure it would 
seem reasonable to argue that each of the children's resistance 
cognitive processes would be used more on the moral judgement 
measure compared to the behavioural measure. 
Interactions between the behavioural and moral measures 
and the cognitive process categories was considered of research 
interest, although no direct expectations were held. 
Specific hypotheses have been set out to examine the above 
assumptions. 
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Hypotheses for Phase 2  
I. That there would be a significantly higher proportion 
of children using extrinsic compared to intrinsic yielding 
cognitive processes on both the behavioural ('did do') and moral 
judgement ('should do') measures. 
II. That there would be a significantly greater number of 
children using extrinsic compared to intrinsic or right/wrong 
resistance cognitive processes on both the behavioural and 
moral judgement measures. 
III. That there would be a significantly higher proportion 
of children who used extrinsic yielding cognitive processes on 
the behavioural measure compared to the moral judgement measure. 
IV. That there would be a significantly higher proportion 
of children who used extrinsic, intrinsic, and right/wrong 
resistance cognitive processes on the moral judgement measure 
compared to the behavioural measure. 
V. As a consequence of data reported by Haines, Jackson 
and Davidson (1980) and Jackson (1968), it was hypothesized from 
a situational analysis: (a) that significantly more children 
would use extrinsic compared to intrinsic processes in Situations 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 on both the behavioural and moral judgement 
measures; (b) that significantly more children would use intrinsic 
compared to extrinsic processes in Situation 7 on both the 
behavioural and moral judgement measures; (c) No specific 
hypotheses were derived for the situational comparison of the 
children's resistance cognitive processes. 
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7.3 PROCEDURE 
Measuring Instruments  
1. Data concerned with the variables age, sex, I,Q. and 
parental occupation were obtained from the current school records. 
2. Measure of Socio-economic Status (SES): Parental 
occupation was used as an index of SES. Specifically, the 
parents' occupations were located on the occupation distribution 
of the Australian workforce (Broom and Lancaster-Jones, 1976). 
Four categories were derived from this distribution: professional, 
managerial, and clerical occupations; skilled manual occupations; 
unskilled manual occupations; and a miscellaneous category, 
including agricultural positions and unemployed workers. The 
parents were allocated to one of these four categories. 
Other measures used in the study will be discussed 
separately, including the modifications to such measures 
indicated from the data derived from the pilot studies. Details 
of all measures are shown in Appendix I - A to F. 
Measures of Judgement and Behaviour in Stealing 
Situations: As indicated earlier Jackson (1968) had devised a 
test known as the Jackson Hypothetical Temptation to Steal Test 
(JHTST) to yield both a behavioural and a judgement measure. 
A description of this test is given below. 
Jackson's Hypothetical Temptation to Steal Test (JUST) 
Version I of the JHTST consists of eight hypothetical 
temptation to steal situations. The following is an example of 
one of the situations: 
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Test Situation 4. "One day at the football after nearly 
everybody had gone I was walking past the stand when I 
saw a small purse under the seat. I bent down and picked 
it up. When I opened it I found it had one dollar 
20 cents in it. There was a name on the flap but you 
couldn't read it very easily. I 
because 
Version 2 of the JHTST suggested by Haines (Jackson and 
Haines, 1980) utilizes the identical wording for each of the test 
situations with the exception of the last word of the test 
situation. In addition to the word "I" (where the subject is 
required to respond) the word "should" is added. The addition of 
this word offered an opportunity to assess the subject's moral 
judgement, that is, to state what s/he "should do". The 
validity of the "should do" version has been established in a 
study comparing "should do" and "did do" responses by the same 
subjects to the same test situation. These data indicate that 
normal subjects respond significantly differently to the two 
versions of the test; p< .001 (Jackson, 1978b). Version 1 of the 
test has been called the "did do" version, and Version 2, the 
"should do" version. 
The JHTST was originally constructed to be presented as a 
paper and pencil test. Since many of the educable mentally 
retarded children in the present study were not able to read and 
write the presentation of the test found applicable to normal 
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subjects needed to be changed. It was essential to preserve the 
characteristics of the original test such as anonymity, ease of 
comprehension and a recording mechansism. In addition to these 
aspects it was felt to be essential to (i) elicit further 
information upon the child's final response, and (ii) to probe 
for reasons for that response. 
To achieve this the eight hypothetical temptation to 
steal situations were sketched and put on slides so that each 
situation would be depicted in a concrete fashion (see Figure 2a & b). 
Separate male and female slides were made so that each child 
could identify with his/her own sex. 
To ensure anonymity the tester and the child were in 
separate rooms. This was done to minimise the experimenters' 
influence on the child's responding. The child was seated in 
front of a winged screen, to minimise distraction, on which the 
slides were projected (see Figure 3a). The slide projector 
was operated by a push button control held by the tester in the 
adjacent room (see Figure 3b). Communication with the child 
was via an audio link up by headphones. This allowed the tester 
to : 
(a) make sure the child could understand the temptation 
situations, 
(b) give the child a way of indicating his/her response, 
and (c) provide a means of probing the child's cognitive 
operations or 'reasons' for responding. 
All of the child's responses were automatically tape 
recorded via a small microphone attached to the headphones. 
FIGURE 2A The Lost Purse Situation 
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FIGURE 2b The Little Brother Situation 
FIGURE 3a Slide Presentation of the Temptation to 
Steal Situations to the Child 
FIGURE 3b Tester Orally Presenting the Temptation 
Situations and Recording the Child's 
Responses 
A validity study (Haines and Jackson, 1979) using normal 
subjects confirmed that the responses given to the audio/slide 
presentation did not differ in any significant way from those 
given in the paper and pencil situation. 
Scoring  
To assess reliability of scoring a random sub-sample of 
10 percent of all protocols was rated by two trained raters. 
Behavioural Responses: On the resistance or yielding 
behavioural response level there was an inter-rater reliability 
of r = 0.99. 
Cognitive Process Responses: Jackson (1968) divided 
children's cognitive processes into two broad categories, namely 
intrinsic and extrinsic. Previously Jackson (1968) had 
classified what he referred to as the 'right/wrong' schema 
within the intrinsic category. However the probing of children's 
responses in a small pilot sample with the present methodology 
provided data to indicate that the right/wrong schema could 
arguably be given a separate position. For example, when one 
child was asked why it was 'wrong', he replied, "Because you 
could get into trouble". More often, however, other children 
responded to the probe 'why is it wrong' by saying, "Because it 
is wrong". Further questioning elicited a similar type of 
response. 
The present research therefore has referred to three 
types of cognitive processes: intrinsic, extrinsic and right/ 
wrong (Jackson, 1978c). 
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Using a 10 percent sample of children's responses an 
analysis of their cognitive processes by two trained raters 
indicated an inter-rater reliability of r = 0.81. 
Jackson's Person and Parental Reaction Test (JPPRT): 
The JPPRT is a paper and pencil test which examines what 
children feel and think when in temptation to steal situations. 
The test is divided into PERSON factors and PARENTAL factors. 
The child is provided with a story stem and a choice between 
two story endings. An example of a probe and story endings 
on the PERSON factors are as follows: 
When I am tempted to steal (a) find it easy to decide 
something, I usually right from wrong. 
(b) find it difficult to 
decide right from 
wrong. 
An example of PARENTAL factor test items include: 
If ever I get caught for 
pinching, my mother usually 
(a) explains then smacks. 
(b) explains but does not 
smack. 
There are 10 PERSON, and 12 PARENTAL factors on the JPPRT. The 
child can score 1 or 0 on each factor. 
Jackson (1969) found that girls scored significantly 
higher on these types of variables compared to boys. Also girls 
obtained higher levels of resistance on the JHTST compared to 
boys. These data suggest a relationship between the JPPRT and 
the JHTST. 
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As many educable mentally retarded children could not 
read and write sufficiently to respond to the paper and pencil 
form of the JPPRT it was decided to represent pictorially the 
story endings, and to read these as well as the story stem to 
each child. The pictorial representations of the first example 
on the person and parental factors outlined above are presented 
in Figures 4(a,b) and 5(a,b) respectively. 
During the test administration the tester told the child 
that information s/he provided would be strictly confidential. 
Testing did not proceed until the child said he felt comfortable 
about doing the test. 
5. The Measure of 'General' Moral Judgement: Stephens 
has reported measures of moral judgement in a study relating to 
educable mentally retarded persons (Mahaney and Stephens, 1974). 
Earlier it was noted that the latest Kohlberg's Moral Judgement 
Scale was found to be unsuitable, however the measures used by 
Stephens were converted into a pictorial/verbal form and proved 
to be such that educable mentally retarded children could 
respond to them adequately. After extensive pilot sampling, two 
moral judgement measures were selected. For the purposes of 
distinguishing between these measures and Jackson's moral 
judgement ('should do') measures, the Stephens measures will 
hereafter be referred to as general moral judgement indices. 
The two general moral judgement measures chosen were: 
• (a) Collective Responsibility Test 
(b) Clumsiness and Stealing Test. 
Representation of a Boy Finding 
it Easy to Decide 'Right' from 
'Wrong' 
FIGURE 4a 
77,  
6 6'?? 
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Representation of a Boy Finding 
it Difficult to Decide 'Right' 
from 'Wrong' 
FIGURE 5a Representation of a Mother Who Explains 
Then Smacks 
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FIGURE 5b Representation of a Mother Who Explains 
But Does Not Smack 
69. 
(a) Collective Responsibility Test. Three stories were 
read to each child. A child was required to make a judgement 
concerning the justice of punishing an entire group for something 
one member had done. In some instances the identity of the 
wrongdoer was unknown. An example of one of the stories follows: 
"Some boys were playing football near a school. One 
boy kicked a ball. He broke a window in a house. A 
man came out of the house. He asked who broke the 
window. No-one said anything. The other boys did not 
tell on him. The man went and got the school 
principal." (Story 3). 
What should the principal do? 
"Whom should he punish? No-one? Or the whole 
class? Why?" 
To assist the child in comprehending the collective 
responsibility stories pictorial representations were provided. 
An illustration of the pictorial representation of the above 
example is given in Appendix I - C (Figure 42). 
Scoring: Each test item or story was scored on a four 
point scale. The child's score consisted of his/her average 
points scored across stories. 
(b) Clumsiness and Stealing Test. The aim of this 
measure was to establish if the child was more concerned about 
the intentions of the actor, or the material consequences of the 
action. The four stories were read in pairs. After each story 
the child was asked to repeat it before s/he was questioned on 
it. An example of one of the stories was: 
"la. Mother said to John, "Come and eat lunch". 
John went to eat his lunch. He went to pick 
up a glass of water. His arm banged into a 
tray of dishes. The dishes fell on the floor. 
Fifteen dishes broke. 
lb. Mother said to Henry, "Do not eat any cookies". 
As soon as mother left he ate some cookies. 
Henry dropped the cookie jar on the floor, and 
the cookie jar lid broke." (Story 1) 
Which of the two boys did worse? 
Why?" 
Pictorial representations of clumsiness and stealing 
stories were also constructed to facilitate the children's 
understanding of the stories. An example of Story 1 is given in 
Appendix 1- C (Figure 43a,b). 
Scoring: Each test item was scored on a three point scale. 
The child's score consisted of his/her average points scored 
across stories. 
6. A Measure of Reflectivity: As Jackson's (1968) data 
indicated that resisters showed more evidence of 'self-discussion 
and reflection' operation in their processing of hypothetical 
temptation to steal situations than yielders, it was reasoned 
that there may be a positive relationship between children's 
resistance in hypothetical temptation to steal situations and 
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reflectivity. One acceptable way to measure reflectivity has 
been by Kagan's Matching Familiar Figures Test (KMFFT). 
The children were administered the 'elementary' version of 
the KMFFT. Each child was shown both the stimulus item and the 
alternative array at the same time. The task was to match the 
stimulus item to the correct alternative. Latency of responses 
and accuracy was recorded for each child. 
Scoring: Recently Sal kind and Wright (1977) revealed 
methodological problems with the original scoring of the KMFFT and 
offered an alternative conceptualisation of the speed/accuracy 
domains of the test. They proposed two orthogonal constructs: 
impulsivity and efficiency. Impulsivity is defined as ranging 
from fast-inaccurate to slow-accurate performance, and efficiency 
from slow-inaccurate to fast-accurate performance. From this 
conceptualisation it was expected that reflection within 
Jackson's cognitive processing model would involve a slowing 
down of processing and therefore may be significantly related 
to the impulsivity construct, but not the efficiency construct. 
In analysing the impulsivity construct, large positive scores 
indicate impulsivity and large negative scores reveal reflectivity. 
In the efficiency domain large positive scores indicate 
inefficiency and large negative scores point to efficiency. 
On the general moral judgement indices and Kagan's Matching 
Familiar Figures tests a 10 percent random sub-sample of children's 
responses demonstrated an inter-rater reliability ranging from 
0.8 to 0.9. 
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7 . Real Life Stealing Test: To provide some form of 
measure of educable mentally retarded children's behaviour in a 
real temptation to steal context, a real life stealing test was 
included in the study. 
The stealing test was contrived along similar lines to 
Stephens self-control test (Moore and Stephens, 1974). 
Specifically the experimenter placed a dish of pre-counted candy 
in the room prior to the child's arrival. When the child came 
into the room the dish of candy was left on the desk. If the 
child referred to the candy the experimenter said that it 
belonged to another person who works in the room sometimes. 
After a period of working together the experimenter tells the 
child he has to leave the room for a couple of minutes. When he 
- returns he dismisses the child. He then counts the candy to 
see if the child has taken any (Appendix I - E). 
8. The Real Life.Cheating Test: The cheating test was 
proposed in order to allow for a comparison between children's 
cheating and stealing behaviour. Because this study dealt with 
educable mentally retarded children the available cheating tests 
were examined for their suitability. This examination suggested 
certain test limitations. These were: (a) the inability of 
mentally retarded subjects to handle the self-recording 
requirements of Grinder's (1961) ray-gun game; and their inability 
to count in a classroom cheating test described by Moore and 
Stephens (1974); (b) although the difficulty level of another 
cheating test was within the range of educable mentally retarded 
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children it presented other problems. Grinder's (1961) bean 
bag game was complicated with electrical circuitry and the need 
for a one way screen. Such complexities presented practical 
limitations which ruled against the use of the bean bag game. 
Because of the above limitations it was decided to 
construct a cheating test which educable mentally retarded 
children could easily operate and also offered few practical 
constraints. 
General Criteria for Apparatus Construction:  The criteria 
specified by Grinder, set out below, were generally accepted. 
Briefly, these criteria included: (a) a highly interesting and 
meaningful activity which made it easy to transgress and aroused 
no fear of coercion or detection; (b) a goal which was attainable 
by all subjects irrespective of skill differentials; (c) an 
objective recording system; (d) an apparatus easy to transport 
and operate in a familiar setting; and (e) an offer of the same 
incentive stimuli to all subjects. 
The following specifications for the construction of a 
cheating test adhered to the above general criteria as closely 
as possible. 
Characteristics of Apparatus: The following character-
istics for apparatus were drawn up. The apparatus was to consist 
of a sloping wooden tray and six ball-bearings held separately. 
On the surface plane of the tray there were (see Figure 6a): 
(a) two red dots placed at the beginning of the tray and 
placed either side of the centre of the tray; 
Er 
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FIGURE 6a Child Rolling Ball at the 'Cut-Out' Man 
FIGURE 6b Locking Mechanism To Stop the 
Bell Ringing 
(b) a further 12 cm down the tray from the red dots were 
two guiding pieces of wood (20 cm in length) one on either side 
of the tray, each pointing in toward the centre. There was a 
distance of 8 cm between the ends of the guiding rods; 
(c) Fifteen centimetres past the edge of the guiding rods 
and centred between the edges of the tray was a cut out figure 
representing a person (15 cm in height). Attached to the head 
of the cut out figure was a wire which held a small bell and was 
connected to a strip of wood set above the edge of the tray at 
the same height as the cut out 'man'; 
On the reverse side of the wooden tray (See Figure 6b) 
was: 
(d) a strong spring attached to the base of the cut out 
'man'; 
(e) a sliding metal clip which was capable of locking in 
beneath the base of the cut out 'man' preventing the backward 
movement of the cut out; and 
(f) when the clip was moved away from the base of the 'man' 
the cut out was able to move backwards upon impact and thereby 
ring the bell. 
At the base of the tray was a recess which could hold 
balls rolled down the tray and prevent their convenient removal. 
Method of Operating: The apparatus was introduced as a 
ball game the object being to hit the cut out 'man' hard enough 
to make the bell ring. 
The experimenter demonstrated the rules of the 'ball game'. 
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He took three balls and indicated that the starting position for 
rolling the balls was between the two red dots. He said the 
player only had three rolls to try and make the bell ring. The 
guiding rods were referred to as aids to help the player aim 
straight at the 'man' 
The experimenter used his first roll to demonstrate that 
by simply letting the ball gently roll onto the 'man' the bell 
did not ring. He used the remaining two balls to show that if 
the 'man' was hit harder the bell would ring and a prize could 
be won. 
The balls passing the 'man' or hitting the 'man' and 
rolling past it fell into the recess at the end of the tray. This 
was included so that the child could not roll more than three 
balls at the 'man'. 
The incentive stimuli for the game was consistent for all 
children and consisted of a choice between five jelly beans or 
one plastic animal if the bell rang. The choice was given to 
increase the desirability of the prize across children. 
After the demonstration, the experimenter pretended to 
check that the apparatus was working before the child was to have 
his turn. On this pretext he blocked the child's view of the 
'man' and put the metal catch in the locking position so that 
the 'man' would not move and thus the bell would not ring if 
the 'man' was hit by the ball. 
The experimenter then gave the child his three balls and 
indicated he had to go out for a minute but would come back 
shortly to •ask if the child had hit the 'man' and rung the bell. 
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The experimenter then left the room and listened to the 
child roll his three balls. Immediately following this the 
experimenter returned so that the child would not have an 
opportunity to manually try and move the 'man'. The experimenter 
asked had the child rung the bell. If s/he said s/he did s/he 
was given his/her prize. However the bell could only ring if 
the child physically rattled the bell (Appendix I - F). 
On both the cheating and stealing real life temptation 
measures the child either yielded or resisted. Scoring was 
carried out immediately after the child had been observed in the 
structured situation. From a 10 percent random sub-sample of 
children's responses an inter-rater reliability of 1.0 was 
revealed. 
Testing Personnel and Procedure  
Three trained experimenters, two female and one male, 
administered all measures in special testing rooms provided by 
the schools. Testing was conducted over a six week period. 
All children were tested individually. In order to avoid bias 
each of the three experimenters was randomly allocated approxi-
mately 27 children to test. 
On the first day of testing both versions of the JHTST 
were administered. Prior to test items being first presented 
every child was given two trial examples to ensure s/he understood 
the task commands, and to allow for some time for rapport to be 
established. As mentioned the experimenter and subject were in 
separate rooms and all responses were tape recorded for later 
analysis. 
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On the next day of testing the general moral judgement 
measures were presented individually to the child. The experi-
menter sat beside the testee and explained the test stories, 
each of which was pictorially represented to facilitate their 
comprehensibility. Following these tests the child was 
administered the cheating test. 
On the final day of testing the child was presented 
Kagan's Matching Familiar Figures test. The tester unobtrusively 
timed the child's responses with a stop-watch and immediately 
recorded the response latency and error number after each item. 
At the conclusion of this test the experimenter allowed the child 
to have a short break from testing. When the child came back 
to the testing room a bowl of smarties was positioned on the 
desk. Any questions by the child about the candy elicited the 
standard response that someone had come in whilst s/he was 
absent and left the candy there. In order to give the child a 
reason for staying in the room the experimenter asked the child 
to draw three pictures of his/her own choosing. After the first 
picture was drawn the tester made an excuse to leave the room 
for a couple of minutes. The child was left with the instruction 
to complete his drawings while the experimenter was absent. 
On his return the experimenter thanked the child for drawing the 
pictures and then dismissed him/her. 
Each date of testing was separated by at least three days. 
CHAPTER 8 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The data were analysed in two components 
Part I Educable mentally retarded children's responses in 
hypothetical stealing dilemmas and real-life temptation 
situations. 
Part II Educable mentally retarded children's cognitive processes 
in hypothetical temptation to steal situations. 
These two components of the obtained data will be analysed 
and discussed separately. The raw scores for the data for each 
measure in Part I are presented in Appendix II - A to C. 
8.1 PART I : EDUCABLE MENTALLY RETARDED CHILDREN'S RESPONSES  
IN HYPOTHETICAL STEALING DILEMMAS AND REAL-LIFE TEMPTATION  
SITUATIONS  
These data will be analysed in the following way: 
1. A comparison of children's resistance responses on the 
behavioural and moral judgement measures of the JHTST. 
2. A situation by situation analysis of the children's 
resistance responses on the behavioural and moral judgement 
measures of the JHTST. 
3. A comparison of the children's resistance responses on 
the behavioural and moral judgement measures of the JHTST 
situation by situation. 
4. An analysis of the relationship of the independent 
variables, age, sex, I.Q., SES, general moral judgement, 
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reflection-impulsivity/efficiency, and resistance on the 
moral judgement measure to the dependent variable - resistance 
on the behavioural measure, as well as the additive contribution 
the independent variables make to the variance of the dependent 
variable. 
5. An analysis of the relationship of the independent 
variables - age, sex, I.Q., SES, general moral judgement, 
reflection - impulsivity/efficiency, and resistance on the 
behavioural measure to the dependent variable - resistance on 
the moral judgement measure, as well as the additive contribution 
the independent variables make to the variance of the dependent 
variable. 
6. An analysis of the children's responses on the real-
life temptation tests. 
1. A Comparison of Children's Resistance Responses on the  
Behavioural ('did do') and Moral Judgement ('should do')  
Measures. of the JHTST. 
Consistent with the continuing interest of researchers in 
moral conduct and moral judgement, an analysis was performed on 
the children's resistance responses on the 'did do' and 'should 
do' measures. The results indicated that children obtained 
significantly higher mean resistance scores on the moral judgement 
as compared to the behavioural measure (means were 6.88 and 3.36 
respectively, related t test = 11.09, df = 82, p<.001). This 
finding suggested there was a significant discrepancy between 
what many children said they 'should do' compared to what they 
'did do'. Hypothesis 1 was therefore confirmed. 
2. A Situation by Sitaation Analysis.of the Children's Resistance  
Responses on the Behavioural ('did do') and Moral Judgement  
('should do') Measures of the JHTST. 
In order to further analyse both types of resistance 
responses, and to determine whether the situations influenced 
the children's responses, a situation by situation analysis was 
performed. The situation analysis of the behavioural and moral 
judgement responses will be discussed separately. 
Resistance Responses on the Behavioural Measure : 
situation by situation are shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
A Situation Breakdown of Children's Resistance Responses 
on the Behavioural Measure 
Situation 
Frequency of 
Subjects Resisting 
1. Given too much change by 
shopkeeper 51 
2. To board the bus without 
paying 33 
3. Peer influence to take 
Lifesavers 29 
4. Found purse 56 
5. Pocket knife in Woolworths 27 
6. Money in mother's draw 26 
7. Help little brother to get 
pocket knife 28 
8. Keep mother's change 29 
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An analysis of the responses in the various situation using 
the McNemar Test (1969) showed that children resisted significantly 
more in Situation 1 compared to Situations 2,3,5,6,7 and 8 
(z = 3.28, 3.7, 3.9, 4.36, 3,89 and 3.57 respectively; p<.01 
for all situations). A similar finding was derived when 
Situation 4 was compared to Situations 2,3,5,6,7 and 8 (z = 4.27, 
5,1, 4.9, 5.3, 4.8 and 4.33 respectively; p<.01). There was no 
significant difference between Situation 1 and 4 (z = 1.09; 
p>.05), or Situation 2 to 3,5,6,7 and 8 (z = 0.1, 1.42, 1.46, 
1.09 and 0,71 respectively; p>.05 for all situations); Situation 
3 to 5,6,7 and 8 (z = 0,63, 0,78, 0.24 and 0; p>.05 for all 
situations); Situation 5 to 6,7 and 8 (z = 0.33, 0.3 and 0.5 
respectively; p>.05 for all situations); Situation 6 to 7 and 8 
(z = 1.27 and 0.9 respectively; p>.05 for all situations); and 
Situation 7 to 8 (z = 0.22; p>,05). These findings supported 
Hypothesis II. 
Jackson (1968). found a similar high level of resistance 
in Situation 4 (found purse). He suggested that this was one 
temptation situation which teachers discussed with children even 
to the point of talking about the feelings of the one who had 
lost the money (Jackson, 1969), 
Penner et al (1976) stressed that a child's feelings 
toward the owner was a critical influence in determining how he 
would respond. This emphasis on the child's perception of the 
owner as being disadvantaged if someone stole from him may go a 
long way toward explaining the present findings of a significant 
degree of resistance in the 'keeping too much change from a 
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shopkeeper' (Situation 1) and the 'keeping a found purse' 
(Situation 4) situations. 
In contrast, it can be seen that in the big department 
store situations (Situations 5 and 7), and the bus situation 
(Situation 2) that it was harder for the children to identify 
with an owner. Also in the 'peer influence' situation (Situation 
3) it appeared that peer pressure may have overcome the child's 
feelings for the owner. In comparing the small store 
situation (Situation 3) to the big department store situations 
(Situations 5 and 7) it can be seen there was slightly greater 
resistance in the small store situation, a finding in line with 
Smigel's (1970) research. 
Several explanations have been offered for the high levels 
of stealing in the 'mother's drawer' situation (Situation 6) 
(Jackson, 1969). It was suggested that possibly the children 
had been successful in pilfering from parents in the past, or 
that children may perceive their parents as being less punitive 
than outside agents, and further that some children may have 
experienced faulty discrimination learning of intra-family 
'yours/mine' distinctions. All of these explanations appear 
relevant to the present study. 
The major implication from the situation by situation 
analysis of the data was that in Situations 1 and 4 where the 
owner was identifiable and a strategy of action had been taught, 
such as 'be fair to the owner', resistance to the temptation 
to steal was relatively high. It would appear therefore that 
training which stressed empathetic considerations, along with a 
cognitive awareness and concern for the owner would be likely 
to reduce stealing behaviour. 
Resistance Responses on the Moral Judgement Measure : 
situation by situation are shown in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
A Situation Breakdown of Children's Resistance Responses 
on the Moral Judgement Measure 
Situation Frequency of 
Subjects Resisting 
1. Given too much change by 
shopkeeper 69 
2. To board the bus without 
paying 71 
3. Peer influence to take 
Lifesavers 73 
4. Found purse 79 
5. Pocket knife in Woolworths 71 
6. Money in mother's draw 72 
7. Help little brother to get 
pocket knife 68 
8. Keep mother's change 68 
Using the McNemar Test as a means of analysis it was shown 
that there was no significant difference between Situation 1 to 
2,3,5,6,7 and 8 (z = 1.6, 0.89, 0.43, 0.66, 0.22 and 0.22 
respectively; p>.05 for all situations); Situation 2 to 3,5,6,7 
and 8 (z = 0.63, 0, 0.26, 0.78 and 0.69 respectively; p>.05 for 
all situations); Situation 3 to 4,5,6,7 and 8 (z = 1.73, 0.38, 
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0.33, 1.89 and 1.51. respectively; p>.05 for all situations); 
Situation 4 to 6 (z = 1.81; p>.05). While the children 
resisted significantly more in Situation 4 compared to 1,2,5,7 
and 8 (z = 2.67, 2.0, 3.1 and 2.52 respectively; p<.05 for all 
situations). These findings fail to confirm Hypothesis III. 
The most striking aspect of these findings was the 
overall high number of children resisting in each situation. 
These results suggest that most children had comprehended the 
social rule which prohibits stealing. The higher number of 
children resisting in Situation 4 relative to most of the other 
situations reflects the trend of almost complete resistance 
in Situation 4. 
3. A Comparison of the Children's Resistance Responses on the  
Behavioural ('did do') and Moral Judgement ('should do')  
Measures Situation by Situation on the JHTST. 
To further analyse the difference between behaviour and 
moral judgement, a situation by situation comparison of the 
children's responses was made. This comparison is graphically 
represented in Figure 7. 
When comparing the children's responses on each situation 
on the behavioural ('did do') measure to their responses on 
the corresponding situation on the moral judgement ('should do') 
measure, it was clear that the children resisted significantly 
more on each situation on the 'should do' measure (by the McNemar 
test, z = 3.18, 5.6, 6.22, 4.64, 6.14, 6.38, 5.9 and 5.82 
respectively for the eight situation comparisons; p ‹ .01 for all 
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situations). This result supported Hypothesis IV. 
However, inspection of the data indicated that 9 (10.8%) 
of the 83 children resisted across all hypothetical temptation 
situations both behaviourally and in their moral judgement 
responses. Such individuals were termed by Haines, Jackson and 
Davidson (1980) as categorical resisters. This finding, which 
supports Hypothesis V, suggested that a small number of 
children could resist consistently across situations and is 
similar to Hartshorne and May's (1928) finding. In this sample 
of educable mentally retarded children all of the categorical 
resisters were males, from across the I.Q., age, and socio-
economic range of the sample. A further group of 13 children 
(16%) were identified as categorical yielders on the behavioural 
measure of the JHTST. There was approximately equal represen-
tation of males (7) and females (6) in this group, although in 
terms of percentages these figures indicate that 11 percent of 
males were categorical yielders compared to 27 percent of 
females. 
As the cognitive processes that categorical resisters 
employ are of particular significance in this study they will be 
examined in the section on cognitive operations. 
Another feature of the data was the children's legitimate 
alternative responses. That is, after indicating resistance the 
child would elaborate on a ',Nay of getting his/her goal by 
socially acceptable or legitimate means. Nine children (6 males; 
3 females) used at least one legitimate acquisition response on 
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the behavioural measure across the eight situations on the 
JHTST. Jackson's data (1968) also suggested that only a few 
children spontaneously chose to use legitimate means to achieve 
their goal. 
When it came to the children's legitimate alternative 
scores on the moral judgement measure some 28 (33.7%) children 
used one or more legitimate alternative scores across the eight 
situations on the JHTST. A comparison of the children's 
legitimate alternative scores on the 'did do' and 'should do' 
measures indicated that the children used significantly higher 
mean legitimate alternative scores on the 'should do' measure 
(means were 0.18, 0.51 respectively; related t test = 3.095; 
df = 82; p<.01). Hypothesis VI was therefore confirmed. 
It is suggested that this finding may be explained by the 
argument that when the children are making an evaluative judge-
ment response they have fewer competing demands on their 
cognitive functioning by emotive factors compared to when they 
must make an actual behavioural response in a situation. This 
view holds that children have more cognitive power on the 
'should do' measure to apply to generating legitimate alternative 
responses than they do on the 'did do' measure. This explanation 
is consistent with the earlier finding of a significant relation-
ship between I.Q and the 'should do' measure, but not with the 
'did do' measure. 
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4. An Analysis of the Relationships of the Independent Vqridbles  
(IVs): Age, Sex, I.Q., SES, General Moral Judgement, Reflection  
- Impulsivity/Efficiency, Parent and Person Variables, and  
Resistance on the Moral Judgement Measure to the Dependent  
Variable (DV), Resistance on the Behaviour Measures, as Well as  
the Additive Contribution the IVs make to the Variance of the DV. 
J.B. Wilson's (1978) "Teddybear" Statistical Package was 
used for the correlations and multiple regression analysis, 
except where reference was made to specific tests. The results 
indicated that there were no significant correlations between the 
independent variables, age, I.Q., general moral judgement, 
impulsivity/efficiency, SES and the person and parent variables 
as measured by the JPPRT,and the dependent variable, behavioural 
resistance. For these variables Hypothesis VII was not 
supported. 
There was a significant relationship between the independent 
variable, sex, and the dependent variable (r pbis = 0.26; p<.05). 
Further analysis of the sex variable indicated that males 
resisted significantly more than females (t = 2.30; p‹.01; df = 81). 
Also there was a significant correlation between resistance on 
the moral judgement and behaviour measures (r = 0.23; p<.02). 
For these two variables Hypothesis VII was supported. 
The non significant findings suggested that within the age 
and I.Q. range of the sample, educable mentally retarded 
children's age, intelligence, general moral judgement level, 
impulsivity/efficiency, SES and the person and parent variables 
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on the JPPRT were not good predictors of the children's 
resistance on the 'did do' measure in the hypothetical 
temptation to steal situations. 
These data on age and I.Q. question the developmental 
nature of moral conduct (Moore and Stephens, 1974) and the 
relationship between cognitive competency and honesty (Hartshorne 
and May, 1928). However, it must be recalled that the I.Q. 
(50-75) and age (11-16) ranges within the present study are 
restricted. The general moral judgement data indicate that this 
type of thinking may bear little correspondence to the specific 
problem of stealing. It was expected that because Jackson (1968) 
found that resisters showed clearer evidence of self-discussion 
and reflection in their cognitive processing of a temptation to 
steal problem than yielders, that there may have been a 
significant relationship between reflectivity and resistance on 
the JHTST. This expectation was not realised. The lack of a 
significant relationship between the person and parental variables 
on the JPPRT and resistance on the JHTST was also not anticipated. 
This result may have been due to a methodological artefact. 
In Jackson's study (1968) the children responded to a paper and 
pencil version of the JPPRT. However, because of the 
inapplicability of this version of the test with the retarded, the 
experimenter sat with the child during the test administration to 
explain the test items. This procedure may have caused the 
children to make socially acquiescent responses. 
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Although the findings relating two of the independent 
variables, sex, and resistance on the moral judgement measure, 
to the dependent variable, resistance on the behavioural measure 
were statistically significant, they each accounted for only 
approximately 10 percent of the variance of the DV. This qualification 
must be considered when referring to these IVs as predictive 
variables of resistance in hypothetical temptation to steal 
situations. The finding of greater resistance by educable 
mentally retarded males compared to females is contrary to 
findings with normal children (Jackson, 1968; Wright, 1971). 
However, it must be stressed that no previous findings have 
been based on a sample of educable mentally retarded children. 
A replication study with educable mentally retarded children is 
therefore suggested. 
The results of a multiple regression analysis showed that 
additively all of the IVs accounted for only 18 percent of the 
DV. As the IVs account for a relatively small proportion of the 
variance of the DV, it is possible that a substantial part of 
the remaining variance may be accounted for by an interaction 
between a complex set of person and situation variables. 
5. An Analysis of the Relationships of the Independent Variables  
(as set out above) and Resistance on the Behavioural Measure to  
the Dependent Variable, Resistance on the Moral Judgement  
Measure as well as the Additive Contribution the Independent  
Variables Make to the Varianceof the Dependent Variable  
The findings indicated that there was no significant 
relationship between the IVs,- age, sex, SES, parental variables, 
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or impulsivity, and the moral judgement measure relating to 
clumsiness and stealing, to the dependent variable, resistance 
on the moral judgement measure. These results did not support 
Hypothesis VIII and suggested that high level resistance scores 
were not confined to a particular age or SES level, but were 
found across the age and socio-economic range within the sample. 
Also there was not a strong correlation between the parental 
variables on the JPPRT, and what educable mentally retarded 
children think they 'should do' in a set of hypothetical temptation 
to steal situations. 
Information on either the duration of the interval that 
educable mentally retarded children reflect on a match to sample 
type problem, or whether they focus on the intentions of the 
actor, as compared to the consequences of the action, both 
failed to operate as good predictors of resistance on the moral 
judgement measure. These findings were consistent with those on 
the 'did do' measure. The finding of no significant relationship 
between sex and resistance in the 'should do' measure, however, 
was counter to the results on the 'did do' measure. 
Taken together the results on the relationship between the 
sex and the 'did do' and 'should do' measures indicated that 
there was no significant difference between what boys and girls 
felt they 'should do' in hypothetical temptation to steal 
situations. When it came to what they 'did do' however, the 
boys resisted significantly more than the girls. That is, the 
correspondence between what the children said they 'should do' 
and 'did do' was higher for the boys than for the girls. 
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Small, but statistically significant correlations were 
found between resistance on the moral judgement measure and the 
IVs Cr = 0.31; p<.005), efficiency (r = 0.21; p<.05), person 
variables on the JPPRT (r = 0.26; p<.01), and the collective 
responsibility of general moral judgement (r = 0.31; p<.005). 
These results supported Hypothesis VIII and suggested that I.Q. 
was one predictive variable of resistance on the moral judgement 
measure. Also the children's accuracy or cognitive efficiency 
on match to sample problems, as well as their allocation of 
blame to the responsible party in a moral conflict, were both 
significantly correlated to resistance on the moral judgement 
measure. Person variables, such as "finding it easy to distinguish 
'right' and 'wrong'", were also related to what children thought 
they 'should do'. Overall the above findings reflect the role 
that cognitivecompetency plays in resistance on the moral 
judgement measure. These results are also consistent with the 
relationship other researchers have found between cognitive 
functioning and moral judgement (Kohlberg, 1976a;Mischel and 
Mischel, 1976). 
The results of a multiple regression analysis of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable showed that 
additively the IVs account for 26 percent of the variation of 
the DV resistance on the 'should do' measure. This result 
shows that the IVs account for more of the variance on the 
'should do' measure (26%) compared to the 'did do' measure (18%). 
The fact that these independent variables accounted for less 
than a third of the variance of resistance on the behavioural 
or moral judgement measures suggests that another complex set 
of variables may account for a large proportion of the variance 
of resistance on the 'did do' and 'should do' measures of the 
JHTST. 
Analysis of the Real-life Temptation Situations. 
• The real-life temptation situations included a stealing 
and cheating test. The results of these two tests have been 
analysed and discussed separately. 
The Stealing Test. From the sample of 83 educable mentally 
retarded children 16 (19%) stole one or more smarties (lollies) 
from the bowl when the experimenter was absent from the room. 
Of these 16 children, 12 were males and 4 females. Proportion-
ately this represented approximately the same degree of stealing 
among males and females. A point biserial correlation test, 
however, found no significant relationship between stealing and 
sex (rpbis = 0; p.05). In order to examine the developmental 
nature of stealing an analysis between age and stealing was 
performed. This analysis revealed a significant relationship 
between age and stealing (r = 0.21; p<.05). This finding is 
consistent with Moore and Stephens' (1974) developmental 
research conclusions. 
• An analysis of the children's resistance scores on the 
'did do' measure compared to their real-life stealing behaviour 
indicated there was no significant relationship between the two 
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variables. Hypothesis IX was thus not confirmed. The discrepancy 
between the 'did do' measure and the real-life stealing test may 
arise from the limitations of the real-life measure. 
Further analysis of the real-life temptation situation 
indicated that 5 of the stealers were categorical yielders 
(3 males, 2 females), and only one (male) was a categorical 
resister on the behavioural measure of the JHTST. The difference 
between categorical yielders and resisters in the real-life 
stealing situation was assessed using Fishers Exact test. There 
was no statistical significant difference (p>.05). However, 
38.5 percent of the categorical yielders stole candy as compared 
to only 11 percent of the categorical resisters. In previous 
research Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1980) found that all six 
categorical resisters on the JHTST resisted in a real-life 
temptation to steal situation. A number of considerations must 
be taken into account in comparing these two research findings. 
Firstly, in the earlier study the real-life temptation 
situation was designed to be very similar in terms of the context 
and temptation stimuli to that used in one of the hypothetical 
situations in the JHTST. In contrast, in the current study there 
was no obvious similarity between the context, or temptation 
stimuli in the real-life situation as compared to any of the 
hypothetical situations in the JHTST. 
• Secondly, the earlier study involved normal children. This 
may account for some differences, and at least suggests the need 
for replications with both groups of children. 
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Thirdly, the difference between the results of the two 
studies is really quite arbitrary. The difference is represented 
by only I out of 9 educable mentally retarded categorical 
resisters stealing candy as compared to none of the 6 normal 
categorical resisters 'keeping found money'. 
On balance therefore the categorical resister label 
generated from the JHTST could be regarded as having a degree of 
predictive validity, at least in terms of real-life situations 
which are similar to those hypothetical situations used in the 
JHTST. 
The Cheating Test  
Forty (48%) educable mentally retarded children cheated 
on the 'ball game'. Of these there were 31 (50%) males and 
9 (41%) females. Analysis of the correlations between the 
independent variables, sex, age, SES, I,Q., general moral 
judgement, parent and person variables scores, resistance 
scores on the behavioural and moral judgement measures to the 
dependent variable, cheating, indicated that there was no 
significant relationship between the IVs and the DV. 
As hypothetical temptation to steal behaviour and cheating 
represent clearly different types of responding it was not 
unexpected that there was not a significant relationship 
between the two measures. This result supported Hypothesis X. 
A significant relationship between cheating: I,Q., age, 
and sex may have been expected from other research findings. 
However, it must be recalled that the age and I.Q. of the sample 
were somewhat restricted (age range, 11 to 16 years, I.Q. 50 to 
75). 
Further analysis of the cheating test indicated that 
5 cheaters were categorical yielders (3 males, 2 females), and 
4 were categorical resisters on the JHTST. Also a comparison of 
the children's responses or the real-life temptations revealed 
that significantly more children cheated as compared to those who 
stole (McNemar test, p<.05) and also there was no significant 
relationship between stealing and cheating. These findings 
supported Hypothesis XI and the research literature which 
suggests there is not a significant relationship between 
children's responses in the moral behaviour domains (Lickona, 
1976). 
A direct comparison between the real-life cheating and 
stealing tests must be qualified by the fact that in the cheating 
test the children had the opportunity of two kinds of 
temptation stimuli, candy and plastic toys, while in the stealing 
test candy was the only temptation stimulus. 
Conclusion  
The major finding of this part of the study was that 
there was a significant discrepancy between the children's 
resistance on the moral judgement ('should do') measure compared 
to the behavioural ('did do') measure in each situation and 
across the eight temptation to steal dilemmas as measured by the 
JHTST. 
It was concluded from these results that most of the 
children had acquired some form of the social rule prohibiting 
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stealing, but had not acted consistently in accord with that 
rule. This conclusion had to be qualified however by the 
finding that a small number of the children, termed categorical 
resisters, resisted in all situations. The suggestion was made 
that the finding of categorical resistance provided important 
data for the specificity/generality debate. 
A situation by situation analysis of the children's 
behavioural responses indicated that a significantly greater 
proportion of the sample resisted in Situations 1 and 4 ('too 
much change from shopkeeper', and 'found purse') when compared to 
the remaining six situations. This difference between Situations 
1 and 4 and the remaining situations on the JHTST was discussed 
in relation to Jackson (1969) and Penner et al's (1976) notion 
that the child's consideration for the owner played an important 
role in the child's decision to resist or yield to the temptation 
to steal. 
An examination of the children's moral judgement response 
to each hypothetical situation indicated high levels of resistance 
in every situation with almost ubiquitous resistance in 
Situation 4. 
Additional analysis revealed that the independent 
variables, age, I.Q., SES, general moral judgement, person and 
parent variables and reflection, were not significantly related 
to the dependent variable, behavioural resistance, whereas the 
independent variables, sex and moral judgement resistance, were 
significantly related to the dependent variable and were 
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regarded as the best predictors of behavioural resistance. 
Interestingly it was found that males resisted significantly 
more than females. This result differs from other findings in 
the literature with normal children. It was also found that 
the independent variables accounted for only 18 percent of the 
variance of the dependent variable, resistance on the behavioural 
measure. 
When it came to the independent variables related to the 
dependent variable, moral judgement resistance, it was found 
that the independent variables, age, sex, SES, parental 
variables, impulsivity/efficiency and the clumsiness and stealing 
measure, were not significantly related to the dependent 
variable, while the independent variables, I.Q., person variables 
and collective responsibility, were significantly related to the 
dependent variable, moral judgement resistance. It was further 
found that the independent variables accounted for only 26 percent 
of the variance of the dependent variable. 
The children's responses to the real-life temptation 
situations revealed a significant relationship between age an0 
stealing, but not between age and cheating. The children cheated 
significantly more than they stole, while there was no significant 
relationship between cheating and stealing in the real-life 
temptation situations. These results emphasise the situational 
specificity of responding within moral domains. 
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8.2 PART II : EDUCABLE MENTALLY RETARDED CHILDREN'S COGNITIVE  
PROCESSES IN HYPOTHETICAL TEMPTATION TO STEAL SITUATIONS  
The present study has followed Jackson's conceptualization 
of the nature of stealing as consisting of a temptation phase, 
involving cognitive activity, and outcome phase which indicates 
the child's decision to resist or yield. As these two phases 
are functionally related it would seem critical to examine 
the kinds of cognitive processes educable mentally retarded 
children use to influence their decision to resist or yield. 
An examination of the cognitive processes will be based on 
an analysis of the data across situations and within situations. 
The raw data and means for the following measures will be reported 
in Appendix II - D to G. 
1. An Across Situations Analysis  
The 'reasons' for a yielding response were divided into 
either 'intrinsic' or 'extrinsic' cognitive process categories, 
while the 'reasons' for a resisting response could involve 'intrinsic' 
'extrinsic' or 'right/wrong' cognitive process categories. The 
data for the yielding and resistance cognitive process categories 
were obtained by counting the type of cognitive processes a child 
used to resist or yield in each situation, and then averaging 
these scores using the eight situations when an analysis of means 
was required. This analysis will involve a separate discussion 
of the children's resistance and yielding cognitive processes. 
(i) Yielding Cognitive Processes. A situational presenta-
tion of the children's yielding cognitive processes on both the 
'did do' and 'should do' measures is shown in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
Frequency of Yielding Responses on the 'Did Do' and 'Should 
Do' Measures by the 83 Children Classified by Type of 
Cognitive Process 
(I) 
I 	LLI C) 	I 
CO CL 	P-4 
C:) 
Li— 1--1 (1) C—) (1) 
C) C3 V) 	(I) 
U— LU 
>— LLJ 
(-) 	CD 
>- 	LU 
LU 
Cr 	(r I-- LLI 
LLJ C—) 
LL— o'D CI— CO I-- 
1 2 3 
SITUATIONS 
4 5 6 7 8 
'Did D6' 
Measure 
Extrinsic 
Intrinsic 
30 
2 
50 
0 
54 
0 
27 
0 
55 
1 
57 
0 
11 
44 
54 
0 
'Should Do' 
Measure 
Extrinsic 
Intrinsic 
8 
6 
12 
0 
9 
0 
4 
0 
12 
0 
11 
0 
6 
9 
15 
0 
From the above table it is clear that across situations 
children used more 'extrinsic', compared to 'intrinsic' schemata or 
cognitive processes on both the 'did do' and 'should do' measures. 
In order to test this observation and to examine the interaction 
between the measures and the cognitive processes a 2 x 2 ANOVA 
analysis of variance was performed with repeated measures over 
subjects (Appendix II - H). The analysis revealed significant main 
effects •and a significant interaction : 
'Did' vs 'Should' , F(1,82) = 108.64 pl.001 
'Extrinsic' vs 'Intrinsic' F(1,82) = 215.92 lx.001 
Interaction F(1,82) = 78.02 ' 
Accordingly Duncan's New Multiple Range Tests (1955) were performed 
to examine differences between means. The means of the cognitive 
processes are shown in Figure 8. The mean for extrinsic processes 
was significantly greater than the mean forlintrinsic processes in 
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both the behavioural ('did do') and moral judgement ('should do') 
measures (t = 16.1, p<.0001; t = 3.6, p<.001). 
With the extrinsic processes the behavioural measure had a 
significantly higher mean than the moral judgement measure (t = 14.37, 
p‹.0001), however with the intrinsic processes the trend was in the 
same' direction but did not achieve statistical significant (t = 1.88, 
p > .05). The interaction shows that the difference between the 
'did' and 'should' measures for the extrinsic processes was 
significantly greater than the corresponding difference for 
intrinsic processes. 
Overall the results demonstrate that children use 
predominantly extrinsic motives to yield whether it can be on the 
behavioural or moral judgement measure and also that they use more 
extrinsic processes on the 'did' compared to 'should' measures. 
These findings supported Hypotheses I and III. 
(ii) Resistance Cognitive Processes. A situational 
presentation of the children's cognitive processes on the 'did' 
and 'should' measures is shown in Table 4. 
In order to compare the data shown in the above table a 
2 (did/should) x 3 (right/wrong, extrinsic, intrinsic) analysis of 
variance was performed with repeated measures over subjects (Appendix 
II - I). The analysis revealed significant main effects and a 
 
significant interaction : 
'Did' vs 'Should' 
Intrinsic vs Extrinsic 
vs Right/Wrong 
Interaction 
F(1,82) 
F(2,146) 
F(2,164) 
= 
= 
= 
106.66 
26.92 
3.55 
p<.001 
p<.001 
v.05 
It should be noted that the F value just fails to exceed the very 
conservative Greenhouse and Geisser (Winer, 1971) criterion of 
F' 09=3.96, p<.05. Since it did however exceed the Greenhouse and 
Genser criterion F'82=277' p=
'
10 level, it seems reasonable to 
interpret the effect as meaningful. 
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TABLE 4 
Frequency of Resistance Responses on the 'Did Do' and 'Should Do' 
Measures by the 83 Children Classified by Type of Cognitive Process 
1 2 3 
SITUATIONS 
4 5 6 7 8 
U_ 
UJ 	V' 
C-) V') U-1 V) 
UJ 	LLI 
›- C.) 
V) 	CC 
Ce CC) 
LL 	W 
>- 
L.L.1 V) V) C.D 
LU LU 
CC CC (-) 
Li- 
'Did Do' 
Measure 
Right/ 
Wrong 
Extrinsic 
Intrinsic 
44 
4 
3 
15 
17 
1 
19 
10 
0 
23 
7 
26 
17 
9 
1 
11 
9 
6 
20 
4 
4 
6 
19 
4 
'Should Do'
Measure 
Right/ 
Wrong 
Extrinsic 1 Intrinsic 
49 
16 
4 
36 
32 
3 
33 
35 
5 
25 
13 
41 
32 
31 
8 
22 
34 
16 
32 
25 
11 
24 
33 
11 
Therefore Duncan's New Multiple Range Tests were performed 
to examine the differences between means. The means of the 
cognitive process are shown in Figure 9. On the 'did do' measure 
the mean for right/wrong processes was significantly greater than 
the extrinsic or intrinsic processes (p<.05). While there was no 
significant difference between the extrinsic and intrinsic processes 
(p>.05). On the 'should do' measure both the right/wrong and 
extrinsic processes were significantly greater than the intrinsic 
processes (p<.05). These results failed to support Hypothesis II. 
Although not specifically hypothesised it was of research 
interest to compare the processes or schemata between the measures. 
By means of the t test statistic it was found that the mean scores 
on each of the cognitive schema on the 'should do' measure were 
significantly greater than those on the 'did do' measure 
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(right/wrong, t = 4.39, p<.0001; extrinsic, t = 6.2, p<.0001; 
intrinsic, t = 2.44, p<.01). This result indicated a significant 
mean increase from 'did do' to 'should do' in each cognitive 
processing category. Hypothesis IV was therefore supported. 
As mentioned another finding from the 2 x 3 ANOVA was a 
significant interaction between the 'did do' and 'should do' 
measures and the cognitive processes (F 2,164 = 3.55, p<.05) 
To investigate this interaction an orthogonal partitioning 
procedure was adopted (Appendix II - I). The differences between 
the behavioural ('did do') and moral judgement ('should do') 
measures were compared. The difference was significantly greater 
for extrinsic processes than for intrinsic processes (F 1,164 
= 7.09, p<.01). The difference for the right/wrong category was 
intermediate and not significantly different from the difference 
for either extrinsic or intrinsic processes (F 1,164 = 1.65; 
F 1,164 = 1.9, p>.05 respectively). 
In summary, the findings on the resistance cognitive 
processes within and between the 'did do' and 'should do' 
measures were as follows : 
(1) On the 'did do' measure the children used the right/ 
wrong category significantly more than the extrinsic or 
intrinsic categories. There was no significant difference 
between the extrinsic and intrinsic processes. On the 'should 
do' measure the children used the intrinsic category significantly 
less than the right/wrong or extrinsic schemata. However, there 
was no difference between the right/wrong and extrinsic 
processes. 
(2) There was a significant mean increase from the 'did 
do' to the 'should do' measure on each cognitive category, and 
(3) The mean increase from 'did do' to 'should do' on the 
extrinsic category was significantly greater than in the 
intrinsic category. The right/wrong category was not 
significantly different from the difference for either extrinsic 
or intrinsic processes. 
2. A Within Situation Analysis  
It was expected that within situations the children 
would tend to use one type of cognitive process more than 
another to motivate their yielding or resistance responses. 
To test this expectation on both the 'did do' and 'should do' 
measures, cognitive processes were compared in pairs to a 
theoretical chance distribution using a binomial statistic 
as a means of analysis. 
An examination of the children's cognitive processes 
will involve a separate analysis of the (a) behavioural 
measure, and (b) moral judgement measure. 
(a) The Behavioural Measure. An analysis of the 
resistance and yielding cognitive processes will be discussed 
separately. 
107. 
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(i) Yielding Cognitive Processes. A graphic representation 
of the yielding cognitive processes, situation by situation, 
follows (see Figureld. 
An analysis of the children's extrinsic compared to 
intrinsic yielding processes situation by situation shows that on 
situations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 the children used significantly 
more extrinsic 'reasons' for yielding (p<.001 for all situations). 
In contrast, in Situation 7 the children used significantly more 
intrinsic 'reasons' for yielding (p<.05). 
In a qualitative analysis of his data, Jackson (1968) also 
identified that most children used extrinsic 'reasons' or motives 
for yielding. However, in the one situation Jackson designed to 
arouse emphathy (the little brother situation) he found that most 
children revealed a concern for others even though they made a 
yielding response. The data in this study also showed a similar 
trend to that of Jackson's, and indicated that most of the 
educable mentally retarded children in the little brother situation 
(Situation 7) used predominantly intrinsic 'reasons' for stealing. 
The following is an example of one of the children's responses: 
I "took it and give to him cause he had lost the 
one mum give him for his birthday" 
(Child C.C.; Story 7) 
The findings from these cognitive operations clearly demon-
strate that the nature of the situation has a strong influence on 
the type of cognitive orientation the child uses when he yields. 
The results supported Hypotheses V(a)(b). 
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(ii) Resistance Cognitive Processes. A profile of the 
three kinds of resistance processes the educable mentally retarded 
children used in each situation on the JHTST is depicted in 
Figure 11. 
An analysis of Situation 1 demonstrated that the right/wrong 
reference was used significantly more than either the extrinsic or 
intrinsic motives for resistance (p<.001 for each comparison). 
'A similar result was found in Situation 7 (p<.01 for each comparison). 
Also there was no significant difference between the number of 
extrinsic and intrinsic cognitive operations used in either 
Situation 1 or 7 (p>.05 for both situations). There was no 
significant difference between the number of right/wrong and 
extrinsic motives for resistance in Situation 2, 3 and 5 (p›.05 
for all situations). However, the children used significantly more 
right/wrong and extrinsic frames of reference compared to intrinsic 
motives in Situation 2 and 3 (p<.001 for each comparison within the 
situations) and 5 (p<.001 on the right/wrong comparison to 
intrinsic, and p<.02 on the extrinsic to intrinsic). 
An analysis of Situation 4 indicated that there was no 
significant difference between the number of right/wrong and 
intrinsic frames of reference (p<.05) while both the right/wrong 
and extrinsic were used significantly greater than intrinsic 
processes (p<.01 for both comparisons). 
In Situation 6 there was no significant difference between 
right/wrong and extrinsic and intrinsic processes (p›.05 for each 
comparison). 
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
S
u
b
j
e
c
t
s
 
U
s
i
n
g
 
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
R
e
s
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
.
 
C
o
g
n
i
t
i
v
e
 
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
e
s
 
i
n
 
E
a
c
h
 
S
i
t
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
7:
1 
-n
 
M
 
C
 
a
 u
)
 c
 
mr
ml
-m
 
-
= 
O
r
)
 
CD
 
o
 
n 
0
 
= 
c-
) 
r
t 
aa
 
=-
 =
 
CD
 
C
, 
<
 0
 
▪
M
  c
i-
 
0
_
 0
 
C
, 
0
 0
 0
 
- 
0
 
M
 =
 
3
 0
 (
.0
 
M
 
0
 
M
 
c
i 
0
 
0
 
m
 =
 m
 
P
1
 
CD
 = 
C)
 (-1
- 
=7
 
The Ei gh t Hypotheti cal Temptati on to S teal Si tuati ons 
112. 
An examination of Situation 8 revealed that the children used 
significantly more extrinsic compared to intrinsic processes (p<.01) 
while there was no significant difference between extrinsic and 
right/wrong (p>.05), right/wrong and intrinsic (p>.05). 
Inspection of Situation 1 revealed that the term 'too much' 
is presented twice. Some children could conceivably resist and 
then simply recall the 'too much' term to explain why they 
resisted. A re-designing of Situation 1 may be necessary. An 
empirical comparison between the original Situation 1 and the 
redesigned version may help to tease out the effect that the wording 
in the original Situation 1 has on the children's resistance 
cognitive processing. 
In Situation 7 (little brother), like Situation 1, 
significantly more children used a right/wrong frame of reference 
compared to extrinsic or intrinsic frames of reference. A reason 
for the low extrinsic processing may be found in the argument that 
the fear of consequences is not a major consideration for the child 
as s/he has no personal need to steal the knife. Low intrinsic 
processing may have resulted because the child was more concerned 
about his/her brother than the owner. Accordingly children may have 
used the impersonal and general notion that stealing is wrong, 
rather than trying to attach a clearer or more fundamental reason 
as to why it is wrong. 
In Situations 2 (bus situation), 3 (Life-savers situation), 
5 (Coles store situation), most children used basically either an 
extrinsic or right/wrong schema to resist. These three types of 
113. 
situations would seem to be regularly occurring situations in 
most children's experience. In all probability most children would 
have either personally or vicariously experienced the consequences 
of being caught in these kinds of situations. The substantial degree 
of resistance relating to extrinsic considerations is therefore not 
unexpected. As suggested, the right/wrong schema responses may be 
accounted for by the inability to express a clear orientation, or 
by unsophisticated notions of resistance, or by the children's 
use of summary statements referring to a 'wrongness' of stealing 
concept. 
The small number of intrinsic responses may be explained by 
the difficulty in those situations of identifying an owner for whom 
to show consideration. 
Again in Situation 4 a substantial proportion of the 
sample used the right/wrong schema. However, an even higher 
proportion of children used an intrinsic schema to resist. A 
typical example of an intrinsic frame of reference was : 
"I'd give it to the owner because it's their money 
they lost it" 
(Child J.D., Story 4) 
This type of consideration of the owner response becomes more under-
standable when it is recognised that the situation is highly 
personalised with an identifiable owner. The child can readily 
empathise with the owner's plight. 
Situation 8 represents a situation of high detectability. 
Consistent with this interpretation, an analysis of the children's 
114. 
cognitive processes revealed that the majority used an extrinsic 
frame of reference in resisting the temptation to steal. An 
example of a child's extrinsically motivated response follows : 
"Don't worry about the drink ... in case mother finds 
out, she might come shopping one day and say 30¢ and 
go really mad and smack" 
(Child J.C., Story 8) 
The above typical example reflects the child's concern that his 
mother may detect his misdemeanor on a future shopping trip. In 
this type of situation the child could never be sure when his 
mother would find out. The time delay between the child's yielding 
and possible discovery may be lengthy. The thought of this type 
of aversive consequence may be sufficient to generate enough 
anticipatory anxiety to motivate the child to use a fear of 
consequences schema in resisting the urge to steal. 
A separate situation by situation analysis of categorical 
resisters' cognitive operations presented a similar profile of 
resistance strategies as that represented by the overall sample 
(see Figure 12). 
In summary, the above situational analysis of educable 
mentally retarded children's cognitive processes in hypothetical 
temptation to steal situations as assessed by the 'did do' measure 
on the JHTST indicated the kinds of influences the situation per se, 
has on responding. This finding is generally consistent with other 
research conclusions in the resistance to temptation literature 
(Hartshorne and May, 1928; Jackson, 1968; Mischel and Mischel, 1976). 
91\102iMi1H9H 
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However, these other research reports, with the exception of 
Jackson (1968), had not focused on the children's cognitive 
processes, but rather on their end responses. 
Given the very high number of children using right/wrong 
strategies in Situation 1, it would appear that factors in 
addition to an understanding, but inability to express a clear 
resistance orientation, or a child's unsophisticated level of 
resistance, or his/her use of a selective no stealing summary 
statement are operating in Situation 1. These factors include 
situation specific considerations and possible methodological 
artefacts. 
In relation to the situation specific considerations, the 
child may have learned to regard buying 'cakes' from a shopkeeper 
in transactional terms. That is, the child sees the item as having 
a fixed price which s/he must pay to complete the transaction. 
If, as in Situation 1, the shopkeeper makes a mistake and gives too 
much change, the child may feel it is right in terms of the correct-
ness of the transaction to point out the error, even though s/he is 
tempted to keep the extra change. In this interpretation the child 
may imply it would be wrong to take the extra change because it 
would not be an equitable transaction. In this sense the right/ 
wrong frame of reference refers to the transaction per se, and is 
distinguishable from extrinsic and intrinsic frames of reference. 
Also some children's reference to the typical 'too much' 
change statement as an explanation of why they resisted may, in 
part, be due to a methodological artefact. In order to discuss 
this point, Situation 1 will be presented : 
117. 
"One day your mother gave you 40 cents and sent you down to 
the shop to buy some cakes. The cakes cost 35 cents but 
when the shopkeeper gave you the change he handed you 10 
cents which was of course 5 cents too much. (OK?) You 
looked at the change and knew there was too much." 
(Situation 1). 
Overall, the above analyses suggest that the nature of the 
situations not only influences the type of response, but also the 
kinds of cognitive operations the children use to resist. In 
Situation 1 where the shopkeeper gives the child 'too much change' 
a typical 'reason' for resistance given by children was, "I did not 
take it because it was too much". 
Experimenter probing of this type of response often led to 
a circular chain of interchanges between the child and the experi-
menter, with the child often ending up by saying he did not take 
the 'too much change' because it was 'too much'. This type of 
response was coded as a right/wrong frame of reference. The child 
may not have been able to express a clear extrinsic or intrinsic 
'reason', or may simply have been operating at an unsophisticated 
or early developmental level where he could recognise stealing as 
'wrong', but could not really define why it was 'wrong'. This may 
be a type of habit response. This kind of response may be found in 
very young children who are told by their mother, for instance, not 
to take lollies from the shop because "it is wrong". If the mother 
either did not tell the child why stealing is wrong, or if she did, 
but the child could not understand the explanation, it is likely 
118. 
when the child confronts a similar situation that s/he would say 
s/he would resist simply because stealing is 'wrong'. Further 
questioning may not budge him/her from this response. This is 
really a type of conditioned response and has been regarded by 
Aronfreed (1976) as representing a cognitive label with an 
attached anxiety loading. 
Alternatively, some children may have used a summary 
statement, such as, "it'sstealine or "it's naughty" as sufficient 
reason to explain why they resisted. These children therefore may 
have been able to supply a clear orientation response but felt that 
this kind of summary statement was what they actually used to motivate 
their resistance response. 
(b) The Moral Judgement Measure. An analysis of the resistance 
and yielding processes will be discussed separately. 
(i) Yielding Cognitive Processes. A graphic representation 
of the yielding cognitive processes situation by situation follows. 
(see Figure 13). 
An analysis of the children's extrinsic compared to intrinsic 
yielding processes situation by situation revealed that on 
Situations 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8 the children used significantly more 
extrinsic 'reasons' for yielding (p<.01 for all situations), while 
in Situation 1, 4 and 7 there was no significant difference in 
cognitive processes (p>.05 for all situations). This finding lent 
some support to Hypothesis V(a)(b). 
In most of the situations therefore significantly more of 
those children who judged that they should yield used extrinsic 
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'reasons' to motivate their judgement. This finding is similar to 
that found from the data on the children's yielding cognitive 
processes on the behavioural measure. Although the difference 
between extrinsic and intrinsic cognitive processes was not 
significantly different from what would have been expected by 
chance in Situations 1, 4 and 7, the trend in each of these 
situations approximates the results found on the corresponding 
situations on the behavioural measure. Overall, therefore, a 
similar conclusion from the data on the children's yielding 
cognitive processes on both the 'did do' and 'should do' measures 
emerges. Namely, that although in most situations the child will 
focus on extrinsic concerns to motivate his/her yielding behaviour 
and moral judgement, situations can be contrived to reverse this 
trend. 
(ii) Resistance Cognitive Processes. A profile of the 
three kinds of resistance processes the educable mentally retarded 
children used in each situation is presented in Figure 14. 
An analysis of the schemata in Situation 1 indicated that 
most children who resisted said they should not keep the excess 
change because it was 'wrong'. Significantly more children used 
the right/wrong strategy processes compared to those using an 
extrinsic or intrinsic 'reason' to resist (p<.001 for each comparison). 
These data showed that relatively few children used moral 
judgement processing which was oriented toward a concern for the 
shopkeeper, or fear of consequences, although extrinsic processes 
were used significantly more than intrinsic (p<.05). 
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In Situations 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 there was no significant 
difference between the number of children using right/wrong compared 
to extrinsic motives for resisting (p>.05 for all situations). 
The children used significantly more right/wrong compared to 
intrinsic processes in Situation 2, 3, 5 and 7 (p‹.01 for all 
situations). 
In Situation 8 there was no significant difference between 
right/wrong and extrinsic processing scores (p>.05). 
The extrinsic processes were used significantly more than 
intrinsic processes in Situation 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 (p<.05 for all 
situations). 
However, in Situation 4 the trend was reversed with 
significantly more children using intrinsically oriented responses 
compared to either right/wrong or extrinsic 'reasoning' (p<.05). 
This result reflects that most children think they 'should' 
resist because the owner will be disadvantaged in some important way 
if his/her purse is stolen. This kind of processing is shown in 
the following examples : 
"Take it and find the owner to it cause it's not yours" 
(Child C.C., Story 4) 
"Find out and see who it is then the people wont' know 
Ring the police up it might be someones purse, they 
might find out its lost" 
(Child K.B., Story 4). 
Children also used the right/wrong processing significantly more than 
extrinsic processes in Situation 4 (p<.05). 
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In Situation 6 children used significantly more extrinsic 
compared to intrinsic processing than would be expected by chance 
(p<.01) while there was no significant variation from a chance 
distribution when right/wrong processing was compared to either 
extrinsic or intrinsic processing (p>.05). 
An overall observation of the type of cognitive processes 
educable mentally retarded children used in this study indicates 
that the processes were not different in kind from those reported 
for normal children by Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1980). 
Discussion  
The major findings from the yielding cognitive processing 
data on both the behavioural and moral judgement measures was the 
significantly greater use of extrinsic compared to intrinsic schema. 
However, from the within situation analysis it was shown that in 
Situation 7, which was designed to evoke the subject's sympathy 
for his/her little brother, that more intrinsic responses were 
recorded. This trend was the reverse of that found of other 
situations. Jackson (1968) found a similar profile of cognitive 
processing in each situation as was revealed with this sample of 
educable mentally retarded children. 
The major finding on both the 'did' and 'should' measures 
from the resistance cognitive process data was the preponderance 
of right/wrong responses made by the sample - a result which was 
counter to expectations. As the mental age of the sample ranged 
from only five and a half to twelve years, it was reasoned from 
the developmental literature (Mischel and Mischel, 1976; Piaget, 
124. 
1977), that most of the educable mentally retarded children's 
responses would focus on the consequences of the hypothetical 
temptation to steal situation, and therefore be extrinsic in nature. 
The presence of a large proportion of right/wrong responses across 
situations generally suggested three possible explanations. 
Firstly, that the children using right/wrong responses were not 
capable of expressing a clear orientation. If this was the case 
children who used a right/wrong 'reason' on one situation would not 
be able to express an extrinsic or intrinsic schema on any of the 
other situations. However, inspection of the children's protocols 
does not support this explanation, as many children used all three 
types of cognitive processing across the JHTST. Secondly, that 
the children were at an early level of resistance functioning 
whereby they had not learnt why it was wrong to steal. They simply 
had associated wrongness or naughtiness with stealing. 
The evidence given in the first alternative explanation also 
largely discounts this second possibility as being able to account 
for the preference for right/wrong responding. 
The third alternative suggests that many children related 
to certain situations in such a way that they used summary statements 
which refer to the wrongness of stealing. These summary statements 
presumably come to the child's mind when he is confronted with a 
temptation situation, and thereafter help to guide his behaviour in 
that situation. The nature of these summary statements may be 
influenced by the kind of temptation situation as well as his 
•accepted notion of the general wrongness of stealing. In this 
125. 
sense the concept of summary statements are compatable with 
Jackson's (1968) view of cognitive schemata. For instance, the 
child may say, "it's wrong", "it's stealing", or "it's naughty" 
when asked why s/he didn't steal. These summary terms are not 
specifically related to a concern for the owner or to a consideration 
of the consequences of detection, but instead to a general concept 
of the wrongness of stealing. This is not to say that the concept 
of wrongness of stealing cannot be found to be based on some form 
of intrinsic or extrinsic consideration. The point is that it is 
the general concept of wrongness or the right/wrong schema as it 
occurs to, the child in the form of a summary statement or schema 
which guides his/her responding and therefore is the true cognitive 
process responsible for his/her action. The way the cognitive 
process and response are functionally linked in these data supports 
the earlier conception of a temptation to steal situation as 
having a temptation phase characterised by a high level of cognitive 
activity which functions to guide the child's response in the 
outcome phase. 
The main finding from the across situations analysis was 
significant increase from 'did do' to 'should do' on each of the 
resistance cognitive categories, with the largest mean increase 
on the extrinsic category. The within situation analysis 
demonstrated that the situation per se, had a considerable 
influence on the kind of cognitive processing schema the 
children used in each of the eight situations on both the 
behavioural ('did do') and moral judgement ('should do') 
measures. 
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8.3 GENERAL CONCLUSION OF STUDY I 
Data from both Part 1 and Part 2 of Study I indicated 
that on the 'did do' measure the majority of children resisted 
on the situations (1 and 4) which clearly identified an owner. 
Additionally many of the children who resisted on these situations 
used intrinsic and right/wrong motives to guide their decision 
making. As intrinsic motives especially represent a morally 
advanced form of reasoning, training children to use such 
motives would seem desirable. 
One of the practical implications of this research 
would therefore appear to be that a program with educable 
mentally retarded children, based on the teaching of an 
intrinsic schema, such as consideration for the owner, may 
significantly facilitate the children's resistance behaviour 
in temptation to steal situations. Research into the efficacy 
of this type of program will be undertaken in Study II. 
LITERATURE REVIEW TO STUDY II 
127. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE MODIFICATION AND TREATMENT OF STEALING BEHAVIOUR 
Various approaches have been used to modify the behaviour 
of children who steal. These include: 
1. Detention in state corrective institutions. 
2. Changing the juvenile's home environment. 
3. Psychotherapy including crisis counselling. 
4. Structuring the youth's time through probation rules. 
5. School activities and employment. 
6. Fining the youth and/or his family. 
7. Moral judgement training. 
Not all of these approaches have been subjected to 
rigorous research and those that have been have often yielded 
ambiguous results. Some approaches used are believed to be 
rehabilitative for juvenile offenders, however, no thorough 
research has been done proving their effectiveness (Wax, 1977). 
It is not the aim of this study to examine these kinds of 
approache to the modification of stealing. Rather the focus of 
this present study is to look specifically at research concerned 
with developing cognitive-behavioural approaches to stealing 
prevention and treatment. This research will now be considered. 
9.1 COGNITIVE-INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO SHOPLIFTING 
As shoplifting is often treated as a separate category in 
• the research literature, and because it has attracted many 
approaches which are shoplifting-specific it will be discussed 
separately in this review. 
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The anti-shoplifting campaigns have been mainly based on 
cognitive informational programs. The strategy used has been to 
post signs in shops indicating that shoplifting is a crime. This 
approach seems to have had the effect of increasing public 
awareness of the consequences of shoplifting or increasing the 
threat of detection. In any case, it seems to have had only 
limited success in reducing shoplifting rates (Spain, 1977). 
However, McNees, Egli, Marshall, Schnelle and Risley (1976) 
found that when merchandise that was frequently taken was 
identified by signs and stars shoplifting decreased to zero. 
Further research is therefore indicated. 
Although the shoplifting statistics cannot be broken down 
into retarded and non-retarded offenders, so that a comparison 
could be made, it could be argued that a campaign based on 'signs' 
would have only a negligible preventative effect on retarded 
shoppers as many of these people have limited or no reading skills. 
Accordingly the overall results of an anti-shoplifting campaign 
using 'signs' only may be that a greater proportion of retarded 
compared to non-retarded potential shoplifters would be 
apprehended. This approach would seem to have disadvantages for 
the non-reading retarded person. 
Another approach to decreasing shoplifting has been to 
influence shoppers to report shoplifters. Bickman and Green (1974) 
adapted Latane and Darley's (1970) cognitive model of bystander 
intervention. The model consisted of five points: (i) noticing 
the event; (ii) interpreting the event as an emergency; (iii) 
taking responsibility; (iv) deciding how to intervene; and 
(v) intervening. 
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Bickman and Green (1974) suggest that most programs only 
emphasise points (ii), (iii) and (iv), however actual inter-
vention by way of shoppers reporting shoplifting does not seem to 
result. 
In applying Latane and Darley's (1970) model, Bickman and 
Green (1977) found that when a confederate defined the situation 
(Point (i)) and suggested reporting it to the manager (Point (v)) 
this had a strong influence on the subject's decision to report 
the incident, whether or not signs were posted conveying 
information about the correct action to take. In fact, signs 
alone had no effect, even if placed where the theft had occurred. 
These findings suggest the relative effectiveness of inter-
personal influence over non personal means of communication in 
motivating shoppers to report shoplifters. 
Although not strictly a cognitive-informational approach, 
direct restitution and symbolic restitution in the form of 
community based services have been used to modify shoplifting. 
Restitution has operated in two forms, direct and symbolic. 
Direct restitution has required the offender to confront the 
victim and return the stolen property. Wax (1977) stated that 
this corrective approach has proved to be of limited effective-
ness as it has been hard to find victims who have been willing 
to supervise offenders. Also, in most cases juvenile thefts 
reported to juvenile courts have been thefts already recovered. 
Many courts have turned to symbolic restitution in the form of 
community service. To date symbolic restitution/comnunity 
service has produced promising but modest results (Wax, 1977). 
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9.2 SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY AND THE TREATMENT OF STEALING 
Two basic types of management strategies have been 
identified: 
(i) Contingency Management  
• Contingency management procedures have been effective in 
modifying a wide range of social and academic behaviours amongst 
retarded children (Becker, Engelmann and Thomas, 1975). However 
there appears to be a paucity of reported studies on the 
. application of contingency management procedures to the problem 
of stealing in the retarded. Indeed only relatively few 
researchers have used contingency procedures with normal children 
and adolescents to curb the problem of stealing. 
Some of those who have reported such studies have attempted 
to apply contingency procedures within the juvenile delinquent's 
natural environment. In a Behavioural Research Project in 
America, community-trained teachers, parents, and other adults 
in the child's natural environment used reinforcers "to modify 
delinquent and pre-delinquent behaviour such as stealing ... 
following the principles of 'contingency management'" (Tharp, 
Wetzel and Thorne, 1968). A rationale for this kind of approach 
to stealing has come from Tharp (1971) who has argued that the 
individual's functioning is influenced by significant others in 
his social context. Therefore the social and other significant 
contextual aspects of the individual's environment are in need 
of change rather than just the deviant individual. The process 
of change "requires that we view every member of the system as 
equally needful of a homeostasis (Tharp, 1971, p. 5)". 
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Consistent with this view, parents and other mediating agents 
should maximise the use of positive influence techniques and 
minimise negative confrontation (Stuart, 1971). The use of 
a positive form of contingency management by significant others 
follows from this analysis. 
A major barrier to the management of stealing has been 
determining the responsible party for the theft. In the research 
with juvenile delinquents it has been established that the 
children have a history of anti-social behaviour such as stealing. 
The monitoring of their behaviour and application of contingency 
procedures therefore becomes simpler because the children have 
been isolated for treatment. In the classroom, however, where 
a group of children confronts the teacher it becomes somewhat 
more difficult to detect bona fide theft and the responsible 
person (Switzer et al, 1977). In the absence of a reliable 
method of dealing with stealing, teachers often resort to 
managing misbehaviour by lecturing to the children about what 
the school rules are, and the consequences of violating them. 
Such methods have not usually been found to be effective in 
significantly altering classroom behaviour (Herman and 
Tranontana, 1971; O'Leary, Becker, Evans and Saudargas, 1969). 
Classroom management literature however has suggested 
that using group plus individual consequences is a powerful 
procedure for increasing appropriate behaviour (Greenwold, Hops, 
Delquadri and Guild, 1974). Consistent with this literature, 
Switzer et al (1977) conducted a well designed multiple base 
line study to reduce stealing in second graders by using a 
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group contingency. The authors compared an anti-stealing 
lecture method With non specific contingency to a direct group 
contingency method. In order to reliably measure the incidence 
of stealing, ten items were placed around each room daily. In 
the group contingency procedure the teacher would indicate to 
the class that if she did not find: anythingmissing in the 
morning they could have ten minutes of free time. After this 
statement data was collected at 15 minute intervals. At the 
end of the last 15 minute interval, an observer (a teacher's 
aide) discreetly signalled the teacher as to the nature and 
number of items stolen. Following this the teacher indicated 
she knew what was missing, and added that she was going to 
leave the room for 2 or 3 minutes. If on her return the 
object(s) was/were put back then they could have their free 
time, if not, then they were to sit quietly. In short, three 
components were involved in the group contingency: (a) 
positive reinforcement for no thefts; (b) restitution of 
existing privileges for the return of stolen items; and (c) 
punishment for failure to return items. 
The findings of the study significantly favoured the 
group contingency method. However the authors did state that 
the specific factors leading to the effectiveness of this 
method could not be readily identified. They have stressed 
that, in a group contingency the individual responsible for the 
theft was punished directly. Thus while the group contingency 
was seen as working by peers exerting pressure on each other 
not to steal, it was also seen as working directly on individual 
members of the group. 
Switzer et al (1977) have cited several problems that 
could exist if attempts were made to apply their procedure to 
normal classrooms. They referred to the need for a reliable 
method of theft detection. They suggested that teachers could 
at least maintain an accurate assessment of teacher-owned items. 
Another possible problem raised by the authors was that of the 
validity of thefts reported by students. They noted that the 
group contingency procedure might reduce the number of reports 
which the children were uncertain about. Also they felt it 
might result in children not reporting thefts for fear of 
negative peer pressure over loss of free time, or because free 
time was more important to the child than was the missing item. 
They concluded their comments by a call for a more precise 
method of theft detection! 
In addition to Switzer et al's (1977) own concerns with 
the group contingency procedures, other problems seem apparent 
with this method of control in the classroom. The method 
penalises those children who do not engage in acts of theft. 
In this way it works against the rights of the child. This 
type of unfairness may engender a revenge motive in those 
children who have been honest. That is, they may steal to make 
the child who has been stealing experience what it is like to 
be punished when you have done nothing wrong. This method may 
also create negative attitudes toward the teacher because the 
technique is perceived as being unfair. Furthermore if the 
procedure was used in a special class, the honest retarded 
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children may not understand why they have been penalised. The 
procedure is not educationally instructive in the sense that 
it does not specify why a child should not steal. Instead the 
procedure encourages a fear of detection in the child and 
thereby teaches the child to avoid stealing because of the 
external consequences.• 
(ii) Family Therapy  
Family therapy like contingency management has been based 
on the theoretical rationale that the individual's functioning 
has been shaped and developed by significant others in his 
social context. Indeed, Patterson, McNeal and Hawkins (1976) 
coined the concept of 'reprograming the social environment' 
in order to harness family forces to alter deviant behaviour. 
Patterson's techniques for the management of delinquent 
behaviour in the home have been based on the following 
assumptions: 
"(1) ... behaviours associated with delinquency are 
social behaviours that are acquired and maintained, 
in a large part, by the process of social 
reinforcement; 
(2) the primary locus for the initial development 
of social behaviours is in the home, and; 
(3) the place to start in the prevention of delinquency 
is with the pattern of social reinforcement that 
occurs in the homes of pre-delinquent children" 
(Reid and Patterson, 1976, p. 124). 
Patterson has made it clear that if delinquent behaviours 
were to be extinguished then all social systems for children 
must be reprogramed. However, he has suggested that the home 
provides a logical starting point because the social system is 
simpler than many others, and also because the child would be 
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influenced profoundly in the developmental stages by family 
interaction. 
Reid and Patterson (1976) reported that a group of 
families with deviant members who stole, were not as responsive 
to treatment as another group of families with non-stealing but 
deviant members. Following this finding, an analysis of 
stealers, non-stealers and normal children on positive-friendly 
•and negative-coercive measures was performed.. The lowest rates 
of negative exchange behaviour in the families of the three 
groups were normals, stealers, and non-stealers respectively. 
The highest rate for positive exchange behaviours werenormals, 
non-stealers, and stealers. Reid and Patterson (1976) 
interpreted this finding as suggesting that the low rate of 
. positive (and negative) social exchange in the family of 
stealers "gives the picture of a rather boring family climate 
that may, in fact, serve to motivate the child to seek out his 
developmental experiences and positive reinforcers in unsuper-
vised, extra family settings" (p. 133). This interpretation 
of the data still remained consistent with the implementation 
of . a parenting program. 
Of 34 stealing referrals made to a parenting program 
only 10 actually began treatment. The drop out families were 
'characterised by a marked level of disorganisation. The 
Children in these families were typically unsupervised for long 
periods- each day and the parents were involved in work schedules 
which .kept them from spending much time with their families. 
Reid and Patterson (1976) suggested that the ten families 
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in the program presented a pattern of problems different from 
families of social aggressors. The families missed appointments 
and failed to complete assignments. The parents were unable 
to track their children's behaviour. Also the parents spent 
much of their time with activities away from home. Additionally, 
the parents failed to identify stealing behaviours of their 
children as theft. They either ignored instances of stealing 
behaviour, or recategorised it so that it did not appear deviant. 
The program managers stated, "This sort of relabelling of stealing 
as the child finding things, trading for things, or being given 
things by an unnamed benefactor prevented the parents from 
recognising stealing when it occurred and consequating it" 
(Reid and Patterson, 1976, p. 134). 
Furthermore, as the parents were not greatly disturbed 
by the children's stealing behaviour they were not generally 
highly motivated to institute an intervention strategy. So a 
plan had to be devised to cope with the parents who were not 
motivated to manage their children's behaviour even after being 
told of their high rate of stealing. To enlist unmotivated 
parents' cooperation it had been decided to use extrinsic 
reinforcers such as a parenting salary, preventing the 
juvenile court from taking custody of the child, and the 
therapist reinforcing parenting behaviour through daily phone 
calls. During the first treatment sessions parents were 
specifically instructed in the defining of stealing, and in 
tracking and monitoring the child's behaviour. In fact, a 
continuous knowledge of the child's whereabouts was a condition 
of treatment. 
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With the exceptions of the planned extrinsic reinforcers 
and the first treatment sessions indicated above, the treatment 
of stealers was the same as for socially aggressive boys. This 
included base line and further observation probes, collection 
of parent report data, reading the parent book, training in 
tracking and counting behaviours, and designing and executing 
modification programs. One additional component was added. 
Because stealing did not lend itself easily to measurement by 
professional observers, a new data collection procedure was 
devised. The parents were phoned every day after the initial 
contact and asked whether any stealing had come to their 
attention during the previous 24 hours. If stealing had 
occurred a series of questions on the stolen objects was asked: 
its value, the place where the stealing occurred, whether the 
child was alone or not when he stole, and what the parents did 
about the act, and so on. 
At this point in time Reid and Patterson (1976) 
reported that an analysis of only 7 of the 10 families in the 
program had been completed. It was established that in 4 cases 
stealing was eliminated, and in one case it was reduced when 
the parents followed the parent management programs and 
consistently consequated stealing. In one of the other two 
families, the child said she stopped stealing to please the 
therapist, and in the other, the family dropped out of the 
program. 
The family therapy approach to the treatment of juvenile 
stealing seems to be worthy of serious consideration. The 
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practice of readjusting the immediate social milieu of the 
offender appears to be a robust method of bringing stealing 
behaviour under control. Although the notion of reprograming 
a deviant child's social systems has obvious appeal, the 
practical constraints on this type of exercise must be kept in 
mind. A detailed examination of Reid and Patterson's (1976) 
attempts at this type of reprograming in the home environment 
indicate that there are a number of practical limitations. 
These limitations were as follows: 
(1) As Reid and Patterson (1976) indicated, two thirds 
of the referred cases to their program dropped out. This self-
selection procedure suggests that the remaining third were more 
highly motivated to undergo the program. This variable must 
be taken into account when evaluating the effectiveness of 
the parent programing strategy. 
(2) Also the program organisers used extrinsic 
reinforcers (for example, parenting salaries) where it was 
necessary to keep parents motivated to fulfil their obligations 
in the program. The effective ingredient in the program may 
be the extrinsic reinforcers rather than the content of the 
program, per se. 
(3) An essential ingredient in the program package was 
the reading and working through of exercises in a parenting 
book. This procedure would seem to lend itself more to the 
verbal, literate parent than those less motivated or skilled 
to analyse book materials. 
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(4) A definition of stealing incidents seems a necessary 
component of the program. However, this specific definitional 
training was extended to the parents only, presumably because 
they were controlling the child's behaviour by consequating it. 
It may also be useful to teach the child to accurately define 
stealing behaviours. The phenomenon of rationalising away, or 
negating the stealing episode, as really another category of 
behaviour, would then be minimised. Definitional training 
aimed at the child may also help him to control his own 
behaviour. 
(5) The phone call method of collecting data also raises 
questions. Parents may get tired of answering a series of 
questions each day over the phone. Indicating that the child 
does not steal anymore may be negatively reinforcing because 
it stops the phonecalls. As Reid and Patterson (1976) have 
stated, stealing behaviour was not directly punishing to the 
parents. The authorities, police, welfare officers, 
counsellors and others who contacted the parents seemed to be 
the most punishing aspect of their child's stealing. A report 
of successful treatment would stall this pressure. This 
argument questions the reliability and validity of this data 
collecting procedure, and the subsequent findings of the 
parent programing procedure. 
It can be seen that attempts at reprograming the social 
system in the home to make it more positive and less negative 
and punishing has achieved a degree of success, but still has 
certain problems. However, this should not cause such attempts 
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to be abandoned. It simply means the methodology of this 
approach needs to be improved. One overriding aspect of 
reprograming the contingencies in a social system, with 
respect to the treatment of stealing, remains that the child is 
being brought under external control. Basic to the philosophy 
of social reprograming is the view that the social system 
largely determines the child's behaviour. Although this view-
point is not being fundamentally challenged, it would seem in 
the case of stealing behaviour that direct training to teach 
the child to resist temptation also warrants the attention of 
the researcher. Even though social systems strongly influence 
behaviour, in the final analysis, the responsibility for 
prosocial or antisocial behaviour rests with the individual. 
Accordingly direct training to help the individual resist 
antisocial acts and to engage in prosocial behaviour has clear 
merit. 
In short, it is contended that research on reprograming 
social systems should continue. However, research on teaching 
children to control their own behaviour in temptation to steal 
situations should also be pursued. 
(iii) Overcorrection  
Barton, Guess, Garcia and Beier (1970) found that timeout 
from reinforcement reduced the stealing of food by profoundly 
retarded persons by only 57 per cent over a period of 24 'meals. 
Azrin and Armstrong (1973) dealing with the same problem, 
indicated that a simple correction by restitution procedure 
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yielded positive results. In a later study Azrin and 
Wesolowski (1974) applied an overcorrection procedure to 
stealing behaviour. Simply stated, the overcorrection principle 
suggests that the thief be required to give the victim more 
than he had stolen. The overcorrection procedure effectively 
and almost immediately eliminated theft by all the retardates 
in the study. The authors suggested that overcorrection was 
so effective because it: 
"(a) Terminated reinforcement for the theft by 
withdrawing the stolen items, 
(b) was a negative reinforcer because it required 
effort when the additional item has to be 
obtained, 
(c) constituted a timeout from positive reinforcement, 
in that the thief was interrupted for a period of 
time in his other activities, and 
(d) was re-educative in that the thief practised the 
positive action of giving snack items to the 
victim" (p. 580). 
The overcorrection procedure must be regarded as one 
method the clinician may use to modify stealing behaviour in the 
retarded. 
In an extensive review, Axlerod, Brantner and Neddock 
(1978) have critically re-examined the overcorrection procedure. 
They have suggested that a partialling out of the behavioural 
techniques which are often an integral part of the overcorrection 
package is necessary before it can be established what unique 
contribution the overcorrection procedure, per se, makes to a 
behaviour modification program. Further, they have challenged 
the comparative effectiveness of the procedure by citing 
examples of alternative techniques which have been relatively 
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more successful than the overcorrection procedure. The review 
also identified certain negative side effects of the 
overcorrection technique. From a conceptual systems viewpoint 
Axelrod et al (1978) stresses the relationship between over-
correction and the punishment process. Overall, the authors 
indicate the need for a more rigorous scientific analysis of 
the overcorrection procedure. 
Clearly there are also specific limitations to the 
overcorrection procedure when applied to the stealing situation. 
Firstly, the overcorrection strategy depends on detection of 
the theft. Restitution corrective procedures used with shop-
lifters have been stifled by the problem of getting the victim 
to supervise the restitution. Also the procedure is somewhat 
negated when the victim has already recovered his property. 
The value of the item stolen would seem to be a relevant 
consideration before implementing an overcorrective procedure. 
If it takes a long time to repay a debt, the offender may be 
motivated to steal again in order to expedite the payment of 
his original debt. It is not uncommon for offenders to say 
they stole in order to pay outstanding fines. Also the 
offender may regard it as unfair or inequitable justice for 
him to have to pay more than the item is worth. This may be 
especially confusing to the retarded offender. Finally, the 
main emphasis in the overcorrection procedure may be perceived 
of as punitive rather than re-educative. Further to this 
point, Parke (1977) has shown that a rationale procedure was 
more effective than punishment in facilitating children's 
resistance to temptation. 
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9.3 COGNITIVE TRAINING AND STEALING 
Various forms of cognitive training have been used 
extensively with normal and retarded children to modify and
•develop a range of behaviours. Cognitive procedures have been 
employed to modify 'cognitive impulsivity' responses (Finch et 
al, 1975), 'hyperactivity' (Moore and Cole, 1978), problem 
solving skills (Ross and Ross, 1973, 1978), behaviour problems 
(Camp et al, 1977), resistance to temptation (Fry and Preston, 
1979; Mischel and Patterson, 1970, 1978) and 'stealing' 
behaviour (Guidry, 1975; Stumphauzer, 1976). 
As indicated in the review to Study I, cognitive 
strategies of the self-regulation kind include such covert 
procedures as self-observation and self-reinforcement. These, 
covert procedures are subject to the same behavioural principles 
which govern overt behaviours. Based on these theoretical 
foundations, Guidry (1975) successfully treated a compulsive 
stealer of some ten years duration by using a covert punishing 
contingency. Specifically the client imagined a stealing 
sequence followed by an imagined aversive consequence, for 
example, •getting caught. 
Also, in a study by Stumphauzer (1976) stealing 
behaviour in a 12 year old girl was eliminated by self-
reinforcement of alternative behaviour and family contracting. 
The first part of the procedure utilized self-control techniques. 
The child role-played seeing the usual kinds of things she 
would steal and alternated to interesting things and 
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activities she could shift her attention to which were 
followed by self-reinforcement (for example, I am proud of 
myself). Also when she did not steal she was to use self-
reinforcing language. In the second part of the procedure 
simple family contracts were used which comprised of shifting 
parental and school attention away from stealing to non-
stealing. Primary and social reinforcers were used for each 
day of non-stealing. Following treatment and at follow-ups 
(6, 12 and 18 months) there was no return of stealing 
behaviour. 
Currently researchers within the resistance to 
temptation paradigm have also focused on self-regulation 
procedures. In a recent review on increasing children's self-
control through cognitive interventions Pressley (1979) drew a 
distinction between the self-regulation procedure of self-
reinforcement, and cognitive intervention which aimed to 
directly change cognitions. Put differently, self-reinforcement 
could be seen as consequating covert and overt behaviours 
and increasing or decreasing its future probability, while 
cognitive interventions of the self-instruction kind attempts 
to change the child's thought structures. 
Meichenbaum (1977) has suggested a rationale for self-
verbalisation training. He suggested that a child's inappropriate 
task performance and behaviours have been largely due to the 
child's use of poorly organised cognitions, such as sub-vocal 
speech, thoughts, and images. Working with impulsive children, 
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Meichenbaum and Goodman (1971) used verbal self-instructional 
training which involved children progressively shifting from 
• overt to covert self-instruction. This model of self-
instructional training was used by Fry and Preston (1979) with 
a sample of normal 7 to 8 year old children to increase their 
resistance to temptation. These researchers also examined the 
individual effectiveness of the components in the self- . 
verbalisation training sequence (overt, covert, and overt plus 
covert), as well as the interactive effects between these 
different types of training and children's locus of control. 
It was found that both boys and girls trained with a complete 
sequence of overt to covert speech self-verbalisation, and 
those who employed an internal locus of control, delayed 
gratification longer than any other combinations of treatment 
and locus of control. 
Although not specifically utilizing Meichenbaum's model 
of self-verbalisation instruction, other researchers have 
experimentally examined the types of self-verbalisations which 
affect the self-control of pre-schoolers. 
The Types of Self-verbalisation in Resistance to Temptation  
Paradigms. 
Various types of self-verbalisations have been examined 
in delay of gratification studies. In a typical kind of delay of 
gratification study, pre-school children were assigned to a 
boring task and told that if they stuck to the task until the 
experimenter returned they could play with 'fun' toys, but if 
they ceased the task they would only get 'broken' toys to play 
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with. A clown box with a tape recorder attempted to distract 
the child throughout the task. Mischel and Patterson (1976, 
1978) discovered that, (a) specific temptation-inhibiting 
verbalisations ("no, I'm not going to look at Mr. Clown box") 
was more effective than, (b) specific task-facilitating 
verbalisations ("I'm going to look at my work"), or (c) a 
control (no strategy) condition. Also conditions (a) plus (b) 
were no better than (a) alone. While (a) alone was no more 
effective than another condition, namely (d) a reward relevant 
verbalisation condition ("I want to play with the fun toys and 
Mr. Clown box later"). It was also found that when the 
children were asked to generate their own strategy that this 
was no more effective than the (c) control condition. 
Toner and Smith (1977) indicated that when the 'reward' 
verbalisation of the kind, "the candy will taste good" was 
employed,self-controlwas decreased. A further study by 
Patterson and Mischel reported by Pressley (1979) demonstrated 
that children provided with a specific verbal plan resisted the 
temptation better than children who were not given a specific 
plan. It was further shown that with a verbal plan condition 
both the internal and external cues produced greater self-
control than unspecified cues. Moreover, the provision of a 
specific verbal plan without a specific cue for •execution of 
the plan produced no increase in self-control over no 
provision of a plan. 
Overall these results have suggested that even pre-
schoolers could use a verbal strategy to control their own 
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behaviour. However, the specific content of the strategy 
largely determined the effectiveness of the strategy. Specific 
temptation inhibiting, and reward-relevant temptation strategies 
were the most effective. Evidence has suggested that reward-
relevant verbalisations which emphasise the consummatory 
aspects of rewards tend to decrease self-control. Therefore, 
how the child 'thinks' of the reward must be regarded as a 
highly relevant aspect of self-control intervention strategies. 
The findings on the relationship between self-verbalisation 
strategies and self-control with pre-schoolers should give the 
educator of the mentally retarded child cause for optimism. As 
has been noted, the kind of self-verbalisations the child is 
able to employ depends on his cognitive developmental level. 
If pre-schoolers can employ self-verbalisation strategies •then 
retardates of a comparable MA should similarly be able to 
utilize such strategies to control their own behaviour. 
Other experimental investigations into the variables 
influencing self-control have included affective variables, 
cognitive transformations, and attentional variables. 
(a) Affective variables. Mischel, Ebbeson and Zeiss (1972) 
showed that children would wait longer for a preferred reward 
when they were instructed to think 'fun' thoughts than if 
they were provided with no cognitive strategy. Also in an 
experiment where a group of pre-schoolers were instructed to 
think 'sad' thoughts they were less likely to wait for rewards 
than no affect control subjects (Moore, Clyburn and Underwood, 
1976). Fry (1977) found that children with induced happiness 
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(happiness related to a success experience) resisted temptation 
to play with toys more than children who were sad (because of 
a failure experience). Failure children furthermore deviated 
more quickly than did a group of control children. It would 
appear then that when a child self-produces happy thoughts that 
the child will be more likely to resist the temptation of an 
immediate reward, or the temptation to quit a dull task. Self-
produced sadness has been shown to produce the reverse effect. 
(b) Cognitive transformations. Mischel and Baker (1975) in a 
four group condition experimental design found that pre-
schoolers who mentally transformed food for which they were 
waiting, compared to those who concentrated on the consummatory 
aspects of another food waited longer. This and other 
experiments (Patterson and Mischel, 1975; Yates and Millman, 
1978) demonstrated that pre-schoolers could imaginally transform 
stimulus situations so as to produce better control behaviour. 
(c) Manipulations of attention. It has been well established 
•that externally provided activities during a delay period produce 
increased self-control in delay of gratification situations 
(Mischel et al, 1972; Perry and Parke, 1975). A series of 
investigators have shown that paying attention to rewards in a 
delay of gratification situation decreases self-control (Mischel 
and Moore, 1973; Toner and Smith, 1977): Research on the issue 
of attention to reward objects versus pictures of reward 
objects found that the child's cognitive orientation during 
exposure to either stimulus determined his length of delay of 
gratification. For example, it was found that thinking about 
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the arousing aspects of the picture of the rewards was conducive 
to less self-control than just thinking of the picture. These 
data have shown that the attentional orientation of children 
could be manipulated so as to affect self-control. 
In summary, the overall findings indicate that very 
young children can manipulate their cognitions when instructed 
to do so, and can have their cognitions manipulated in various 
ways so as to affect their self-control. What has not been done 
extensively to this point in time has been to compare cognitive 
strategies. Pressley (1979) has called for studies to determine 
if the ability to use self-control strategies is developmentally 
mediated. 
The encouraging aspects of the many studies on pre-school 
children and self-control remains that the positive conclusions 
from such studies strongly suggests the applicability of 
cognitive strategies to increase self-control in mentally 
retarded children. This is not to infer, of course, that there 
would be a simple one to one correspondence between pre-school 
children's use of cognitive self-control strategies and 
mentally retarded children of comparable MA. Logically, 
although a mentally retarded child may have a similar mental 
age to a younger normal child, the older retarded child would 
have additional social or life experiences which would inter-
actively affect his functioning in resistance to temptation 
situations. This statement gains support from research which 
has indicated that moral functioning involves an interaction of 
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factors including cognitive and social factors (Bandura, 1977; 
Kohlberg, 1976a). 
Cognitive training procedures have also been used to 
develop problem solving skills (Ross and Ross, 1978). 
Cognitive Training and Problem Solving  
The position taken in this thesis is that a temptation 
to steal situation is a problem solving situation. Stealing 
has further been referred to as a temptation problem solving 
situation with two possible problems confronting the child. 
The first problem consists of making a choice between resisting 
and yielding, and the second problem emerges if the child 
decides to resist. This latter problem involves planning an 
alternative way to legitimately acquire the desired object. 
Specifically the child must generate a set of alternatives and 
then select the most appropriate alternative. The components 
in this second type of problem relate directly to D'Zurilla and 
Goldfield's (1971) definition of problem solving: 
" ... a behavioural process, whether overt or cognitive 
in nature, which (a) makes available a variety of 
potentially effective response alternatives for dealing 
with the problematic situation, and (b) increases the 
probability of selecting the most effective response 
among these various alternatives" (p. 108). 
It would appear then that training programs to reduce 
stealing may be strengthened by a problem solving component. 
This suggestion has direct relevance for the retarded. Research 
has shown that retarded children lack skills in everyday problem 
solving (Ross and Ross, 1971). Ross and Ross (1973, 1978) have 
found however, from social situation prOblem exercises, that with 
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sufficient training educable mentally retarded children could 
significantly improve in the skills of the generation of 
solutions, and the evaluation of the best alternative solution. 
Overall, there would seem to be a considerable body of 
research supporting the application of self-regulatory programs 
with any one of the following three components; self-
reinforcement, self-instruction or problem solving. Additionally, 
self-control programs can involve complex multi-dimensional 
procedures (Sanders, 1978) which could include these three 
components. 
Recently an attempt was made to combine self-instructional 
and problem-solving components into a self-regulatory program 
to facilitate resistance to stealing (Haines, Jackson and 
Davidson, 1980). This particular self-regulatory program was 
presented in a direct instruction format in a similar manner 
to that reported by Meichenbaum (1977), along with additional 
features. As this program was designed as a type of pilot 
program for the present study with educable mentally retarded 
children, it will be discussed next. 
9.4 A DIRECT INSTRUCTION PROGRAM TO FACILITATE RESISTANCE TO 
STEALING 
It was decided to use a direct instruction format for the 
resistance training program because this type of teaching format 
has been shown to be highly effective in facilitating learning, 
especially amongst disadvantaged and retarded children (Becker 
and Carnine, 1978; Becker, Engelmann and Thomas, 1975). Also 
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there are distinct parallels between the direct instruction 
technology used to teach concept skills, and the self-instruction 
procedures embodied in the cognitive-behaviour modification 
methodology (Meichenbaum, 1977). 
Self verbalisation instruction and concept training both 
involve a shift from overtized to covertized programing 
Specifically, the trainer makes explicit every step in the 
strategy, at first prompting the learner to perform on every 
step. Over a number of training sessions the prompts are faded 
to the point where the task sequence has been covertized. The 
learner can then demonstrate his knowledge of the task sequence 
by repeating the correct series of responses overtly to the 
trainer without prompting. Covertization provides an essential 
link between teacher-directed and independent work (Becker, 
and Carnine, 1978), or between external instruction and self-
control. 
Cognitive-behavioural modification and direct instruction 
teaching models also utilize the principles of operationalised 
objectives and task analysis. 
The content of the direct instruction program was based 
on Jackson's (1968) model of children's cognitive processing in 
hypothetical temptation to steal situations. As mentioned, the 
model consists of a series of stages; namely, (a) temptation 
problem; (b) sense of dilemma; (c) reflection/self-discussion; 
• (d) retrieval of cognitive schemata; (e) decision to resist or 
yield; (f) post-decision responses. Since the children were 
being trained to resist only 'resistance cognitive schemata' 
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were taught. These schemata included: rule (internalised 
principle), right/wrong, example (model), friends, guilt, self-
image, consequence, habit and self-control. 
Another feature of Jackson's (1968) analysis of children's 
responses was that a few children used legitimate alternatives 
to achieve their goal. These children responded to the 
temptation to steal situation by following a two stage 
resistance pathway. That is, in the first stage they resisted 
the urge to steal, and in the second stage they planned a way 
to obtain their goal legitimately. This type of responding 
was viewed as both morally and socially acceptable and 
desirable. It was therefore included in the direct instruction 
resistance training program. 
The Procedure of the Direct Instruction Program  
In this program children were presented with hypothetical 
moral dilemmas, but a series of responses and response 
alternatives were indicated. The essence of this program was 
the acquisition of a set or chain of responses leading to a 
resistance response, possibly followed by a legitimate 
acquisition response. 
The beginning of the chain consisted of a temptation 
problem situation (TPS); next came a characteristic initial 
reaction (IR) to the TPS. This commonly involves attention 
being focussed on an object, physical reacting such as heart 
racing and asking the question, "Will I or won't I take it?". 
This is usually the first decision making point an individual 
155. 
reaches. His/her decision to yield or resist directs the 
individual thinking along a yield or resist congitive pathway 
which terminates in a final yield or resist response. In this 
program an a priori decision was made that resistance was an 
acceptable response and yielding an unacceptable response. 
Accordingly, at the IR decision making point the child was 
taught to use the IR as a cue to direct him along the 
resistance pathway. 
Decision making was also involved at the intermediate 
stages but morally defensible answers were provided. At the 
alternative response stage, further decision making was involved 
as subjects considered viable alternatives to yielding. The 
• response chain was structured in order to enhance learning and 
retrieval (Loftus and Loftus, 1976).• 
As mentioned, following the TPS, the common initial 
reaction functioned as a cue to focus the child's thinking on 
additional response category cues, that is, think, feel, and 
behave, and response category order cues which aided him in 
recalling the schemata in the response category clusters and 
the remainder of the response chain terminating in a resistance 
response and finally a legitimate acquisition response. 
The importance of cues in memory research is well 
documented (Tulving and Pearlstone, 1966). The resistance 
response chain described in Figure 15was,presented progressively 
over six sessions,and was repeated three times during the 
program. This was done to further enhance acquisition of the 
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(reported by Haines, Jackson & Davidson, 1980) 
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resistance response chain. In the final stages of the program 
each child had to go through the resistance chain saying it 
aloud, without prompting, and was required to complete the 
chain by generating a legitimate alternative. 
To test the effectiveness of the direct instruction 
program Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1980) conducted a study 
with normal children. The study utilized a direct instruction 
program as well as a general instruction program and a post 
only control group to partial out the effectiveness of the 
instructional procedures. 
The general instruction program followed as closely as 
possible the procedure used by Blatt and Kohlberg (1975). 
This procedure was chosen as programs using Kohlberg's model 
have increasingly been used by schools in moral development 
courses. 
It was found that the direct instruction teaching method 
was more effective than the general instruction program, in 
reducing children's resistance to stealing in hypothetical 
temptation to steal situations (Haines, Jackson and Davidson, 
1980). As the direct instruction format has been shown to be 
a most effective teaching method with retarded children in 
other areas of learning (Becker and Carnine, 1978; Maggs and 
Patching, 1979), and also, as Study I has shown that educable 
mentally retarded children use the same kinds of cognitive 
processes in temptation to steal situations as normals, it 
was argued that a similar type of cognitively oriented direct 
instruction program with the retarded would be worthy of study. 
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STUDY II 
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CHAPTER 10 
EDUCABLE MENTALLY RETARDED CHILDREN'S RESPONSES TO 
TREATMENT IN HYPOTHETICAL AND REAL-LIFE TEMPTATION 
TO STEAL SITUATIONS 
10.1 THE PURPOSE 
The main aim of this study was to compare the relative 
effectiveness of two treatment programs in facilitating educable 
mentally retarded children's resistance to the temptation to 
steal in hypothetical and real-life temptation situations. 
10.2 METHOD 
10.2.1 Hypotheses  
It was expected that a direct instruction program group 
would produce greater resistance responding in hypothetical and 
real-life temptation situations than a general instruction 
program group or a no treatment control group. Further it was 
expected that there would be no significant differences between 
the general instruction program group and the no treatment 
control group. As reflections of these expectations a series of 
hypotheses were drawn up. 
(a)That a direct instruction program (DIP)group would 
produce significantly more resistance responses on the behavioural 
measure ('did do') of the JHTST than a general instruction 
Program (GIP) group, or a no treatment control group. 
(b) That there would be no significant differences in 
resistance responses on the behavioural measure between the 
GIP and no treatment control groups. 
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(c) That the post treatment resistance responses on the 
behavioural measure of the no treatment control group would not 
be significantly different from the post-only control group. 
II (a) That the DIP group would produce significantly more 
children who become categorical resisters on the 'did do' 
measure than a GIP or no treatment control group. 
(b) That there would be no significant difference in the 
number of children who become categorical resisters on the 'did 
do' measure between the GIP and no treatment control groups. 
III (a) That a DIP group would produce significantly more 
legitimate alternative responses on the behavioural measure than 
a GIP group, or no treatment control group. 
(b) That there would be no significant difference in 
legitimate alternative responses on the 'did do' measure between 
the GIP group and no treatment control group. 
IV (a) That a DIP group would produce significantly more 
intrinsic resistance responses on the behavioural measure than 
a GIP group or no treatment control group. 
(b) That there would be no significant difference in 
intrinsic resistance responses on the 'did do' measure between 
the GIP group and no treatment control groups. 
V (a) That there would be no significant difference between 
the DIP, GIP, or no treatment control groups in resistance 
responding on the moral judgement ('should do') measure. 
VI (a) That a DIP group would produce significantly more 
legitimate alternative responses on the ,'should do' measure than 
the GIP group or no treatment control groups. 
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(b) That there would be no significant difference in 
legitimate alternative responses on the 'should do' measure 
between the GIP group and no treatment control group. 
VII (a) That a DIP group would produce significantly more 
intrinsic resistance responses on the 'should do' measure than 
the GIP group or no treatment control group. 
(b) That there would be no significant difference in 
intrinsic resistance responses on the moral judgement measure 
between the GIP group and no treatment control group. 
VIII That there would be no significant difference between the 
DIP, GIP or no treatment control groups •in general moral 
judgement on the clumsiness and stealing index. 
IX That there would be no significant difference between the 
DIP, GIP and no treatment control groups in general moral 
judgement in the collective responsibility index. 
X (a) That a DIP group would produce significantly more 
reflectivity than a GIP group or no treatment control group. 
(b) That there would be no significant difference in 
reflectivity between the GIP group and no treatment control 
group. 
XI (a) That a DIP group would not produce significantly more 
efficiency than a GIP group or no treatment control group. 
(b) That there would be no significant difference in 
efficiency between the GIP group and no treatment control group. 
XII (a) That a DIP group would produce significantly more 
resistance responses in the real-life temptation to steal situation 
than a GIP or no treatment pre-post control group. 
162. 
(b) That there would be no significant difference in 
resistance in the real-life stealing situation between the GIP 
group and no treatment control group. 
(c) That the post treatment resistance responses of the 
no treatment control group in the real-life stealing temptation 
would not be significantly different from the post only control 
group. 
XIII (a) That a DIP group would produce significantly more 
resistance responses in the real-life temptation to cheat 
situation than a GIP group or no treatment control group. 
(b) That there would be no significant difference in 
resistance in the real-life cheating situation between the GIP 
group and no treatment control group. 
(c) That the post treatment resistance responses of the 
no treatment control group in the real-life cheating temptation 
would not be significantly different from the post only control 
group. 
XIV (a) That there would be no significant difference in 
resistance responses on the behavioural measure between the DIP 
group post and follow up measures. 
(b) That there would be no significant difference in 
resistance responses on the moral judgement measure between the 
DIP group post and follow up measures. 
XV That there would be no significant difference in intrinsic 
resistance responses on both the behavioural and moral judgement 
measures between the DIP group post and follow up measures. 
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10.2.2 Design  
The experimental design selected basically corresponded 
to the pretest-post test control group design (Campbell and 
Stanley, 1963). This design controls for most problems of 
internal validity. The design chosen however, also incorporated 
a post only control group. 
A four group design was used. The groups, each of which 
consisted of 27 children, were delineated as follows: 
Two treatment groups 
(a) Direct Instruction Program (DIP) group 
(b) General Instruction Program (GIP) group 
Two control groups 
(c) No treatment Pre and Post Control group. When 
referred to hereafter this group will be termed the 
no treatment control group. 
(d) No treatment Post Only Control group. Hereafter this 
group will be referred to as the post only control group. 
The no treatment control group was included to control 
for the possibility of improvement merely as a function of time. 
The post only control group was designed to measure the degree 
to which the no treatment control group improved on the JHTST 
and real-life resistance to temptation situations as a result 
of sensitization on the pretest measures of the JHTST and real-
life measures alone. 
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10.2.3 Subjects  
A population of 115 educable mentally retarded children 
between 11 and 16 years of age, I.Q. 50 to 75 was drawn from 
children attending special schools in two major centres of 
Tasmania (Hobart and Launceston). Parental permission was 
obtained for 108 of the children. These 108 children were 
randomly allocated to one of four groups. The composition and 
defining characteristics of the four groups are shown below in 
Table 5. 
TABLE 5 
Comparison and Defining Characteristics of the 
Experimental and Control Groups 
DIP GIP No Treatment Post Only 
Treatment Group Treatment Group Control Group Control Group 
Number: 
Males 19 20 20 18 
Females 8 7 7 9 
Total 27 27 27 27 
Age: Mean 153 mths 159 mths 156 mths 158 mths 
Range 133-191 mths 136-189 mths 132-187 mths 134-194 mths 
lg. : Mean 63 62 65 63 
Range 50-74 50-75 51-75 50-75 
10.2.4 Testing Procedures  
As mentioned in Study I three trained experimenters, two 
female and one male, administered the pretest measures and one 
further female was employed to administer post tests. None of 
the testers, graduates in Psychology or Education, was 
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acquainted with, the hypotheses of the experiment. 
The pre and post treatment-measures included: 
Kagan's Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT)(1964) to 
measure reflection/efficiency; 
Stephens tests of collective responsibility and clumsiness 
and stealing (Mahaney and Stephens, 1974) to assess the children's 
general moral judgement level; and 
Jackson's Hypothetical Temptation to Steal Test (JHTST) 
(Jackson, 1968) as a measure of both behavioural and moral 
judgement in hypothetical temptation to steal situations. 
Real-life temptation measures included a stealing and 
cheating test. 
The study was divided into approximately three six week 
intervals which corresponded to the pretesting, treatment, and 
post testing periods. A three month follow up testing over a 
three week period of the DIP was an additional feature of the 
study. 
Pretesting  
In order to minimise the possible sensitization effects 
that testing may have on the treatment procedures the study was 
designed in such, a way that there was a delay interval between 
'testing and treatment for each child. For this experimental 
design purpose children in the direct instruction program group (DIP) 
and general instruction program group (GIP) were randomly divided 
into two sub-groups; hereafter labelled DIP 1 and DIP 2, and 
ou 1 and ou 2. 
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The DIP 1 and GIP 1 children were tested over the first 
three weeks of the six week pretest period, and the DIP 2 and 
GIP 2 children over the following three weeks. The pre-post 
control group children's pretesting ranged over the six week 
period. All children were tested individually. 
Treatment Procedure  
The treatment period extended over six weeks. The 
treatment sub-groups DIP 1 and GIP 1 were treated for the initial 
three weeks, and then the DIP 2 and GIP 2 children were treated 
for the following three week period. This procedure fulfilled 
the requirement of providing a delay interval between testing. 
and treatment. 
Each of the DIP and GIP children were given ten sessions 
of 20 minutes over the three week training period, four sessions 
in each of the first two weeks and two sessions in the third week. 
Four experimenters conducted the training sessions. To 
control for extraneous effects, each trainer was required to 
treat approximately seven DIP and seven GIP children, who were 
randomly assigned to the trainer. Again none of the experimenters 
was aware of the hypotheses of the experiment. 
Post Testing  
To allow for a meaningful test of the effectiveness of the 
treatment programs and to diminish the interaction between 
testing and treatment, the direct instruction program sub-group 
(DIP 1) and general instruction program sub-group (GIP 1) were 
post tested over the first three weeks following the cessation of 
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the treatment period. The second of the sub-groups in both 
treatment groups (DIP 2, GIP 2) were then tested over a three 
week period. The pre-post no treatment control group and post-
only control group were tested over the six week post test 
period. 
Follow Up Testing  
It was hypothesised that there would be a significant 
•increase in resistance responding on the DIP group. Therefore 
a three month follow up on the DIP group was incorporated in 
the design to assess whether any change from pretest to post 
test would be maintained. 
A schematic outline of the study is provided in Figure 16. 
10.2.5 The Treatment Programs  
General Instruction Program. For the purposes of this thesis the 
GIP was defined as an awareness training procedure whereby a 
child would be taught to think about the issues related to 
stealing. However, the child would be required to discover for 
him/herself the critical components in a stealing dilemma and 
to make his/her own decision on whether to yield or resist. No 
moral directives were offered to the children in this type of 
program. Specifically the essential features of the GIP were: 
(i) to expose the child to a range of pictorially 
represented temptation to steal situations; 
(ii) to provide the child with issues to help him/her focus 
his/her attention on the problem of stealing from a number of 
perspectives; 
FOLLOW-UP TESTS POST-TESTS TREATMENT PRE-TESTS 
DIP 1 	DIP 2 DIP 1 	DIP 2 DIP 1 	DIP 2 DIP 1 and 2 
TESTING AND TREATMENT ORDER 
GIP 1 	GIP 2 GIP 1 	GIP 2 GIP 1 	GIP 2 
PPC GROUP PPC & POC GROUP 
0 
	3 	9 	12 	15 	18 
TIME LINE IN WEEKS 
KEY 
DIP 1, DIP 2 Direct Instruction Program sub groups 1 and 2 respectively GIP 1, GIP 2 General Instruction Program sub groups 1 and 2 respectively 
FIGURE 16 	Testing and Treatment Timetable for Study II 
PPC No treatment control group 
POC Post only control group 
30 33 
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(iii)to allow the child to establish what was 'wrong' with 
stealing without the experimenter specifically indicating the 
'right' and 'wrong' response in a situation. That is, no moral 
absolutes were given to the child. It was reasoned that in
•this way the child might be expected to integrate the information 
in a discussion of stealing perspectives at his own level. 
The General Instruction Program Procedure. Each child was 
individually trained for ten, 20 minute sessions over three weeks. 
The content of the program involved specific discussion of 
temptation to steal situations. These situations are given in 
Appendix III - A. The following is an example of one of the 
conflict situations used : 
"Jan/Fred looked at the comics on the stand. S/he 
thought to herself/himself, 'Wow! I would really like 
one of those Superman comics. The comic looks just like 
the movie of Superman'. Jan/Fred knew that s/he did 
not have any money and therefore could not buy one. 
S/he looked around and could not see anybody looking at 
her/him. S/he then looked hard at the Superman comic 
again and wondered if s/he should quickly grab it and 
run." 
Each child individually discussed approximately two problem 
situations with the experimenter during each 20 minute session. 
A slide apparatus was used to project pictures of the 
stories used during training to both the GIP group and the DIP 
group. This procedure was followed to facilitate the educable 
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mentally retarded children's comprehension of the temptation to 
steal stories. The slide relating to the above story is shown 
in Figure 17. 
As the slide relating to each temptation problem was 
projected onto a screen the experimenter read out the details of 
the conflict situation. Following the presentation of the story, 
which wasalways in third person in order to maintain the 
undirective nature of the program, the experimenter presented 
sequentially 17 issues related to the stealing situation, and 
represented in the form of probe questions details of which 
may be found in Appendix III - B. An example of some of the probes 
and issues covered however are indicated here: 
Issue  
General reference 
Model's behaviour 
Law 
Probe 
Do most people take things 
that they want? Why/why not? 
Do you think that a friend of 
yours would steal from you, 
or anyone? Why/why not? 
The law is made up of rules. 
One rule says that it is not 
right to steal. Do you think 
it is a good rule? Why/why 
not? 
The concept of using issues was based on the notion that 
stealing can be influenced by any one of a number of motives. 
Some of these include, financial needs, peer pressure, attitude 
to the law, influence of esteemed models, and so on. It was 
FIGURE 17 An Example of a Slide of a Temptation Situation 
Used in the GIP Program 
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reasoned that a child should be encouraged to view a temptation 
to steal problem situation from all kinds of perspectives and to 
think about the stealing in relation to these perspectives. 
Every child was encouraged to discuss each issue. The 
experimenter did not tell the child what he thought was the 
right or wrong answer. The experimenter's role was merely to 
act as a catalyst for discussion and to attempt to keep the 
child's responses relevant to the issues being discussed. If 
the child was in favour of stealing the experimenter posed a 
question centred around - how the child would feel if someone 
stole from him, and the question, 'if everyone stole, how could 
anyone own anything?; and does it make it right to steal just 
because someone else does? 
The Direct Instruction Program  
Specifically, the DIP is based on the assumption that the 
precise, careful analysis and presentation of elements and 
issues relating to stealing should be defined, clarified and 
taught directly to children. One of the other features of such 
a program is that learning is not left to chance. 
The essential features of the DIP were: 
(i) to ensure that the child had acquired the concept of 
'ownership' (yours/mine distinction). 
(ii) to define and present the processes involved in the 
resistance to stealing program into a step-by-step teaching 
sequence as defined by Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1980). 
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(iii) to delineate and order the processes involved in the 
resistance to stealing program into a step-by-step teaching 
sequence as defined by Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1980). 
(iv) to provide;.pictorial representations of the processes 
outlined in the resistance program. 
(v) to provide decision-making opportunities for the child 
throughout the resistance program. 
(vi) to provide corrective feedback contingent on the 
child's resistance or yielding decisions. 
(vii) to present a range of everyday temptation to steal 
situations for the child to engage in problem solving. 
(viii) to allow the child to choose a legitimate alternative 
way of getting his goal, and 
(ix) to give the child an opportunity to act out his 
chosen alternative via a simulated roleplay with 3-D models. 
The Direct Instruction Program Procedure. Each child was 
individually trained for ten, 20 minute sessions over three weeks. 
In order to facilitate learning to the resistance chain, a 
special treatment apparatus was constructed. 
Treatment Apparatus. The treatment apparatus was in most 
respects similar to the testing apparatus. However, there were 
two notable differences. Firstly, the experimenter was seated 
beside the projector in the same room as the child. This was 
necessary as part of the training procedure involved close•
trainer-child interaction. Secondly, the child had a display 
panel in front of him/her with two buttons on it. A red button 
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marked NO and a green button marked YES. S/he was taught the 
association between colour and label. The display panel was 
installed so that the child could indicate his/her decision to 
resist or yield during exposure to temptation to steal situations 
(see Figure 18a). The wires from the display panel led to a 
box with a green and red bulb which corresponded to the display 
panel buttons, and was situated near the experimenter (see 
Figure 18b). 
Training Procedure. The ten training sessions consisted of 
concept training and assessment during the first session, and 
resistance training using the treatment apparatus, on the 
following nine sessions. The concept and resistance training 
procedures will be discussed separately. 
Concept Training and Assessment (Session 1) (Appendix III - C). 
As the concepts of ownership and stealing along with a 
definition of a temptation to steal problem were fundamental 
to the resistance training program it was critical to establish 
the subjects' comprehension of these concepts. 
Session 1 - Procedure. Using a concept assessment 
procedure similar to that employed by Becker, Engelmann and 
Thomas (1975), the concept of ownership was first tested. A 
card sorting task formed the basis of this evaluation. Both the 
experimenter and child wrote theirnames on a card and then each 
drew a different picture on three other cards. The experimenter 
then placed the 'name' (label) cards on the table and jumbled 
the remaining picture cards. S/he then asked the child to sort 
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FIGURE 18a The Display Panel with the 'NO' and 'YES' 
Decision Buttons 
FIGURE 18b The Box with the 'Red' and 'Green' Bulbs 
Indicating to the Experimenter Which 
Decision the Child Has Made 
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the picture cards under the correct 'name' label. The child had 
to place all the cards correctly (the instances and non instances) 
on three consecutive sorts. On each sorting the 'name' labels 
were switched to minimise the order learning effect (see Figure 
19a). Next the 'name' labels were replaced by 'yours' and 'mine' 
lables. In an earlier study Jackson (1969) had emphasised the 
need to make certain that children discriminated between the 
'yours' and 'mine' concept in relation to possessions. 
During the yours/mine concept assessment the experimenter 
also gave the child training in the concept of 'being fair'. 
Each time the child completed a successful yours/mine sort, s/he 
repeated after the experimenter, "Being fair means you say, 'I 
can take mine but cannot take yours;,that's treating the other 
person as you would like to be treated'. The same sorting 
procedure as used previously was then repeated (see Figure 19b). 
Following this procedure, the yours/mine labels were replaced 
by 'own' and 'do not own' labels and again the same concept 
assessment procedure repeated (see Figure 19c). 
The next main concept to be discussed was that of 
'stealing'. Stealing was defined to the child as 'taking 
something without asking the owner'. An exercise was then 
conducted which consisted of teaching the defining character-
istics of a temptation to steal situation, as well as repeating 
the definition of stealing. 
The experimenter took out two boxes and labelled Box 1 
with his/her name and Box 2 with the child's name. The experi-
menter put a jelly bean in his/her box and asked the child, 
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"Do you want that?" The experimenter then said, "If I turned 
away and you really wanted that jelly bean you would get excited 
- you could probably feel your belly getting excited - and then 
you would say to yourself - will I take it or not! If you did 
take it, what would you be doing? The experimenter gave the 
child five seconds to respond and then said, "If you take some-
thing without asking the owner, you are - stealing. Say, 
'Stealing is taking something without asking the owner. What is 
stealing?" The child said after the experimenter what stealing 
was. 
This procedure was repeated with two other temptation 
stimuli. 
Additionally the notion of achieving the item legitimately 
was introduced again using the owner labelled boxes and models 
to concretize the examples (see Figure 19d). For example, the 
experimenter said, "How do you think you could get the pen 
without taking it?" The child was given five seconds to 
respond, then the experimenter said, "You could ask the owner if 
you could have it, or you could ask a friend or your parents if 
you could borrow or have a lend of some money so you could buy a 
pen, or you could save the money up, or you could do some jobs 
and earn the money for the pen. Let's go over those ways you 
can get something without taking it." 
Sessions 2 to 10 - Resistance Training. The contents of 
the resistance training per se, were similar to that presented by 
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Haines, Jackson and Davidson, 1980). However, in this earlier 
program the child was required to define, or recognise the 
stealing situation, then to recall nine schemata, and on the 
basis of these schemata to resist and then make a legitimate 
acquisition response. Due to memory limitations, the retarded 
child was only required to recall one schema. This schema "Be 
Fair", was chosen as it represents a rule the child can 
internalise, and is morally superior to some of the more 
externally oriented schemata. Other corrective features were 
also added to facilitate learning of the resistance sequence. 
Resistance training with the DIP involved presenting the 
child with a series of slides synchronised with verbal instructions 
which the child was required to repeat. There were four phases 
of self-verbalisation resistance training (see Appendix III - D). 
During the initial training sessions the child slowly repeated 
each key word presented by the instructor. As sessions progressed 
the child was given less verbal prompting by the experimenter, 
until during the final two sessions the child was required to 
recall the resistance chain unassisted. The format of the 
resistance chain is represented in Figure 20 below. 
Example of a Training Session. The child, seated behind the 
screen, was told to imagine s/he was the boy/girl in the temptation 
situation which was on the slide in front of him/her (see Figure 
21a). The experimenter then told the child s/he would be able to 
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recognise a temptation to steal situation by the cue words he 
would say to himself/herself, "Will I take it or not?" •After 
repeating this phrase, the slide changed to a THINK slide (see 
Figure 21b) which was designed to make the child 'reflect' 
before making a decision. The child repeated "think". 
Next came a BE FAIR slide (see Figure 21c), after repeating 
the key phrase designed to give the child an internal rule to 
guide his decision, for example, 'Treat others as you would like 
to be treated'. The original temptation situation slide was 
represented (see Figure 21d). At this stage the child was 
required to make his/her decision and indicate it by pressing the 
YES or NO button in front of him/her. 
In order to more closely approximate a real temptation to 
steal situation the child was given the opportunity at points 
throughout the training to make a decision to steal or not to 
steal. A NO choice represented resistance and a YES choice 
represented yielding. 
NO Choice. If the child pressed the NO button, the following 
slides and verbal instructions sequentially appeared to reinforce 
the child's decision and further guide his response: THINK, 
BEING FAIR MAKES THE OWNER HAPPY (owner is represented smiling), 
BEING FAIR MAKES YOU HAPPY, THINK, TRY AGAIN. These 
slides are presented in Figure 22a,b,c,d,e respectively. During 
this final slide the child was required to select from a split 
screen, which had pictures of four ways of obtaining the desired 
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object without stealing. They were: saving, asking a parent, 
doing odd jobs, collecting bottles. This has been defined as 
legitimate alternative training. The child selected which 
alternative s/he would like to try. The alternatives were: 
do odd jobs, ask parents, collect bottles (see Figure 23). The 
slide session stopped, and the child and experimenter then 
'acted out' one of the four alternatives. 
The Legitimate Alternative Training (Appendix III - E) 
The child 'acted out' his/her chosen alternative using 
three dimensional models. It was suggested that the three 
dimensional concrete mode of instruction with only task relevant 
verbal input would facilitate learning of the legitimate 
alternatives with the retarded more than a highly verbal method 
of instruction. This suggestionwas made for the following 
reasons: 
1. An instruction format based on three dimensional 
objects and figures permits the retarded child to grasp the 
content of an instruction rapidly because the message is 
externalised. The child can actually see a visual representation 
of the message. 2, Further, because he can manipulate the 
objects or figures essential for the message, he is able to 
control the rate of input. 3. Because he can actually see the 
consequences of the message to the three dimensional figures he 
is able to benefit from instant, observable feedback. It should 
be noted that feedback indicating correct and incorrect responses 
185. 
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FIGURE 23 The 'Legitimate Alternatives' Slide 
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is basic to concept learning (Meyer and Offenbach, 1962). It 
also provides reinforcement for the child's response. 4. The 
utilization of three dimensional figures would also seem the 
most parsimonious way of permitting the child to review and 
practise the point of any message. Review and practice also 
facilitate concept learning. 5. Because the child has control of 
the form and rate of responding he is able to function at 
his/her own individual learning level. This minimises 
the retardate's feeling of insecurity, and anxiety. The 
obvious spinoffs are that attention and motivation are not 
hindered. Attention and motivation have been shown to be 
critical for efficient learning. 6. It also seems that three 
dimensional figures and objects present a stimulating stimulus 
complex for the child to attend to. Scott (1966) has stated the 
two major variables controlling those behaviours classified as 
attention: (a) reinforcement; (b) the nature of the stimulus 
display. 
An example of a legitimate alternative training session is 
given in Figure 24a,b. The child's name was attached to the 
scale model s/he manipulated so that s/he could more readily 
identify with the scale model. At the commencement of the 
acting out of the alternative means of attaining a desired 
object the experimenter reminded the child of the temptation 
situation s/he resisted in, and then set out the relevant 
stimulus materials for the child to simulate his/her legitimate 
alternative. In performance of odd jobs alternative of mowing 
the lawn (Figure 24h) the experimenter, represented by an adult 
FIGURE 24a The Legitimate Alternative Training of 
'Saving Money' 
FIGURE 24b The Legitimate Alternative Training of 
'Doing an Odd Job' 
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scale model, would pretend s/he was sitting in the garden. The 
child would then have to approach the adult model and suggest 
that s/he would mow the lawn for a small fee. The adult model 
would agree to this request. The child would then manipulate 
his/her scale model to push a toy lawn mower up and down a desk 
several times. Following this the adult model would pay the 
child the money for the completed job. 
YES Choice. If the child pressed the YES button the following 
slides and verbal instruction appeared in order to correct the 
child's response: THINK, NOT BEING FAIR MAKES OWNER UNHAPPY, 
NOT BEING FAIR MAKES YOU FEEL SAD, TRY AGAIN. These slides 
are represented in Figure 25a,b,c,d respectively. At this 
point the earlier sequence of slides leading up to the point 
of making a decision were repeated. The child could only press 
the YES button twice, after this s/he was directed to press the 
NO button. This procedure was introduced to ensure that the 
child could experience the reinforcing effects of the correct 
decision and have practice 'acting out' legitimate alternatives. 
0 
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FIGURE 25a The 'THINK' Slide FIGURE 25b The 'Not Being Fair Makes 
the Owner Unhappy' Slide 
FIGURE 25c The 'Not Being Fair 
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FIGURE 25d The 'Try Again' Slide 
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CHAPTER 11 
RESULTS 
11.1 DATA ANALYSIS 
The pre-and post-treatment scores for the subjects in 
each of the experimental and control groups on all measures were 
calculated. These data and the group means are shown separately 
for each measure in Appendix IV - A to J. For a number of the 
analyses the "Teddybear Statistical Program" (Wilson, 1978) was 
employed. Results will be discussed separately on each of the 
measures. 
Resistance on the Behavioural Measure of the JHTST  
One of the main aims of the present study was to establish 
whether educable mentally retarded children's resistance behaviour 
in hypothetical temptation to steal situations could be increased 
by the application of treatment programs. In order to evaluate 
this aim an analysis of the experimental and control groups' 
performance on the behavioural measure of the JHTST was conducted 
and compared. 
Group mean resistance scores on the behavioural measure 
('did do') at the pre-treatment and post-treatment are shown in 
Figure 26 for each of the three groups. It is clear from Figure 
26 that the DIP group increased their resistance scores while 
those of the GIP group and no treatment control group were 
relatively stable. 
Analysis of covariance was carried out on the pre- and 
post-treatment measures to evaluate the significance of the 
above trends. Covariance analysis was selected to partial out the 
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effects of differences between pre-treatment group means. In 
this analysis the criterion measure was the post-treatment scores 
while the pre-treatment scores were used as the covariate. 
Results show that the F ratio is significant at the .05 level 
(Appendix IV - K) indicating that at least one significant 
difference exists between the experimental and control groups 
(F[2,78 = 3.59; p<.05]). A Duncan's New Multiple Range test was 
performed on the adjusted post test means to determine which 
inter-group differences were significant. These findings 
indicate that the DIP group differed significantly from both the 
GIP group and no treatment control group (p .05) and that the 
GIP group did not differ significantly from the untreated group 
(p>.05). Therefore the hypotheses I(a) and (b) regarding 
differences in resistance on the behavioural measure between the 
DIP, GIP and no treatment control groups were supported. 
Although the no treatment control group scores indicate 
no group mean improvement from pre- to post-tests, the overall 
design of the study involved a post only control group to 
test specifically for sensitization effects occurring by 
repeating the JHTST. Therefore a t test was performed on the 
no treatment control group and post only control group scores. 
No significant difference resulted between the control groups 
(means were 3.48 and 2.96, t = .81, p>.05; df = 52). This 
finding is consistent with the mean lack of improvement in the no 
treatment pre-post control group. Therefore, Hypothesis I(c) was 
confirmed. 
Although the comparison of the experimental and control 
group means indicated a statistically significant increase in the 
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DIP group relative to the GIP and no treatment control groups, 
inspection of the subjects' pre- and post-scores suggested that 
only a small number of children improved dramatically. In 
order to further clarify this observation the pre- and post- 
treatment raw data of the DIP, GIP and no treatment control groups 
was plotted (Figures 27a,b,c). These figures highlight that most 
of the dramatic improvement occurred in the DIP group. It was 
decided to further inspect the raw data by constructing a table 
of substantial improvers (defined as 4+), slight improvers (1-3), 
slight regressors (-1-3) and substantial regressors (-4). The 
results are shown in Table 6. 
TABLE 6 
Degree of Change from Pre to Post Test 
On The Three Groups 
-1-3 
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From the table it is clear that across groups most 
subjects either improved only slightly, were unchanged or 
regressed (backslid). Only 7 subjects in the DIP and 1 in the 
no treatment control group improved substantially (+4). 
Another point of research interest was the number of 
subjects who resisted across all situations on the JHTST, that 
is, were categorical resisters. A graphic representation of 
categorical resisters in the pre- and post-treatments in the 
three groups is given in Figure 28. 
The figure reveals more children becoming categorical 
resisters from the pre- to post-treatment in the DIP group 
compared to the GIP group and no treatment control group. 
An analysis of the number of children who became 
categorical resisters on the post test using a chi square test 
indicates that there were significantly more DIP compared to GIP 
and no treatment control subjects (x 2 = 4.11, 4.11; p<.05 
respectively, df = 1). There was no significant difference 
between the GIP and no treatment control group (x 2 = 0, p>.05; 
df = 1). These results supported Hypothesis II(a) and (b). 
As an important component of the DIP group's resistance 
training involved legitimate alternative strategies these 
data will be presented in Figure 29. It is apparent from 
Figure 29 that only very few children in the groups, at the pre-
and post-treatment used legitimate alternative strategies in 
resisting the temptation to steal on the JHTST. Although the 
numbers are too small for meaningful statistical analysis, more 
children at the post-treatment used legitimate alternative 
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strategies in the DIP (5) compared to the GIP (2) or no 
treatment pre-post control (3) groups. Although Hypothesis III 
(a) and (b) regarding increases in legitimate alternatives were 
not supported an increase in the predicted direction was noted. 
Intrinsic Resistance Strategies  
As the DIP treatment program incorporated training 
children to use'intrinsic resistance' cognitive processes in 
resisting the temptation to steal a comparison was made of the 
subjects' intrinsic responses in the DIP, GIP and no treatment 
control groups. 
Group mean 'intrinsic resistance' scores at the pre-
treatment and post-treatment are shown in Figure 30 for each 
of the three groups. It is evident from Figure 30 that the 
DIP group clearly increased their use of intrinsic resistance 
strategies while those of the GIP group and no treatment control 
group only increased very slightly. 
The data was subjected to the same covariance analysis 
used for hypothetical behavioural resistance measures with 
. post scores as the criterion measure and pre scores as the 
covariate. The F ratio is significant at the .05 level, 
(Appendix IV - 0, indicating at least one significant difference 
exists between the three groups (F[2,78 = 3.82, p<.05]). A 
Duncan's New Multiple Range test applied to the adjusted 
post test mean revealed that the DIP group was significantly 
different from the GIP and no treatment control groups (p<.05). 
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The GIP group and no treatment control group did not differ 
significantly from one another (p>.05) and therefore 
Hypothesis IV(a) and (b) was supported. 
Resistance on the Moral Judgement Measure of the JHTST  
Another issue of importance in this research was 
related to the influence that the treatment program would have 
on the children's moral judgement in hypothetical temptation to 
steal situations. 
Group mean resistance on the moral judgement ('should do') 
measure at the pre-treatment and post-treatment are shown 
in Figure 31 for each of the three groups. From visual 
inspection of the figure only slight increases occurred in the 
DIP group and GIP, while there was only slight decrease in the 
no treatment control group. 
The data were subjected to the covariance analysis 
procedure with the post scores as the criterion measure and 
the pre scores as the covariate. The analysis indicated no 
significant difference between the groups (F[2,78 = 0.8925, 
p> .05])(Appendix IV - M) and supported Hypothesis V(a) and (b). 
An analysis was also made of the children's use of 
legitimate alternative responses on the moral judgement measure. 
These data are shown in Figure 32. Inspection of the figure 
shows that approximately the same number of children resisted 
on the pre- and post-treatment in each of the groups. The 
number of children resisting at the post-treatment between the 
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groups is also approximately equal. This finding fails to 
support Hypothesis VI(a), but does support Hypothesis VI(b). 
An examination was also made of the subjects' resistance 
on the moral judgement measure which was motivated by 
intrinsic processes. 
Group mean intrinsic resistance scores at the pre-
treatment and post-treatment are shown in Figure 33. From the 
figure the DIP group clearly increased intrinsic resistance 
scores, while there was only a slight increase in the GIP group 
and a slight decrease in the no treatment control group. 
A covariance analysis was performed on the data with 
post-scores as the criterion measure and pre-scores as the 
covariate. The analysis revealed a significant F ratio 
(Appendix IV N) which suggests at least one significant 
difference exists between the three groups (F[2,78 = 2.99, 
p‹.05]). A Duncan's New Multiple Range test was performed on 
the adjusted post test means to determine which intergroup 
differences were significant. The findings indicated that the 
DIP group was not significantly different from the GIP group 
(p>.05) but was significantly different from the no treatment 
control group (p<.05), while there was no significant 
difference between the GIP group and no treatment control group 
(p>.05). 
Therefore that part of Hypothesis VII(a) which referred 
to a significant difference between the DIP group and GIP group 
was not confirmed, while that part of the hypothesis which 
suggested a significant difference between the DIP group and no 
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treatment control group was confirmed. Hypothesis VII(b) was 
also confirmed. 
Stephens' General Moral Judgement Measure  
In order to determine whether the effects of a specific 
(DIP) and general (GIP) stealing program would spread to 
children's wider moral judgement reasoning, two moral 
judgement tests were administered. These tests will be 
examined separately. 
(a) Clumsiness and Stealing Test. The Clumsiness and 
Stealing test examined whether the child made a response based 
on a consequence of the action, or the intentions of the 
actor. 
Group mean clumsiness and stealing scores at the 
pre-treatment and post-treatment are shown in Figure 34 for 
each of the three groups. The figure suggests no substantial 
increases in any of the groups. 
An analysis of covariance was performed on the pre-
treatment and post-treatment measures with the pre-treatment 
scores used as the covariate. The findings indicated no 
significant difference between the groups (F[2,78 = 0.50, 
p>.05])(Appendix IV - 0). Therefore Hypothesis VIII(a) and 
(b) were confirmed with respect to the clumsiness and stealing 
index of general moral judgement. 
(b) Collective Responsibility Test. The collective 
responsibility test analyzed whether the subjects would 
1 
punish everyone without reason for one actor's misdemeanour, 
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or would only punish the perpetrator of the act with a clear 
reason. 
Group mean collective responsibility scores at the 
pre-treatment and post-treatment are shown in Figure 35. It is 
clear from the figure that a relatively small increase 
occurred in the GIP, and there was almost no change in the 
DIP and no treatment control groups. 
An analysis of covariance performed on the pre- and post-
treatment measures with the pre-treatment scores as covariate 
indicated a significant F ratio (Appendix IV - P)(F[2,78 = 3.38, 
p < .05 ]). Accordingly, a Duncan's New Multiple Range test 
was conducted. The results indicated no significant difference 
between the DIP group and both the no treatment control group 
and the GIP group. However, the GIP group was significantly 
different from the no treatment control group (p<.05). 
Hypothesis IX referring to no significant difference between 
the DIP group to GIP group and DIP group to no treatment control 
group was confirmed. While that part of the hypothesis 
referring to no significance between the GIP group and no 
treatment control group was not confirmed. 
Reflectivity Scores on Kagan's MFFT  
An important aspect of the DIP training was to encourage 
children to reflect or 'think' before acting. 
As mentioned, recently Salking and Wright (1977), working 
with Kagan's MEET presented a model conceptualizing reflection-
impulsivity as two orthagonal dimensions, one being a measure 
210. 
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of impulsivity, and the other, efficiency. These measures will 
be treated separately. 
(a)MFFT - Impulsivity Measure. Group mean impulsivity 
scores at the pre-treatment and post-treatment are shown in 
Figure 36. From the figure it is clear that the DIP group has 
increased in reflectivity, that is, decreased in impulsivity, 
while both the GIP group and no treatment control group have 
increased in impulsivity. 
An analysis of covariance was performed on the pre- and 
post-treatment measures, using the pre-treatment scores as 
the covariate and the post scores as the criterion measure. 
The analysis revealed a significant F ratio (Appendix IV - Q) 
(F[2,78 = 3.89, p<.05]). A Duncan's New Multiple Range test 
was performed on the adjusted post test mean indicating that 
the DIP group is significantly different from the GIP group 
and the no treatment control group (p<.05), while there was 
no difference between the GIP group and no treatment control 
group (p>.05). These findings supported Hypothesis X(a) and (b). 
(b)MFFT - Efficiency Measure. Group mean efficiency 
scores at the pre- and post-treatment are shown in Figure 37. 
From the figure it is clear that the DIP group slightly 
increased. 
An analysis of covariance, similar to those previously 
reported, was performed on the data. There was no significant 
difference between the groups (F[2,78 = .49, p ,05]) 
(Appendix IV - R). Hypothesis XI(a) and (b) were therefore 
confirmed. 
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Real-Life Temptation Situations  
In order to examine the efficacy of the treatment 
procedures in a real life temptation to steal situation the 
children were confronted with such a situation. Also to 
obtain an index of the generalisability of the treatment 
procedures from a stealing to cheating domain a temptation to 
cheat situation was presented to the children. The results of 
the stealing and cheating tests will be presented separately. 
(a) The Real-Life Temptation to Steal Test. A graphic 
presentation of real life stealers in the pre- and post-
treatments in the three groups is given in Figure 38. 
It is apparent from the figure that there has not been a 
substantial reduction in the number of children stealing from 
pre- to post-test in the three groups. A comparison of children's 
stealing at the post test level between the DIP to GIP and no 
treatment control groups also reveals no significant 
differences (x2 = 1.3, 0, p>.05 respectively; df = 1). There 
was also no difference between the DIP to GIP and no treatment 
control group (x 2 = .66, p>.05, df = 1). Hypothesis XII(a) was 
thus not supported, while Hypothesis XII(b) was confirmed. 
Furthermore, a comparison of the no treatment control group 
to the post only control groupdemonstrates no significant 
• differences (x
2 
= 0, p>.05, df = 1). This finding suggests 
that test sensitization per se, does not produce a reduction 
of stealing in this situation and supported Hypothesis XII(c). 
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(b) The Real Life Temptation to Cheat Test. The results 
of children's responses to the cheating test are shown in 
Figure 39. From the figure no strong important trends are 
obvious from pre- to post-treatment in the three groups. An 
analysis of cheating behaviour at post-treatment between the 
DIP to GIP and no treatment control groups suggests no 
significant differences (x 2 = .68, .07, p>.05 respectively, 
df = 1). Nor was there a significant difference between the GIP 
and no treatment control group (x
2 
= .01, p>.05, df = 1). 
Hypothesis XII(a) was therefore not confirmed, while Hypothesis 
XII(b) was supported. Also an examination of the behaviour of 
the children in the no treatment control group to the post 
only control group showed no significant difference (x 2 = 0, 
p>.05, df = 1). Again no substantial test sensitization effect 
exists. This result supported Hypothesis XIII(c). 
Follow-Up Results on the DIP  
As it was hypothesised that there would be a significant 
increase in resistance on the JHTST in the DIP group, but not in 
the GIP group or no treatment control group, a follow-up test was 
presented only to the DIP group to establish whether gains 
made during treatment were maintained. At the time of the 
follow-up study, three months later, only 23 subjects remained 
available for testing. 
Group mean resistance responses on the behavioural and 
moral judgement measures at the post-treatment and follow-up 
treatment are shown in Figure 40 for the DIP group. A related 
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FIGURE 40 Mean Changes in Resistance Scores on 
the 'Did Do' and 'Should Do' Measures 
for the DIP Group 
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t test indicated no significant difference between the post 
and follow-up means on the behavioural measure (means were 4.43 
and 4.4 respectively)(related t = 0.1, p>.05, df = 22). These 
results show that the group gains were maintained on the 
behavioural measure. Hypothesis XIV(a) was thus confirmed. 
Resistance on the moral judgement measure revealed a significant 
increase between the post to follow-up treatment (means 7.0 
and 7.4 respectively)(related t = 2.18, p<.05, df = 22). 
Hypothesis XIV(b) was not supported. These results 
indicated an improvement from the post-treatment in the 
children's moral judgement in hypothetical temptation to 
steal situations. 
It was also of concern to establish whether the mean 
increase in intrinsic resistance processing on the behavioural 
measure from pre- to post-treatment in the DIP group would be 
maintained at the time of follow-up treatment. 
Group mean intrinsic resistance means at the post-
treatment and follow-up treatment are indicated in Figure 41. 
Analysis of these means indicated no significant difference 
between the post and follow-up treatment mean scores (means 
were 1.44 and 1.44 respectively)(related t = 0, p>.05, df = 22). 
These findings supported Hypothesis XV(a). It was also found 
that there was no significant difference between intrinsic 
resistance on the moral judgement measure from the post-
treatment to follow-up treatment (means were 2.22 and 1.87 
respectively)(related t = 1.09, p>.05, df = 22). This result 
supported Hypothesis XV(b). 
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11.2 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
Results will be evaluated with respect to the hypotheses 
outlined previously. 
I(a) & (b) There was a significant increase in behavioural 
resistance in the DIP group relative to either the GIP and no 
treatment control groups. There was no significant difference 
between the GIP and no treatment control groups. 
However, it should be noted that the number of substantial 
improvers (4+) in the DIP group consisted of only approximately 
25 percent of the group. 
I(c) 	No significant difference existed in the post 
resistance scores on the behavioural measure between the no 
treatment control group and the post only control group. 
II(a) & (b) An analysis of the children who became categorical 
resisters indicated a significant difference in favour of the 
DIP relative to the GIP and no treatment control groups, while 
there was no significant difference between the GIP and no 
treatment control groups. 
III(a) & (b) No significant increase in legitimate alternative 
responses on the behavioural measure was found in the DIP group 
in comparison with the GIP and no treatment control groups, 
nor was there a significant increase in the GIP relative to 
the no treatment control group. 
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IV(a) & (b) A significant increase in the use of intrinsic 
behavioural resistance strategies occurred in the DIP when 
related to the GIP Or no treatment control groups, whilst there 
was no significant difference between the GIP and the no 
treatment control groups. 
V(a) & (b) No significant increase in resistance on the moral 
judgement measure was found in the DIP relative to the GIP and 
no treatment control groups, nor was there a significant 
increase in the GIP group compared to the no treatment control 
group. 
VI(a) & (b) No significant increase in the number of children 
using legitimate alternative responses on the moral judgement 
measure occurred in the DIP relative to the GIP and no 
treatment control groups. No significant differences existed 
between the GIP and no treatment control groups. 
VII(a) & (b) No significant increase in intrinsic resistance 
on the moral judgement measure was found in the DIP compared to 
the GIP group. However, there was a significant difference 
between the DIP and no treatment control groups, while there 
was not between the GIP and no treatment control groups. 
VIII •No significant increase in general moral judgement 
on the clumsiness and stealing test was found in the DIP relative 
to the GIP and no treatment control groups, or between the GIP 
and no treatment control groups. 
IX No significant increase in general moral judgement 
on the responsibility test was found in the DIP relative to the 
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GIP and no treatment control groups. However, the GIP was 
significantly different from the no treatment control group. 
X(a) & (b) A significant difference in impulsivity on the 
MFFT was found in the DIP relative to the GIP and no treatment 
control groups, while there was no significant difference 
between the GIP and no treatment control groups. 
XI No significant increase in efficiency on the 
MFFT was found in the DIP relative to the GIP and no treatment 
control groups. There was also no significant difference 
between the GIP and no treatment control groups. 
XII(a)(b) & (c) No significant decrease in the number of 
children stealing in the real life situation occurred in the 
DIP relative to the GIP and no treatment control gorups, while 
there was no significant difference between the GIP and no 
treatment control groups, or between the no treatment control 
and post only control groups. 
XIII(a)(b) & (c) No significant decrease in the number of 
children cheating in the real life situation occurred in the 
DIP in comparison with the GIP and no treatment control groups. 
There was no significant difference between the GIP and no 
treatment control groups, or between the no treatment control 
and post only control groups. 
XIV(a) No significant difference resulted in a comparison 
between resistance on the behavioural measure in the DIP post-
treatment relative to the DIP follow-up treatment. 
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XIV(b) A significant increase occurred in resistance 
on the moral judgement measure in the DIP follow-up treatment 
relative to the DIP post-treatment. 
XV(a) & (b) No significant difference occurred in a comparison 
between intrinsic resistance on the DIP post-treatment relative 
to the follow-up treatment on either the 'did do' or 'should 
do' measures. 
226. 
CHAPTER 12 
DISCUSSION 
12.1 INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS 
The interpretation of the findings in the foregoing 
results section will consist of a discussion of the experimental 
and control groups' performance on 
(i) the hypothetical temptation to steal measure 
(ii) real life temptation measures 
(iii) the general moral judgement measures, and 
(iv) the impulsivity and efficiency measures 
(i) The Hypothetical Temptation to Steal Measure: JHTST  
The findings on the behavioural measure of the JHTST 
indicated a significant mean increase in resistance scores in 
the DIP group compared to the GIP and no treatment control 
groups, however there was no significant difference between 
the GIP and no treatment control groups. The design of the 
study included a post only control group in order to assess 
whether repeated exposure to the JHTST, per se, improved 
performance. A comparison of the no treatment and post only 
groups indicated no significant differences. Therefore no 
significant test sensitization effects were apparent. 
The significant mean difference finding between the 
treatment groups on the 'did do' measure would suggest a greater 
efficacy for the DIP group compared to the GIP group in 
facilitating educable mentally retarded children's resistance 
to the temptation to steal in a series of hypothetical 
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situations. In addition, this result clearly established that 
children in the DIP group were able, at least to some extent, 
to learn, retain and operate on resistance to stealing 
information which required them to engage in a high level of 
cognitive activity. 
However, further inspection of the pre- and post-
treatment raw data suggested that only approximately 25 percent 
of the children in the DIP group could be labelled substantial 
improvers (4+). Also over half of the group (52%) either 
regressed or were unchanged, while the remainder (23%) were 
slight improvers (I to 3). The substantial improvers did not 
differ markedly from other group members in terms of I.Q., age, 
SES or sex. Other variables, such as attentional and 
motivational variables may have accounted for the better 
performance of the substantial improvers. 
In attempting to explain why many children did not 
increase their resistance responding, several possible reasons 
emerge. Firstly, although the children had demonstrated that 
they could verbalise the resistance processes in the DIP with 
verbal prompts, they were provided with visual cues throughout 
the program. It may be that a proportion of the educable 
mentally retarded children could not employ the resistance 
processes indicated in the DIP at the time of post-treatment 
because they could not recall these processes without visual 
cues provided in the program. Secondly, a number of the 
children may have acquired the resistance chain used in the 
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DIP but not have been able to generalize their learning from 
the training to the testing situation. Thirdly, a small 
proportion of children were categorical resisters or close to 
the resistance ceiling on the JHTST at the time of pre-
treatment. 
These considerations may constitute the basis for 
future improvements in the DIP. 
An analysis of the GIP and no treatment groups indicated 
no significant differences between the groups. 
However, inspection of the pre- and post-treatment raw data 
revealed that approximately half (45%) of the GIP group 
regressed compared to about one third (33%) of the no treatment 
control group. This greater regression in the GIP group 
requires some further comment. It is suggested that although 
the GIP involved the children in the discussion of issues and 
aspects of stealing, per se, it did not provide definitive 
moral answers. In this sense the program lacked a structural 
and instructional dimension. That is, the children were not 
formally taught whether stealing was right or wrong. It was 
an inbuilt assumption of the GIP procedure that the children 
would discover for themselves the correct moral pathway. 
Clearly, with many educable mentally retarded children this 
proved to be an unwarranted assumption. 
One component of particular importance in the DIP 
procedure was aimed at helping children generate a legitimate 
alternative response to stealing. A comparison of the experimental 
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and control groups on the legitimate alternative index of 
the behavioural measure on the JHTST indicated no significant 
differences between the groups. The failure of the DIP group 
to achieve significance over the GIP and no treatment control 
groups on the legitimate alternative index may have been due 
to the inability of the retarded children to make the required 
level two resistance response outlined in the program. It 
could be argued that the retarded child, unlike the normal 
child in the Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1980) study, 
considered he had successfully responded to a temptation 
situation when he had made a terminal resistance response. He 
may not have considered it necessary after saying s/he would 
resist that he needed to generate a legitimate alternative. 
Further research seems necessary in this area. 
Another comparison between the experimental and control 
groups which involved an analysis of those children who 
became categorical resisters demonstrated that the DIP group 
was significantly different from the GIP and no treatment 
control groups, while there was no significant difference 
between the GIP and no treatment control groups. Categorical 
resistance on the JHTST represents a disposition towards 
0 
honesty in hypothetical temptation to steal situations, and 
has been shown to be related to real life resistance to 
stealing with normals (Haines, Jackson and Davidson, 1980), and to 
some extent with educable mentally retarded children (see 
Study I). Therefore as a greater number of children became 
categorical resisters in the DIP group these data lend further 
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support to the view that a DIP program is superior to a 
GIP one. 
This finding implies that more children in the DIP group 
than in the GIP group shifted from being categorical yielders 
or resisters in only some of the eight situations to the point 
where they demonstrated a cognitive and behavioural consistency 
in resisting across situations irrespective of the nature of 
the situation. In general, this outcome lends support to the 
argument that children can be taught to be honest, and therefore 
supports the generality position in relation to the generality/ 
specificity debate (Burton, 1963). 
Another component in the DIP procedure was to train 
children to use an intrinsic schema when they resisted the 
temptation to steal. The findings on the children's intrinsic 
resistance responses indicated significance in favour of the DIP 
group relative to the GIP and no treatment control groups, 
while there was no significant difference between the GIP and 
no treatment control groups. During the training of the DIP 
group each child was sequentially and systematically taught a 
set phrase or statement to help define the temptation 
situation. Then an intrinsic reason was given as a rationale 
for resistance (Be Fair - treat others as I would like to be 
treated). This was followed by the original temptation 
problem situation. During treatment the child was encouraged 
to make a resistance decision to this temptation problem 
situation. This decision was again supported by the previously 
defined intrinsic schema, and positively consequated by visual 
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representations and verbal expressions of happiness for the 
owner and the child himself/herself. It would seem reasonable 
to suggest that the DIP group's significantly greater use of 
intrinsic schemata was due to the embedding of intrinsic 
schemata into the children's memory during DIP training. In 
evaluating this aspect of the findings however, it should be 
recalled that the intrinsic schema component interacted with 
other variables in the DIP package. A partialling out of the 
effect of the intrinsic schema component from other treatment 
components, such as the defining of temptation problem 
situations, the positive consequating of the intrinsic schema 
and legitimate alternative training was not attempted. The 
specific aim of the study was to assess the efficacy of the 
DIP procedure as a treatment package in facilitating resistance 
to the temptation to steal, and in addition to encourage 
children to use a higher morally defensible and developmental 
schema or process to motivate their resistance responding. 
The findings on the moral judgement measure of the JHTST 
revealed no significant differences between the experimental 
and control groups on mean resistance scores. This finding was 
not unexpected as most of the children in all three of the 
groups demonstrated a high level of resistance at the time of 
pre-treatment. Therefore, due to these near ceiling resistance 
scores across groups, significant post-treatment differences 
between the groups were unlikely. These data however, do 
indicate that most children had acquired a 'no stealing' rule 
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at the time of pre-testing. These data, taken with the findings 
on the behavioural measure of the JHTST, suggest that after 
training there was a greater concordance between the DIP group's 
resistance on the behavioural and moral judgement measures 
compared to that of the GIP and no treatment control groups. 
Such a finding represents the aim of moral development studies 
(Kohlberg, 1976a). 
It was also of research interest to examine whether 
legitimate alternative training in the DIP group would affect 
the children's legitimate alternative responses on the 'should 
do' measure of the JHTST. The data indicated no significant 
differences between the experimental and control groups. The 
same set of reasons offered for the failure of the DIP group 
to use significantly more legitimate alternative responses 
compared to the GIP . and no treatment control groups on the 
'did do' measure are further offered for these results on the 
'should do' measure. 
Again from the view point of transfer of training 
effects from the DIP procedure to the children's moral judgement 
responding it was expected that the DIP group would use 
significantly more intrinsic resistance processing responses 
relative to the GIP and no treatment control groups. The data 
confirmed this expectation. Also there was no significant 
difference between the GIP and no treatment control groups. It 
was established therefore that although there was no significant 
difference in resistance responding on the 'should do' measure 
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between groups, the kind of schema used to resist did differ 
between the groups. This finding suggests an improvement in 
the developmental nature of the DIP children's resistance on 
the moral judgement measure. 
Researchers have established that younger children tend 
to focus on external consequences when reacting to a moral 
dilemma, while older children are more able to consider other 
aspects of moral dilemmas, such as the intentions of the actor 
(Kohlberg,1976a; Piaget, 1977) and the feelings of the owner 
in temptation to steal dilemmas. Furthermore intrinsically 
motivated resistance responses are desirable as they can be 
regarded as moral responses. 
A three month follow-up assessment on the DIP group 
revealed no significant difference in both resistance responses 
and intrinsically motivated resistance responses between post-
treatment and follow-up treatment on the 'did do' measure and 
a significant increase from post to follow-up treatment on 
the 'should do' measure. These results indicate that the gains 
made by the DIP group were maintained on the 'did do' measure 
and even improved upon on the 'should do' measure. 
A criticism of treatment programs is that their effects 
are short-term. This form of criticism would seem even more 
relevant to cognitively based programs where a considerable 
load is placed on the subject's memory capacity. These 
comments are of particular significance for educable mentally 
retarded subjects. The design of the present study therefore 
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included a three month follow-up testing session in an effort 
to respond to such criticisms. 
The present results of sustained resistance levels in 
the DIP group on the behaviour measure suggest that many 
subjects in this group had effectively stored the resistance 
training information into long-term memory. Also the ability 
of the group to maintain the level of intrinsically motivated 
resistance responses indicates that this improved level of 
cognitive processing supports Bandura and McDonald's (1963) 
early claims that cognitive levels can be meaningfully 
affected by social learning variables. It was also of interest 
to note the significant increase in resistance on the moral 
judgement measure from post to follow-up treatment. However, 
the result must be interpreted cautiously. One interpretation 
of these results would suggest that there were delayed 
treatment effects. 
Alternatively, the significant improvement from post 
to follow-up treatment in the DIP group . on the moral judgement 
measure may be more of statistical than clinical significance. 
The post and follow-up means (7.2 and 7.43) were close to the 
early level on the 8-point resistance scale. However the 
variances were very small and a significant difference between 
means resulted. 
Using the JHTST as a measure, the data provided 
evidence for the superiority of a specific direct instruction 
procedure over a general instruction procedure in facilitating 
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educable mentally retarded children's resistance behaviour ih 
hypothetical temptation to steal situations. In addition the 
children's use of intrinsic behavioural and moral reasoning 
resistance schemata were enhanced significantly more by the 
DIP than by the GIP procedure. Furthermore significantly 
more children became categorical resisters in the DIP compared 
to GIP group. A follow-up test three months after post-
treatment indicated that gains made in the DIP group had been 
maintained on the behavioural measure and improved upon on 
the moral judgement measure. 
A qualification to the success of the DIP procedure 
was noted. Only approximately one quarter of the DIP group 
made a substantial improvement in resistance on the 'did do' 
measure of the JHTST. Several hypotheses were offered for 
this finding. 
A close inspection of the GIP procedure indicated that 
a substantial proportion (45%) of the group regressed in their 
resistance behaviour on the 'did do' measure of the JHTST. 
Given the possible negative effects of a 'discovery' learning 
approach to teaching resistance to temptation to steal as 
exemplified in the GIP group, and the clear positive impact of 
the direct instruction procedure, represented by the DIP group, 
it would seem advisable, at least when teaching educable 
mentally retarded children to adopt the direct instruction 
model for the treatment and prevention of stealing. 
The finding of greater resistance on the behavioural 
measure by a direct instruction procedure which required 
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children to use self-statements of a cognitive construction 
(Pressly, 1979) and consequating (Bandura, 1977) kind in 
a temptation to steal situation to guide their behavioural 
responding, attracts support from the cognitive-behaviour 
modification literature. From a wider perspective than 
stealing, Meichenbaum (1977) has demonstrated how schizo- 
phrenics can modify their behaviour by the use of self-statements. 
Similarly, Camp et al (1977) working with aggressive behaviour 
problem children has established the efficacy of the self-
instructional model. Within the resistance to temptation and 
self control frameworks Mischel and Patterson (1978) have 
established the different types of self-verbalisation which 
are most effective in teaching pre-schoolers self control. 
Specifically from within the stealing domain, Guidry (1975) 
and Stumphauzer (1976) have shown the power of covert 
consequating self-statements of the self-reinforcing and self-
punishing kind, in modifying stealing behaviour. Furthermore, 
Haines, Jackson and Davidson (1980) using a combination of 
direct instruction and cognitive-behaviour modification 
procedures established a program, based on Jackson's model of 
cognitive processing in hypothetical temptation to steal 
situations, which proved effective in facilitating resistance 
behaviour in a group of normal children. The present research 
used a similar program to increase resistance to stealing 
among educable mentally retarded children. Additionally 
advantages with direct instruction training, as used in the 
DIP procedure, as opposed to the type of general instruction, 
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as employed in the GIP procedure, in facilitating learning 
in other academic domains in retarded persons has been 
documented by a number of workers in the retardation area 
(Becker and Carnine, 1978; Becker, Engelmann and Thomas, 1975; 
Maggs and Patching, 1979). 
) Real Life Temptation Measures  
The findings from the stealing and cheating real life 
temptation tests indicated that there was no significant 
difference between the three experimental groups. Also a 
comparison of the no treatment control group to the post only 
control group on both tests indicated that there was no 
substantial test sensitization effects, as there was no 
significant difference between the two control groups. 
Although the result from the real life stealing test 
differs from the findings on the behavioural measure of the 
JHTST it can be strongly argued that the limitations on the 
validity of a real life situation,where a child is tempted to 
take smarties from bowl during the brief absence of the 
experimenter,are considerable. These limitations include the 
artificiality, unfamiliarity, and detectability of the situation, 
as well as the general resistance demand characteristics of the 
situation. Further it was not possible to manipulate physical need 
so there was not evidence that the children were tempted. It is 
suggested that real life temptations of a similar kind to those 
used in the JHTST would provide a more face valid measure of 
the correspondence between the children's behaviour in real 
life temptation to steal situations and on the JHTST. The 
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present failure to find a correspondence between the real life 
situation used in this study and the results from the 
experimental groups' responses to the behavioural measure of 
the JHTST should therefore not be regarded as substantially 
detracting from the credibility of the success of the DIP 
procedure. 
The non significant findings on the cheating test were 
not entirely unexpected as the moral developmental literature 
suggests that children's behaviour in different moral domains 
is not highly correlated (Lickona, 1976; Mischel and Mischel, 
1976). This result indicates that the effects of training on 
the DIP procedure are confined specifically to the stealing 
domain. 
(iii) The General Moral Judgement Measures  
The results of Stephens' (1974) two general moral 
judgement measures demonstrated no significant difference 
between the three groups on the clumsiness and stealing test, 
and no significant differences between the DIP and GIP groups 
on the collective responsibility test. However, there was a 
significant difference between the GIP and no treatment control 
groups on the collective responsibility test. 
Overall these findings suggest that the effects of 
specific training in stealing situations, whether the training 
has been a direct instruction program or a general awareness 
of stealing program, do not spread to children's moral judgement 
of intentionality as tapped by the clumsiness and stealing test. 
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The general instruction program relative to the no treatment 
program however did influence how children judged acharacter 
should be punished. 
"v) The Impulsivity and Efficiency Measures  
Using Salkind and Wright's (1977) formula for 
establishing impulsivity and efficiency scores, the findings 
on the efficiency index of the MEET indicated no significant 
differences between the three groups. On the impulsivity 
index the DIP group after treatment was significantly less 
impulsive than the GIP and no treatment control groups. 
There was no significant difference between the GIP and no 
treatment control groups. 
Taken together these findings suggest that the DIP 
procedure, which included a component instructing children to 
'think' and reflect on a resistance schema prior to acting, did 
not increase the children's accuracy on a match to sample task, 
but did make them more reflective in approaching such a task. 
Accordingly a stealing specific DIP procedure produced 
general effects on children's reflectivity in a problem solving 
task of an academic nature. Clearly this finding has far 
reaching ramifications for the special educator. At the 
very least it indicates that by using the DIP procedure to 
facilitate resistance to stealing in children, that such a 
procedure may have the added advantage of giving a child a 
cognitive strategy to decrease his impulsivity in general in a 
problem solving context. 
CHAPTER 13 
CONCLUSIONS OF STUDY II 
The major finding, using the hypothetical temptation 
to steal measure, was that the DIP procedure increased 
educable mentally retarded children's resistance on the 
behavioural measure significantly more than the GIP, or no 
treatment control group procedures. Moral judgement data on 
the JHTST indicated high levels of resistance generally amongst 
the children, but with no significant difference between the 
groups. 
These 'findings suggest that most children had 
internalised a 'no stealing' rule. However, the children 
instructed specifically in resistance strategies (DIP) revealed 
a higher concordance between their resistance responses on the 
'did do' and 'should do' measures than children trained by a 
general, non-directive, awareness of stealing program (GIP). 
This result was also reflected in the greater number of 
children who became categorical resisters in the DIP relative 
to the other two groups. This outcome is consistent with the 
results of an earlier study by Haines, Jackson and Davidson 
(1980). Also the gains made by the DIP group were maintained 
at the time of a follow-up assessment. 
When the children's resistance responses on the 'did 
do' and 'should do' measures were analysed for legitimate 
alternative solutions to stealing there was no significant 
difference between the groups. Although hypotheses were 
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generated to account for this result, further research was 
recommended on this aspect of the DIP procedure. 
On the real-life temptation measures there were no 
significant differences between the experimental and control 
groups on the stealing or cheating tests. 
The data from the general moral judgement measure 
indicated no significant difference between the 'groups on the 
clumsiness and stealing measure, but a significant improvement 
by both the experimental groups as compared to the pre-post 
control group on the collective responsibility measures. 
These results suggest that, irrespective of the specificity or 
generality of a stealing program, it will have a minimal 
influence on a child's judgemental orientation toward 
intentionality, and a maximum influence on his/her orientation 
toward placing responsibility for a transgression response on 
the wrongdoer. 
When it comes to the reflectivity data there was a 
significant improvement by the DIP group compared to the GIP 
and no treatment control groups. The overall findings of a 
significant improvement in the DIP group's reflectivity and 
resistance responding suggests a positive relationship between 
a child's reflection in a temptation to steal situation and 
his/her resistance responding. 
242. 
There are three main implications which appear to follow 
from Study II : 
I. That the direct instruction procedure represents an 
effective cognitive-behavioural method for the prevention and 
treatment of educable mentally retarded children's stealing 
behaviour. 
2. That the legitimate acquisition component of the 
procedure needs to be strengthened. Alternatively, the 
assessment of the children's propensity to use legitimate 
alternative responses needs to be improved. Perhaps, more 
direct probes than those used in the JHTST are required to 
determine whether the educable mentally retarded child would 
use a legitimate alternative response in a temptation to steal 
situation. 
3. That specific resistance training can decrease a child's 
impulsivity in problem situations. This finding has clear 
implications for special educators working in social and 
academic areas. 
Recent data has shown that a few teachers who have applied 
the DIP procedure to individual cases of chronic stealers have 
been able to successfully modify their stealing behaviour. This 
recent evidence together with the findings from Study II leads to 
the general recommendation that a DIP type program should be 
built into the school curriculum as one method of preventative 
education to decrease the problem of stealing in the community. 
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APPENDIX I-A  
THE AUDIO/SLIDE PRESENTATION Of THE JACKSON HYPOTHETICAL TEMPTATION 
TO STEAL TEST (JHIST) 
Experimenter says: 
Hello! 'How are you? My name is  We are going to 
play a story game. You will see some pictures of boys/girls. 
Here is the first story. (Example B). 
Can you see the boy/girl? (holding the baby). I want you to 
think you are the boy/girl in the picture. Can you do that? 
Good. So when you answer you will say, "I did   
or I did not do  
Now I will tell you about the story. 
READ STORY 
Can you finish your story? Why did you 2 
Have you got the idea? Yes. 
EXPERIMENTER LEAVES. 
PRACTICE EXAMPLE  
A One day while Mum was in town she left you home with your 
baby brother. Alright? She told you to get the tea ready. 
(Now you finish your story), what did you do? 
should 
Why did you? 
should 
B One day you were walking through your neighbour's apple 
orchard. OK? There was no one at home and you felt 
hungry 
(Now you finish your story), what did you do? 
should 
Why did you? 
should 
Some of the rest of the stories are about boys/girls being 
tempted to steal things. Do you know what I mean? What you 
say is top secret - no one will know. OK? Remember you are 
the boy/girl in the picture. 
Here is the story. 
READ STORY 
Can you finish your story. Why did you  
1. Here is another story. 
One day your mother gave you 40 cents and sent you down to 
the shop to buy some cakes. The cakes cost 35 cents but 
when the shopkeeper gave you the change he handed you 
10 cents which was of course 5 cents too much. (OK?). 
You looked at the change and knew there was too much. 
Now you finish your story, what did you do? 
should 
Why did you? 
should 
2. Here is another story. 
One hot Saturday morning when you were going to the swimming 
pool by the bus, there were lots and lots of people getting 
on the bus. You knew that you could easily squeeze by the 
257. 
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driver without paying your 10 cents fare and without being 
noticed. (Alright?). In this way you could keep your 
10 cents for spending after the swim. 
Now you finish your story, what did you do? 
should 
Why did you  
should 
3A BOYS 
.• After lunch one day John and you went for a walk down to the 
sweet shop. Before going into the shop John said that he 
would go down one end of the counter and buy some sweets then 
while the shopkeeper was serving him you could easily take 
a packet of Lifesavers from the counter, if you wanted to. 
(OK?). Both of you went into the shop,,John went down one 
end of the counter and you went down the other end. There 
right in front of you were the Lifesavers. 
(Now you finish your story), what did you do? 
should 
Why did you  
should 
3B GIRLS 
After lunch one day Joan and you went for a walk down-to the 
sweet shop. Before going into the shop Joan said that she 
would go down one end of the counter and buy some sweets then 
while the shopkeeper was serving her you could easily take 
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a packet of Lifesavers from the counter, if you wanted to. 
(OK?). Both of you went into the shop, Joan went down one 
end of the counter and you went down the other end. There 
right in front of you were the Lifesavers. 
(Now you finish your story), what did you do? 
should 
Why did you 2 
should 
4. Here is another story 
One day at the football after nearly everybody had gone, you 
were walking past the stand when you saw a small purse under 
the seat. You bent down and picked it up. When you opened 
it you found it had one dollar 20 cents in it. There was 
a name on the flap but you couldn't read it very easily. 
(Now you finish your story), what did you do? 
should 
Why did you 2 
should 
5. Here is another story 
One day you were walking through Coles Store when you saw 
a pocket knife/bracelet which you badly wanted. (OK?) 
You did not have any money. There didn't seem to be anybody 
behind the counter just where you were. 
(Now you finish your story), what did you do? 
should 
Why did you 2 
should 
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6. Here is another story 
At school you noticed that some of the other boys and/or 
girls seemed to have more money to spend than you had. 
(OK?). They were always showing you things they had bought. 
Mum and Dad said they couldn't afford to give you any money. 
You knew however that Mum kept some bits of money in a drawer 
in her bedroom. She never seemed to count this money. 
(OK?). One day while Mum and Dad were out you went into 
the bedroom, opened the drawer and saw that there was quite 
a few silver coins. 
(Now you finish your story), what did you do? 
should 
Why did you  
should 
7. Here is another story 
One day when you were in town your little brother lost a 
very new pocket knife your mother had given him for his 
birthday. He was most upset because he knew Mum would be 
very cross. (OK?). Shortly after you were both walking 
through Woolworths and saw some knives just like the one 
your brother had lost. You did not have any money. (Alright?). 
You thought about what had happened to your little brother 
and what Mum might say to him. 
(Now you finish the story), what did you do? 
should 
Why did you  
should 
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8. Here is another story. 
One day your mother sent you to the fruit shop to buy 6 apples. 
She gave you a dollar and told you not to spend the change. 
(OK?). She said the apples would cost about 40 cents. 
When you bought the apples at the shop you found they only 
cost 30 cents. (Alright?). You thought if you bought a 
drink for 5 cents you could tell Mum the apples cost 35 cents. 
After thinking about it you ... 
(Now you finish your story), what did you do? 
should 
Why did you 2 
should 
'SHOULD DO' PRESENTATION  
Could you tell me what you should do in this story? 
One day you were walking in very muddy wet boots and 
you stepped inside your house right onto the carpet. • 
What should you have done? 
Experimenter says: 
Last time you saw the slides I asked you what you did do. 
This time I am going to ask you what you should do. OK? 
PROCEED TO STORY 1 (leave out the two example slides, A and 8). 
262. 
APPENDIX I-B  
JACKSON PERSON AND PARENTAL REACTION TEST 
Q M.S. Jackson 1964 
revised version 1979 
Please fill in these little boxes correctly with a tick ( ), your 
sex and age and write the name of your school. 
Boy Age School  
Girl 
This is a test about what children feel and think when in temptation 
to steal situations: In each story there is a choice. 
READ each line through carefully and imagine that you are the boy 
or girl in the situation. When you have done that find the story 
ending that is most like you and put the letter of that story in 
the square at the end of the long box. 
Practice Example  
If I got caught by a 
policeman for stealing 
something 
   
 
(a) I would be real scared 
(b) It woudn't bother me at 
all 
    
 
(a)Walk to school 
(b)Take the bus 
 
If I live two miles from 
school and could catch a 
bus, I would mostly 
In this paper there are no right or wrong answers, only answers 
that are most like you. REMEMBER, YOU DO NOT HAVE TO PUT YOUR 
NAME ON THE PAPER so you can say exactly what is most like you 
and no one will know. 
WAIT TILL YOU ARE TOLD BEFORE YOU TURN 
OVER AND BEGIN 
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(a) find it easy to decide 
right from wrong 
(b) find it difficult to 
decide right from wrong 
(a) it's easy to get away 
with things and no one 
will know 
(b) it's very hard and you 
might get found out 
(a) something inside me tells 
me I shouldn't do it 
(b) nothing inside me tells 
me I shouldn't do it 
I. When I am tempted to steal 
something, I usually 
2. When I am tempted to steal 
something I tell myself 
3. When I am tempted to steal 
things 
(a) I think what bad luck 
(b) I think that I deserved 
to be caught 
(a) I tell myself I won't 
steal again 
(b) I never tell myself 
anything 
(a) I never take it back 
(b) I try to take it back 
and apologise 
(a) I usually accept the blame 
(b) I usually blame someone 
else 
(a) I usually come clean and 
tell all 
(b) I go all quiet and don't 
•
speak 
4. When I have been caught for 
pinching something 
5. When I have been caught for 
pinching something 
6. When I have pinched 
something 
7. When I have pinched 
something 
8. When I have been caught 
for pinching something 
•■••■• 
ri 
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9. When I have been caught for 
pinching something 
 
(a) I never apologise 
(b) I usually apologise 
   
    
   
• 
     
     
      
3. When I pinch something (a) it worries me and feel I 
ought to tell 
(b) it doesn't worry me and I 
don't feel I ought to tell 
   
    
    
    
PARENTAL FACTORS  
(a) explains then smacks 
(b) explains but doesn't smack 
(a) often tells stories about 
what happens to people who 
steal 
(b) never mentions any of those 
people who get caught 
(a) says it's OK to keep little 
things you find 
(b) says it's not right to keep 
anything 
(a) often tells stories about 
being caught for things she 
stole when she was little 
(b) never says anything about 
being caught for stealing 
when she was little 
(a) shouts and smacks if I 
pinch anything 
(b) talks quietly and explains 
(a) growls and is cross 
(b) smiles and laughs 
11. If ever I get caught for 
pinching my mother usually 
12. My mother 
13. My mother usually 
14. My mother 
15. My mother usually 
16. My mother 
• 
■•■•■=M1. 
• ■•■••••■ 
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17. If ever I get caught for I (a) explains then smacks 
pinching, my father usually 
(q) explains but doesn't 
smack 
(a) often tells stories about 
what happens to people who 
steal 
(b) never mentions any of those 
people who get caught 
(a) says it's OK to keep little 
things you find 
(b) says it's not right to keep 
anything 
(a) often tells stories about 
being caught for things he 
stole when he was little 
(b) never says anything about 
being caught for stealing 
when he was little 
(a) shouts and smacks if I pinch 
anything 
(b) talks quietly and explains 
(a) growls and is cross 
(b) smiles and laughs 
18. My father 
19. My father usually 
20. My father 
21. My father usually 
22. My father often 
• 
• 
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APPENDIX I-C  
STEPHENS GENERAL MORAL JUDGEMENT TESTS 
(1) Collective Responsibility  
Presentation: The examiner seeks to determine if the subject 
considers it just, in general or in cases where the offender is 
unknown, to punish the entire group for something a member of 
the group has done. 
Example: (Figure 42) 
Some boys were playing football near a school. One boy 
kicked the ball. He broke a window in a house. A man came 
out of the house. He asked who broke the window. No-one 
said anything. The other boys didn't tell on him. The man 
wentand got their school principal. 
What should the principal do? 
Whom should he punish? No-one? Or the whole class? Why? 
(2) Clumsiness and Stealing  
Presentation: The aim is to find out if the child is more 
concerned with motive or with material results. The stories are 
read in pairs; following each pair two questions are asked: 
"Are these people each as bad as the other? Which of the two 
is the worst? Why?" Each question will probably result in an 
extended conversation. After reading each story it is well to 
have the subject repeat it before questioning him on it. This 
assures his understanding of it. 
Examples: (Figure 43(a) & (b)) 
la. Mother said to John "Come and eat lunch." John went to 
eat his lunch. He went to pick up a glass of water. His 
arm banged into a tray of dishes. The dishes fell on 
the floor. 15 dishes broke. 
lb. Mother said to Henry, "Do not eat any cookies." As soon 
as mother left he ate some cookies. Henry dropped the 
cookie jar on the floor, and the cookie jar lid broke. 
Which of the two boys is worse? 
Why? 
_ 
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FIGURE 42 An Example of a Collective Responsibility Story 
268. 
FIGURE 43a An Example of a Clumsiness and Stealing Story . : 
A Boy When Doing the 'Right' Thing Breaks Many , 
Dishes 
269. 
FIGURE 43b An Example of a Clumsiness and Stealing Story: 
A Boy Doing the 'Wrong' Thing Breaks a Lid of 
a Jar 
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APPENDIX I-D  
DIRECTIONS FOR MATCHING FAMILIAR FIGURES TEST 
"I am going to show you a picture of something you know 
and then some pictures that look like it. You will have to 
point to the picture on this bottom page (point) that is just 
like the one on this top page (point). Let's do some for 
practice." E shows practice items and helps the child to find 
the correct answer. "Now we are going to do some that are a 
little bit harder. You will see a picture on top and six 
pictures on the bottom. Find the one that is just like the 
one on top and point to it." 
E will record latency to first response to the half-
second, total number of errors for each item and the order 
in which the errors are made. If S is correct, E will praise. 
If wrong, E will say, "No, that is not the right one. Find 
the one that is just like this one (point)." Continue to code 
responses (not times) until child makes a maximum of six 
errors or gets the item correct. If incorrect, E will show 
the right answer. 
It is necessary to have a stand to place the test 
booklet on so that both the stimulus and the alternatives are 
clearly visible to the S at the same time. The two pages 
should be practically at right angles to one another. 
Note: It is desirable to enclose each page in clear plastic 
in order to keep the pages clean. 
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APPENDIX 1-E  
REAL-LIFE STEALING TEST 
Instructions  
A dish of pre-counted smarties (lollies) is placed 
on the table in the testing room. The experimenter (E) then 
goes to get the child. 
E does not mention the smarties. If asked about them 
E simply says that they do not belong to him/her but to another 
person who sometimes works in the room. 
E then directs the child to draw three pictures of 
his/her own choosing. After the first picture is drawn E 
makes an excuse to leave the room for a minute or two. 
Before going s/he tells the child to finish his/her drawings. 
After waiting outside of the room for a couple of 
minutes the E re-enters the room, thanks the child for doing 
the drawing and then politely dismisses the child. 
E then counts the smarties in the bowls and notes 
down on a scoring sheet the number of smarties missing. 
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APPENDIX I-F  
THE REAL-LIFE CHEATING TEST 
General Instructions  
"This is a ball game. Just like the games you see at side 
shows or fairs. 
You have to make this bell ring by moving the man. 
What you do is roll the ball at the man; if the bell rings 
you win a prize! 
The prize is 5 jelly beans or 1 plastic animal of your choice. 
O.K.? " 
Demonstration  
E takes a ball and rolls it at the man at such a speed that it 
hits the man but does not cause the bell to ring. 
E takes the next ball and this time makes the bell ring by 
hitting the man harder. 
E says "Part of the game is that you only have 3 balls to roll. 
If one of the 3 balls rolls back towards you just roll it to 
the back of the box. O.K.? 
Now remember if you can make the bell ring by moving the man 
you can have either 5 jelly beans or 1 plastic animal." 
E says "I have to go outside for a minute - I will come back 
and ask you if you could make the bell ring?" 
E leaves and listens outside until the 3 balls have been rolled 
and then waits 15 seconds before entering the room. 
E walks into the room and first shows the child the jelly beans 
or plastic animals and then says, "Did you ring the bell by 
moving the man?" If the answer is "no" the child is merely 
sent back to class, if "Yes" his reward is given. 
273. 
APPENDIX II 
A - I 
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APPENDIX II-A  
Description of age, sex, IQ and S.E.S. data for all subjects. 
Subject 
Variables 
Subject 
Variables 
Age Sex IQ SES Age Sex IQ SES 
1 134 1 62 3 22 145 1 52 3 
2 174 1 70 4 23 148 1 51 3 
3 148 1 64 3 24 149 1 70 4 
4 176 1 70 3 25 159 1 62 3 
5 135 1 70 3 26 191 1 53 4 
6 142 0 69 4 27 148 1 50 4 
7 164 0 67 4 28 167 1 63 3 
8 142 1 70 1 149 1 59 4 
9 154 1 60 2 30 143 1 68 4 
1 0 133 1 72 4 31 155 1 58 2 
11 136 1 74 3 32 189 1 59 1 
12 135 0 68 1 33 174 1 68 2 
13 138 0 68 2 34 142 0 57 3 
14 143 0 71 2 35 151 0 68 2 
15 149 1 57 4 36 168 0 50 4 
16 183 1 51 4 37 174 1 70 4 
17 159 1 70 4 38 140 1 69 3 
18 188 1 63 3 39 174 1 67 3 
19 158 0 53 3 40 142 1 72 4 
20 161 0 52 3 41 175 0 75 4 
21 135 0 61 1 42 157 0 75 4 
APPENDIX II-A  
(continued) 
Subject 
Variables 
Subject 
Variables 
Age Sex IQ SES Age Sex IQ SES 
43 182 1 67 3 64 132 0 51 3 
44 136 1 50 1 65 138 1 69 4 
45 180 1 53 4 66 145 1 64 3 
46 186 1 52 4 67 145 1 57 3 
47 178 1 63 4 68 143 1 72 3 
48 138 0 63 2 69 174 1 70 4 
49 145 0 74 3 70 154 1 54 4 
50 187 1 50 2 71 158 1 75 3 
51 152 1 50 3 72 183 1 67 3 
52 138 1 60 3 73 147 1 61 4 
53 145 1 68 4 74 146 0 75 4 
54 140 1 55 2 75 162 0 71 2 
55 150 1 69 2 76 183 0 67 3 
56 148 1 53 3 77 136 0 71 4 
57 180 1 59 4 78 141 1 68 1 
58 164 1 62 3 79 149 1 71 3 
59 187 1 59 3 80 181 1 75 4 
60 184 1 54 3 81 149 1 75 3 
61 166 0 54 2 82 147 1 62 1 
62 139 0 55 2 83 140 1 71 3 
63 139 1 61 3 
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APPENDIX II-B  
Individual scores'on the 'Did do' and 'Should do' measures of 
the JHTST and the scores on the JPPRT for all subjects 
JHTST JPPRT 
'Did do' 'Should do' 
Person Parent Subject 
Resist 
Legitimate 
Alternative 
Resist 
Legitimate 
Alternative 
4 0 3 0 
 
2 8 1 8 2 
3 6 0 6 0 
4 1 0 8 0 
5 6 0 8 2 
6 0 0 7 2 
7 0 0 7 0 
8 7 0 8 0 
9 0 0 7 0 
10 7 2 8 2 
11 0 0 7 0 
12 4 1 8 0 
13 5 0 8 1 
14 0 0 8 1 
15 1 0 4 0 
16 1 0 8 0 
17 0 0 8 0 
18 1 0 8 0 
19 2 0 1 0 
20 2 0 2 0 
21 2 0 5 0 
5 8 
9 3 
6 6 
9 2 
9 4 
10 4 
8 9 
8 6 
8 2 
9 7 
8 5 
8 6 
7 9 
9 11 
4 6 
7 7 
9 5 
5 8 
4 8 
9 6 
5 5 
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APPENDIX II-B  
(continued) 
JHTST JPPRT 
'Did do' 'Should do' 
Person Parent Subject 
Resist 
Legitimate 
Alternative 
Resist 
Legitimate 
Alternative 
22 1 0 8 1 8 8 
23 8 0 8 0 9 9 
24 2 0 6 0 10 4 
25 2 0 8 4 9 2 
26 5 0 7 0 8 8 
27 3 0 7 0 3 6 
28 7 1 8 0 5 8 
29 6 0 8 0 7 6 
30 8 0 8 0 9 9 
31 8 0 8 2 6 8 
32 1 7 1 4 8 
33 1 0 7 0 6 10 
34 1 0 8 2 4 10 
35 5 0 7 0 9 4 
36 2 0 4 0 5 9 
37 0 0 8 3 9 10 
38 5 1 8 1 9 11 
39 8 0 8 0 9 6 
40 2 0 8 0 9 10 
41 3 0 8 1 9 8 
42 7 3 8 1 	6 5 
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APPENDIX II-B  
(continued) 
JHTST JPPRT 
Subject 
'Did do' 'Should do' 
Person Parent 
Legitimate 
Resist 
Alternative 
Resist 
 Legitimate 
Alternative 
43 1 0 7 0 7 5 , 
44 5 0 7 0 5 7 
45 6 0 6 0 5 6 
46 2 0 4 0 9 7 
47 2 0 8 0 7 9 
48 3 0 4 0 8 7 
49 0 0 7 0 5 8 
50 5 0 8 0 9 8 
51 6 0 6 0 6 8 
52 1 0 8 0 9 9 
53 1 1 8 0 10 7 
54 0 0 4 0 7 4 
55 6 0 7 0 4 5 
56 3 0 8 3 7 5 
57 4 0 8 0 5 4 
58 0 0 7 0 9 9 
59 0 0 8 0 3 5 
60 2 0 2 0 5 6 
61 4 2 6 0 5 7 
62 0 0 8 0 9 7 
63 4 0 7 0 8 8 
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APPENDIX II-B  
(continued) 
JHTST JPPRT 
'Did do' 'Should do' 
Person Parent Subject 
Legitimate 
Resist 
Alternative 
Resist 
 Legitimate 
Alternative 
64 3 0 5 0 2 6 
65 3 0 8 1 4 7 
66 7 0 7 0 8 5 
67 7 1 7 0 5 5 
68 8 1 8 1 5 5 
69 3 1 8 1 7 10 
70 7 0 8 0 6 6 
71 2 0 4 1 10 7 
72 8 0 8 0 10 5 
73 8 0 8 1 8 6 
74 0 0 8 0 8 6 
75 3 0 8 1 9 8 
76 1 0 8 2 9 7 
77 1 0 8 2 9 9 
78 3 0 8 1 8 5 
79 2 0 3 0 6 7 
80 8 0 8 2 9 4 
81 1 0 7 0 9 6 
82 4 0 8 0 10 12 
83 2 0 4 0 6 5 
APPENDIX IT-C 
	280. 
Individual scores on the General Moral Judgement Measure, the KMFFT, 
and Real-life Temptation Tests. 
Subject 
General Moral Judgement KMFFT 
Real-life 
Temptation 
Tests 
Clumsiness Collective 
& Stealing Responsibility 
Impulsivity Efficiency Steal Cheat 
1 2.0 1.67 3.20 0.92 0 1 
2 2.25 2.66 0.99 -0.51 0 1 
3 2.25 2.0 1.43 -1.23 1 1 
4 2.0 2.0 -1.87 -0.73 0 1 
5 3.0 2.66 0.93 0.11 0 1 
6 2.0 3.0 1.69 -0.09 1 0 
7 2.0 2.33 -1.19 0.83 0 1 
8 2.25 2.5 0.55 -0.07 0 1 
9 2.5 1.0 -2.25 1.33 0 1 
10 2.0 3.0 -0.12 0.60 0 0 
11 1.75 2.0 -3.03 0.71 1 1 
12 2.25 3.0 0.07 -0.99 0 0 
13 2.5 2.0 1.71 -0.11 1 1 
14 3.0 2.0 0.56 -0.08 1 0 
15 1.75 2.33 2.50 1.62 1 1 
16 2.75 2.33 2.16 1.12 0 1 
17 2.5 4.0 -1.94 -0.10 0 0 
18 2.25 2.0 0.76 -0.84 0 0 
19 2.0 2.0 -0.19 0.39 0 0 
20 2.25 1.0 -0.29 -1.75 0 0 
21 2.5 2.66 -0.50 0.14 0 1 
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APPENDIX II-C  
(Continued) 
General Moral Judgement KMFFT 
Real-life 
Temptation 
Tests 
Subject 
Clumsiness Collective 
& Stealing Responsibility 
Impulsivity Efficiency Steal Cheat 
22 2.0 1.33 2.17 -0.29 0 1 
23 2.0 4.0 -4.47 1.59 0 0 
24 1.75 4.0 -0.50 -0.98 1 0 
25 2.25 2.0 -3.14 0.82 0 0 
26 2.5 2.0 0.11 1.49 0 1 
27 2.0 1.66 3.27 1.13 0 1 
28 2.0 2.0 0.34 2.10 1 1 
29 2.25 2.33 1.34 0.26 0 0 
30 3.0 2.33 0.40 -1.88 1 1 
31 2.5 1.66 -0.70 -1.90 0 0 
32 2.75 1.66 0.89 0.43 0 0 
33 2.25 3.33 -3.40 0.24 0 1 
34 3.0 2.0 -0.84 -0.92 0 1 
35 2.0 2.33 -0.67 0.03 0 0 
36 2.0 1.0 1.31 0.57 0 1 
37 3.0 3.0 -4.36 2.32 0 1 
38 2.0 2.66 -0.54 0.46 0 1 
39 3.0 4.0 -1.30 0.38 0 0 
40 1.75 2.0 -0.97 -0.51 0 0 
41 2.0 2.66 0.08 -1.00 0 0 
42 3.0 2.66 -1.70 -0.34 0 0 
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APPENDIX II-C  
(continued) 
S 
General Moral Judgement KMFFT 
Real-life 
Temptation 
Tests 
ubj 
Clumsiness Collective 
& Stealing Responsibility 
Impulsivity Efficiency Steal Cheat 
43 2.75 2.66 -0.30 -0.34 0 0 
44 1.5 4.0 2.92 0.08 1 0 
45 2.0 1.0 3.27 1.13 0 0 
46 1.5 2.0 0.73 0.87 0 0 
47 2.0 2.0 0.97 -0.49 1 
48 2.75 1.66 1.82 0.90 1 
49 2.0 1.66 -0.09 -1.95 0 0 
50 2.75 3.0 -0.77 -0.43 0 0 
51 2.0 2.0 -1.83 -1.05 0 1 
52 1.5 1.66 1.09 -0.89 0 1 
53 2.0 2.66 -0.43 -0.21 0 0 
54 2.25 3.66 0.34 -0.42 0 0 
55 2.0 2.0 0.51 -0.59 1 0 
56 1.5 3.66 -0.96 1.16 0 1 
57 2.5 2.67 -3.27 3.47 0 1 
58 2.0 2.33 -1.42 -0.34 1 0 
59 2.25 2.0 -0.30 0.22 1 0 
60 3.0 1.33 0.88 -0.96 0 0 
61 1.75 1.0 1.67 1.89 0 1 
62 2.25 1.33 -0.89 1.71 0 1 
63 2.25 1.0 2.19 0.53 0 0 
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(Continued) 
General Moral Judgement KMFFT 
Real-life 
Temptation 
Tests 
Subject 
Clumsiness Collective 
& Stealing Responsibility 
Impulsivity Efficiency Steal Cheat 
64 2.5 1.0 1.64 0.80 0 0 
65 1.75 2.33 0.56 -0.36 0 0 
66 2.0 1.0 3.17 1.51 0 0 
67 2.0 3.0 3.26 1.86 1 0 
68 2.0 4.0 -0.13 -0.23 0 1 
69 2.5 2.0 0.96 0.08 0 1 
70 2.5 2.0 0.57 -0.59 0 1 
71 2.0 2.0 -1.74 -0.86 0 0 
72 2.0 2.0 1.22 0.38 0 1 
73 2.0 2.0 1.47 -0.99 0 1 
74 2.75 1.66 -0.48 -1.56 0 0 
75 2.25 1.66 -0.64 -1.67 0 0 
76 2.5 2.0 1.28 -0.52 0 0 
77 2.75 2.0 0.68 1.76 1 1 
78 2.25 2.33 -0.76 -0.72 0 0 
79 1.75 1.0 -0.21 -1.55 1 1 
80 2.3 2.3 -2.67 -1.05 0 0 
81 2.25 1.0 -1.02 0.94 0 1 
82 2.0 2.0 -1.67 0.09 0 1 
83 2.5 2.0 -1.57 0.73 0 0 
1 
APPENDIX II-D  
Individual scores on the 3 Resistance Cognitive Process Categories by each of the 83 subjects on the 'Did do' 
measure of the JHTST. 
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APPENDIX II-F  
Individual scores on the 3 Resistance Cognitive Process Categories by each of the 83 subjects on the 
'Should do' measure of the JHTST. 
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APPENDIX II-G  
Individual scores on the 2 Yielding Cognitive Process Categories by each of the 83 subjects on 
the 'Should do' measure of the JHTST. 
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APPENDIX II-H  
DF MS 
1 258.58 108.64* 
82 2.38 
1 379.59 215.92* 
1 152.48 78.02* 
82 1.95 
* p < .01 
Means for Measures and Cognitive Levels  
Cognitive Levels 
Analysis of variance of Yielding scores on the 2 measures of 
the JHTST ('did do' and 'should do') and 2 levels of cognitive 
processes (extrinsic, intrinsic). 
'Did do' and 'should do measures 
tested against measures x subject 
variance. 
2 levels of cognitive processes 
Interaction between the 2 measures 
and 2 levels of cognitive processes 
Tested against measures x cognitive 
level x subject variance 
Measures 
Extrinsic Intrinsic 
'Did do' 4.06 0.57 
'Should do' 0.94 0.16 
APPENDIX II-I  
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'Did do' and 'Should do' measures 
tested against measures x subject 
variance 
Analysis of variance of Resistance scores, on the 2 measures 
Of the JHTST ('did do' and 'should do') and 3 levels of 
cognitive processes (right/wrong, extrinsic, intrinsic) with 
planned contrasts. 
DF 
1 
82 
MS 
173.57 
1.62 
F 
106.66* 
2 104.35 29.92* 
1 35.79 26.92* 
1 70.51 18.19* 
1 206.76 53.34* 
164 3.87 
2 10.88 3•55* 
1 5.06 1.65 
1 21.76 7.09* 
1 5.83 1.90 
164 3.07 
3 levels of cognitive processes 
Contrast of right/wrong to extrinsic 
Contrast of extrinsic to intrinsic 
Contrast of right/wrong to intrinsic 
Tested against cognitive level x 
subject variance 
Interaction between the 2 measures 
and 3 levels of cognitive processes 
Interaction between the 2 measures 
and 2 levels, contrasing right/ 
wrong to extrinsic 
Interaction between the 2 measures 
and 2 levels, contrasing extrinsic 
to intrinsic 
Interaction between the 2 measures 
and 2 levels, contrasting right/ 
wrong to intrinsic 
Tested against measures x cognitive 
level x subject variance 
* p< .05 
Means for Measures and Cognitive Levels  
Cognitive Levels 
Measures 
Right/Wrong Extrinsic Intrinsic 
'Did do' 1.86 0.95 0.54 
'Should do' 3.05 2.64 1.20 
APPENDIX III 
A- E 
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APPENDIX III-A  
GENERAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM : TEMPTATION TO STEAL STORIES 
Lollies in Jar at the Shop  
Bill/Jill walked into the shop and saw the big jar of lollies 
on the counter. Bill/Jill had only just enough money to buy 
his/her father's pipe tobacco. But Bill/Jill had walked a long 
way to get to the shop and now s/he really felt like a few 
lollies. S.he noticed that the lady in the shop was very busy 
putting things away on the shelves. S/he thought 'If I quickly 
put my hand in the jar and took some lollies she would never 
know. Then when she turned around I could buy my father his 
pipe tobacco. 
Beach Ball  
Rob/Sally saw a beach ball in the back of a small boat. S/he 
could see that the owner of the ball was busy playing. Bob/ 
Sally thought that it would be great to have a beach ball just 
like that one to play with. S/he knew that it would be easy 
to take the ball without being seen! 
Yo-Yo Story 
Joe/Nell was walking along the path to school when s/he saw 
a yo-yo fall out of the pocket of the boy in front of him/her. 
Joe/Nell remembered that today was the day when everyone was 
supposed to bring their yo-yo's to school. Joe/Nell had 
forgotten, but by taking this one s/he would still be able to 
play with all the other children. S/he wondered what to do. 
Money on the Table at a Friends' House  
Tim/Fran's mother took him/her over to her friend's house for 
afternoon tea. They arrived at 3 p.m. and all had a nice cup 
of tea and some chocolate biscuits. At about 4 p.m. Tim/Fran 
started to get bored with his/her mother talking to her friend 
and began wandering around the house. S/he came back into 
the room where his/her mother was talking. S/he could see that 
they had not noticed him/her. Then all of d sudden s/he saw 
the money on the table. S/he thought 'If I take it my mother's 
friend will probably never know it was me that took it'. 
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Money in the Car  
Bill/Sue was walking past a car when s/he noticed some money on 
the back seat of the car. Bill/Sue quickly looked around to 
see if there was anybody near the car. There wasn't. Bill/ 
Sue thought that the money was just enough to buy the special 
toy s/he had always wanted. S/he looked hard at the money 
and wondered what s/he should do. 
Bike Pump  
Jack/Jill looked at the bike with special interest. The bike 
had a bright new shiny pump on it. Jack/Jill had broken his/ 
her pump yesterday and really wanted a new one. S/he could not 
see anyone close to the bike area. S/he thought to himself/ 
herself, 'If I take the pump I will be able to go for a ride 
on my bike today'. 
Toy in a Friend's House  
Jeff/Sue was playing in his/her friend's home. They were having 
a great time. They had played with the train set and lots of 
other games as well. Jeff/Sue was playing hide and seek and 
had raced into another room where s/he thought his/her friend 
would not look. While s/he was in the room he saw a toy that 
s/he thought would be fantastic to own. S/he looked at the 
toy and wondered if s/he should take it and race home. 
Money in Sue's Bag  
John/Jean opened the door to the room where the school bags 
are kept. S/he looked at Sue's bag and saw two $1 notes 
sticking out of her bag. John/Jean thought to himself/herself 
that if s/he took the money s/he could buy some lollies with 
the money. 
Cake in the Shop  
Max/Jane strolled into the shop to have a look at the new 
games that they were selling. But the first thing to catch 
his/her eye was the cake sitting on the counter. It looked 
mouth watering and Max/Jane was sure that s/he could not 
resist having a closer look. The lady in the shop was not 
watching him/her. Max/Jane was tempted to take a slice. 
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Sneaking_ into Theatre  
Joe/Jane saw the line to get into the pictures. S/he knew 
that s/he did not have enough money to buy a ticket. But 
s/he really wanted to see the picture. All his/her friends 
would see it and talk about it at school. Joe/Jane felt quite 
upset, and then happened to see that the door into the pictures 
was open. S/he thought about sneaking in without saying! 
The above situations were also used in the DIP group with the 
exception that the subject was the principal character in each 
situation. 
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APPENDIX III-B  
GENERAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM : ISSUES AND PROBES 
The following probes were presented to each child after every 
temptation to steal story. 
ISSUE 	 PROBE 
Initial 	1. What do you think   did? 
Reaction (If relevant answer) Did s/he take it or not? 
2. Why do you think s/he did that? 
General 	3. Do most people  things that they want? 
Reference 
4. If  did not know who owned the .... 
Friend 	do you think s/he would do the same thing? 
vs 
Stranger 	5. Is there a difference between stealing from 
a friend and a stranger? What is the 
difference? Why should that be important? 
Model's 	6. Do you think that a friend of yours would 
Behaviour steal from you, or from anyone? 
Why/why not? 
Reaction to 	7. If you found out that a friend of yours did 
Model 
	
	steal something would you still be his/her 
friend? 
Why/why not? 
Parent 	8. What do you think  mother might say 
Reaction if she found out s/he had   
9. What do you think would happen to him/her 
then? 
Parent vs 	10. If  parents had talked about taking 
Child things from the office at work do you think 
Status they would punish   
Why/why not? 
Lack of 	11. Is is OK for  if there is no chance of 
Detection his/her mum or dad finding out? 
Why/why not? 
Headmaster/ 	12. What do you think the headmaster/headmistress 
Headmistress would do to   if s/he found out s/he 
Reaction 
Why? 
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School 	13. What do you think the other boys and girls at 
Friends school would do when they found out that   
Reaction 	Why? 
Law 	14. The law is made up of rules. One rule says that 
it is not right to steal. Do you think that it 
is a good rule? 
Why/why not? 
15. If  broke the rule and .... does s/he 
deserve to be punished? 
Why/why not? 
Penalty 	16. What should be  punishment if s/he 
Need and 	17. Should the punishment depend on how badly .... 
Punishment money? 
Why/why not? 
Feelings 	18. How do you think   would feel if  took 
her  
Why? 
Wealthy 	19. Suppose   (had lots of money). Do you 
Owner think that would make it alright for ? 
Why/why not? 
Poverty 	20. Suppose  came from a very poor family and 
of was never given pocket money. Do you think it 
Thief 	would be alright for  
Why/why not? 
Share 	21. If  was going to share   friend, would 
Money that make it alright for him/her to   
Why/why not? 
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APPENDIX III-C 
THE CONCEPT ASSESSMENT/TRAINING SESSION 
Instructions  
OWNERSHIP  
(A) Card Sorting: Take 2 cards, E writes his/her name 
on 1 card and gets C to write his/her name on the other card. 
Then E takes 3 cards and draws a picture on each card. A 20t 
piece, on one, an apple on another, and a pencil on the last. 
E then gets C to do the same drawings. 
E gathers all the drawings and asks C to sort them 
under the correct name label. E keeps asking C to keep doing 
this until C makes 3 successful sorts. E should change the 
order of the name labels at the end of each trial. 
(B) E then introduces 2 new cards with YOURS on 1 and 
MINE on the other. E gives C practice in saying these words. 
E adds BEING FAIR means you say, "I can keep mine but cannot 
take yours. That's treating the other person as you would 
like to be treated". When C can say this satisfactorily E then 
repeats the process as in (A) above. 
(c) Introduce 2 more cards. Write OWN on 1 and DO NOT 
OWN on 2. Repeat process as in (A) and (B) above. Also discuss 
OWNER. 
T.P.S. 
(A) E says to C stealing is taking something without 
asking the owner. 
E takes out 2 boxes and labels box 1 with E's name 
and box 2 with C's. E puts a jelly bean in E's box and says to 
C, "Do you want that?" E then says, "If I turned away and you 
really wanted that jelly bean, you would get excited - you could 
probably feel your belly getting excited - and then you would 
say to yourself, "Will I take it or not?" If you did take it 
what would you be doing? Give C 5 seconds to respond and then 
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say, "If you take something without asking the owner you are 
- stealing". Say, "stealing is taking something without asking 
the owner". What is stealing? Get C to say after you what 
stealing is. 
(B) Repeat as in (A) with 2 more examples using a watch 
and a pen. 
(C) E says, "How do you think you could get the pen 
without taking it?" Give C 5 seconds to respond then say, "You 
could ask the owner could you have it, or you could ask a friend 
or your parents could you borrow or have a lend of some money so 
you could buy a pen, or you could save the money up, or you 
could do some jobs and earn the money for the pen. Let's go 
over those ways you can get something without taking it. First, 
the jelly bean, then the watch, then the pen." 
(D) Complete the instruction given in (C). 
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APPENDIX III-D  
DIRECT INSTRUCTION PROGRAM 
TRAINING SEQUENCE A  
Make yourself comfortable. Good. 
Slide of Temptation Problem Situation thrown onto screen and 
the story related to the child. 
The boy/girl in the picture is YOU. 
So there you are in the picture - you are looking hard at the 
(state the object) that you want very much and say, "Will I take 
it or not?'. You say out loud, "Will I take it or not?" 
Now before you decide, say THINK. 
- Slide change 
You say out loud after me THINK 
- Slide change 
Think about the owner and say BE FAIR. You say out loud after 
me BE FAIR. Yes, you should BE FAIR. Being fair means saying 
to yourself, "I can keep what is mine but cannot take yours". 
By saying that, you are following the RULE of treating others as 
you would like to be treated. Now you say after me out loud 
(go slowly), "I will treat others as I would like to be treated". 
Good. After all you would not like other people to take things 
that belong to you. So BE FAIR and treat others as you would 
like to be treated. 
- Slide change 
- TPS - Here you are looking back at  that you want 
very much. Now you make your decision. 
Did you take it or not? 
If you did take it - press the YES button - that's the green one. 
If you did not take it - press the NO button - that's the red one. 
PRESS NOW. 
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NO Choice  
- Slide change 
THINK 
Say out loud after me THINK 
- Slide change 
Think about BEING FAIR to the owner. Say out loud after me 
BE FAIR. 
Because you were fair to the owner and did not take the owner's 
things - that has made the owner happy. 
By treating the owner as you would like to be treated - you have 
made the owner happy. 
That's good! 
- Slide change 
By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy. 
By treating the other person as you would like to be treated - 
you feel good. 
Say BEING FAIR feels good. 
- Slide change 
Can you think of another way to get what you want without taking 
it? 
- Slide change 
I will try another way 
Say out loud after me, "I will try another way". 
Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking it. 
Point to the way you would like to try. Keep pointing to it - 
and I will check so you can actually do it. 
EXIT 
Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the 
appropriate situation so that this child can act it out. 
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YES Choice  
- Slide change x 6 
THINK 
Say out loud after me THINK 
- Slide change 
Think about not BEING FAIR to the owner. Say out loud, "I am 
not BEING FAIR". Because you were not fair to the owner and 
took what belonged to the owner you have made the owner 
unhappy. 
By NOT treating the owner as you would like to be treated you 
have made the owner unhappy. That is not BEING FAIR. 
- Slide change 
By not BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself 
unhappy. By NOT treating the other person as you would like to 
be treated you feel unhappy. Not BEING FAIR does not make you 
happy. 
- Slide change 
Try again 
Slide change 
There you are in the picture. 
You are looking hard at what you want very much and say "Will I 
take it or not?". Say out loud after me, "Will I take it or 
not?". Now before you decide say : THINK. 
- Slide change 
Say THINK out loud now. 
- Slide change 
THINK about the owner and say BE FAIR. 
You say out loud after me BE FAIR. 
Yes, you should BE FAIR. Being fair means saying to yourself, 
"I can keep what is mine but cannot take yours". By saying that 
you are following the RULE of treating others as you would like 
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to be treated. 
Now you say out loud after me (go slowly) "I will treat others 
as I would like to be treated". Good. After all you would not 
like other people to take things that belong to you. So BE FAIR 
and treat others as you would like to be treated. 
- Slide change 
- TPS - Here you are looking back at  that you 
want very much. Now you make your decision. 
Did you take it or not? 
If you did take it - press the YES button - that's the green one. 
If you did not take it - press the NO button - that's the red one. 
PRESS NOW. 
NO Choice  
- Slide change 
Say THINK 
Say THINK out loud now 
- Slide change 
THINK about BEING FAIR to the owner. Say out loud after me 
BE FAIR. 
Because you were fair to the owner and did not take his things 
- that has made him happy. By treating the owner as you would 
like to be treated - you have made the owner happy. 
That's good! 
- Slide change 
By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy. 
By treating the other person as you would like to be treated - 
you feel good. BEING FAIR feels good. 
- Slide change 
Can you THINK of another way to get what you want without taking 
it? 
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- Slide change 
"I will try another way" 
Say out loud after me, "I will try another way" 
Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking 
it. 
Point to the way you would like to try. Keep pointing to it 
- and I will check so you can actually do it. 
EXIT 
Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the 
appropriate situation so that this child can act it out. 
YES Choice  
- Slide change 
'THINK 
Say out loud after me THINK 
- Slide change 
Think about not BEING FAIR to the owner. Say out loud, "I am 
not being fair". Because you were not fair to the owner and 
took what belonged to the owner you have made the owner unhappy. 
By NOT treating the owner as you would like to be treated you 
have made the owner unhappy. That's not BEING FAIR. 
- Slide change 
By NOT BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself 
unhappy. By NOT treating the other person as you would like 
to be treated you feel unhappy. NOT BEING FAIR does not make 
you happy. 
- Slide change 
Try Again 
- Slide change 
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There you are in the picture. 
You are looking hard at what you want very much and say, "Will 
I take it or not?". Say out loud after me, "Will I take it or 
not? 
Now before you decide say : THINK. 
- Slide change 
Say THINK out loud now 
- Slide change 
THINK about the owner and say BE FAIR 
You say out loud after me BE FAIR 
Yes, you should BE FAIR. Being fair means saying to yourself, 
"I can keep what is mine but cannot take yours". By saying 
that you are following the RULE of treating others as you would 
like to be treated. Now you say out loud after me (go slowly) 
"I will treat others as I would like to be treated". Good. 
After all you would not like other people to take things that 
belong to you. So BE FAIR and treat others as you would like 
to be treated. 
- Slide change 
- TPS - There you are looking back at  what you 
want very much. 
This time decide not to take it. Press the NO button. That's 
the red one. 
PRESS NOW! 
NO Choice  
- Slide change 
Say THINK 
Say THINK out loud now 
- Slide change 
THINK about BEING FAIR to the owner. Say out loud after me 
BE FAIR. Because you were fair to the owner and did not take 
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his things - that has made him happy. By treating the owner 
as you would like to be treated - you have made the owner 
happy. 
That's good! 
- Slide change 
By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy. 
By treating the other person as you would like to be treated - 
you feel good. BEING FAIR feels good. 
- Slide change 
Can you THINK of another way to get what you want without 
taking it? 
- Slide change 
"I will try another way" 
Say out loud after me, "I will try another way". 
Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking it. 
Point to the way you would like to try. Keep pointing to it 
- and I will check so you can actually do it. 
EXIT 
Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the 
appropriate situation so that this child can act it out. 
305. 
APPENDIX III-D  
(continued) 
TRAINING SEQUENCE B  
Make yourself comfortable. Good. 
- Slide of Temptation Problem Situation thrown onto screen and 
the story related to the child. 
The boy/girl in the picture is YOU. 
So there you are in the picture - you are looking hard at the 
(state the object) that you want very much and say, "Will I take 
it or not?". You finish these words, "Will I ta-- it or no-". 
Now before you decide, say : THINK. 
- Slide change 
You finish this word THIN- (pause) 
- Slide change 
Think about the owner and say BE FAIR. Say "BE FA--". Yes, 
you should BE FAIR. Being fair means saying to yourself, "I can 
keep what is mine but cannot take yours". By saying that, you 
are following the RULE of treating others as you would like to 
be treated. You finish these words: "I will trea- others as I 
would like to be trea---)". Good. After all you would not like 
other people to take things that belong to you. So BE FAIR and 
treat others as you would like to be treated. 
- Slide change 
- TPS - Here you are looking back at  that you want 
very much. Now you make your decision. 
Did you take it or not? 
If you did take it - press the YES button - that's the green one. 
If you did not take it - press the NO button - that's the red one. 
PRESS NOW! 
NO Choice  
- Slide change 
THIN- 
- Slide change 
Because you were fair to the owner and did not take the owner's 
things - that has made the owner happy. 
By treating the owner as you would like to be treated - you have 
made the owner happy. 
That's good! 
- Slide change 
By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy. 
By treating the other person as you would like to be treated - 
you feel good. BEING FAIR feels good. 
- Slide change 
Can you THINK of another way to get what you want without taking 
it? 
- Slide change 
"I will try another way" 
You finish these words, "I will tr- another w--". 
Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking it. 
Point to the way you would like to try. Keep pointing to it - 
and I will check so you can actually do it. 
EXIT 
Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the 
appropriate situation so that this child can act it out. 
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YES Choice  
- Slide change x 6 
THINK 
You finish this word : THIN- 
- Slide change 
Think about not BEING FAIR to the owner. 
Because you were not fair to the owner and took what belonged to 
the owner you have made the owner unhappy. 
By not treating the owner as you would like to be treated you 
have made the owner unhappy. That is not BEING FAIR. 
- Slide change 
By not BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself 
unhappy. By NOT treating the other person as you would like to 
be treated you feel unhappy. NOT BEING FAIR does not make you 
happy. 
- Slide change 
Try again 
- Slide change 
There you are in the picture. 
You are looking hard and what you want very much and say, "Will 
I take it or not?". You finish these words, "Will I ta-- it or 
no-?" 
Now before you decide say : THINK. 
- Slide change 
You finish this word: THIN- 
- Slide change 
THINK about the owner and say BE FAIR. 
You finish these words, "BE FA--". 
Yes, you should BE FAIR. Being fair means saying to yourself 
"I can keep what is mine but cannot take yours". By saying that 
you are following the RULE of treating others as you would like 
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to be treated. You finish these words, "I will trea- others as 
I would like to be'trea---". Good. After all you would not 
like other people to take things that belong to you. So BE FAIR 
and treat others as you would like to be treated. 
- Slide change 
- TPS - Here you are looking back at  that 
you want very much. Now you make your decision. 
Did you take it or not? 
If you did take it - press the YES button - that's the green one 
If you did not take it - press the NO button - that's the red one. 
PRESS NOW! 
NO Choice  
- Slide change 
Say THINK. You finish this word THIN- 
- Slide change 
THINK about BEING FAIR to the owner. You finish these words 
BE FA--. Because you were fair to the owner and did not take his 
things - that has made him happy. By treating the owner as you 
would like to be treated - you have made the owner happy. 
That's good! 
- Slide change 
By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy. 
By treating the other person as you would like to be treated - 
you feel good. BEING FAIR feels good. 
- Slide change 
"I will try another way" 
You finish these words "I will tr- another w--". 
Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking it. 
Point to the way you would like to try. Keep pointing to it - 
and I will check so you can actually do it. 
EXIT 
Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the 
appropriate situation so that this child can act it out. 
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YES Choice  
- Slide change x 6 
THINK. You finish this word: THIN- 
- Slide change 
Think about not BEING FAIR to the owner. You finish these words, 
"I am not BEING FA--". Because you were unfair to the owner and 
took what belonged to the owner you have made the owner unhappy. 
By NOT treating the owner as you would like to be treated you 
have made the owner unhappy. That is not BEING FAIR. 
- Slide change 
By NOT BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself unhappy. 
By NOT treating the other person as you would like to be treated 
you feel unhappy. NOT BEING FAIR does not make you happy. 
- Slide change 
Try again 
- Slide change 
There you are in the picture. 
You are looking hard at what you want very much and say Will I 
take it or not?". You finish these words, "Will I ta-- it or no-?" 
Now before you decide say: THINK 
- Slide change 
YOU finish this word: THIN- 
- Slide change 
THINK about the owner and say BE FAIR 
You finish these words: BE FA-- 
Yes, you should BE FAIR. Being fair means saying to yourself, 
"I can keep what is mine but cannot take yours". By saying that 
you are following the RULE of treating others as you would like 
to be treated. You finish these words, "I will trea- others as 
I would like to be trea---". Good. After all you would not like 
other people to take things that belong to you. So BE FAIR and 
treat others as you would like to be treated. 
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- Slide change 
- TPS - There you are looking back at  what you 
want very much. 
This time decide not to take it. Press the NO button. That's 
the red one. 
PRESS NOW! 
NO Choice  
- Slide change 
Say THINK. You finish this word: THIN-. 
- Slide change 
THINK about not BEING FAIR to the owner. 
Because you were fair to the owner and did not take his things - 
that has made him happy. By treating the owner as you would like 
to be treated - you have made the owner happy. 
That's good! 
- Slide change 
By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy. 
By treating the other person as you would like to be treated - 
you feel good. BEING FAIR feels good. 
- Slide change 
Can you THINK of another way to get what you want without taking 
t? 
- Slide change 
I will try another way 
You finish these words: "I will tr- another w-- 
Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking it. 
Point to the way you would like to try. Keep pointing to it - 
and I will check so you can actually do it. 
EXIT 
Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the 
appropriate situation so that this child can act it out. 
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APPENDIX III-D  
(continued) 
TRAINING SEQUENCE C  
Make yourself comfortable. Good. 
Slide of Temptation Problem Situation thrown onto screen and the 
story related to the child. 
The boy/girl in the picture is YOU. 
So there you are in the picture - you are looking hard at what 
you want very much and say, "Will I take it or not?" 
You finish these words, "Will I t--- it or n--?" Now before 
you decide say: THINK 
- Slide change 
You finish this word: TH--- 
- Slide change 
THINK about the owner and say BE FAIR. "BE FA--". Yes, you 
should BE FAIR. Being fair means saying to yourself "I can keep 
what is mine but cannot take yours." By saying that, you are 
following the RULE of treating others as you would like to be 
treated. You finish these words: "I will tr--- others as I 
would like to be tr . Good. After all you would not like 
other people to take things that belong to you. so BE FAIR and 
treat others as you would like to be treated. 
- Slide change 
- TPS - Here you are looking back at  what you want 
very much. Now you make your decision. 
Did you take it or not? 
If you did take it - press the YES button - that's the green one. 
If you did not take it - press the NO button - that's the red one. 
PRESS NOW! 
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NO Choice  
- Slide change 
THINK 
- Slide change 
Because you were fair to the owner and did not take the owner's 
things - that has made the owner happy. 
By treating the owner as you would like to be treated - you have 
made the owner happy. 
That's good. 
- Slide change 
By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy. 
By treating the other person as you would like to be treated - 
you feel good. BEING FAIR feels good. 
- Slide change 
Can you THINK of another way to get what l you want without taking 
t? 
- Slide change 
"I will try another way". You say the missing words: "I will 
--- another ---". 
Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking it. 
Point to the way you would like to try. ,Keep pointing to it - 
and I will check so you can actually do it. 
EXIT 
Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the 
appropriate situation so that this child can act it out. 
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YES Choice  
- Slide change x 6 
THINK. You finish this word: TH--- 
- Slide change 
Think about not BEING FAIR to the owner. 
Because you were not fair to the owner and took what belonged to 
the owner you have made the owner unhappy. 
By NOT treating the owner as you would like to be treated you 
have made the owner unhappy. That's not BEING FAIR. 
- Slide change 
By not BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself 
unhappy. By NOT treating the other person as you would like to 
be treated you feel unhappy. NOT BEING FAIR does not make you 
happy. 
- Slide change 
Try again 
- Slide change 
There you are in the picture. 
You are looking hard at what you want very much and say, "Will I 
take it or not?". You finish these words: "Will I t--- it or 
n--?" Now before you decide say: THINK 
- Slide change 
You finish this word: TH---. 
- Slide change 
THINK about the owner and say BE FAIR 
You finish these words: "BE F---". Yes, you should BE FAIR. 
Being fair means saying to yourself, "I can keep what is mine 
but cannot take yours". By saying that you are following the 
RULE of treating others as you would like to be treated. 
You finish these words: "I will tr--- others as I would like to 
be tr ". Good. After all you would not like other people to 
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take things that belong to you. So BE FAIR and treat others 
as you would like to be treated. 
- Slide change 
- TPS - Here you are looking back at  
what you want very much. Now you make your decision. 
Did you take it or not? 
If you did take it - press the YES button - that's the green one. 
If you did not take it - press the NO button - that's the red one. 
PRESS NOW! 
NO Choice  
- Slide change 
Say: THINK. You finish this word: "TH---" 
- Slide change 
THINK about BEING FAIR to the owner. You finish these words: 
"BE F---". Because you were fair to the owner and did not take 
his things - that has made him happy. By treating the owner as 
you would like to be treated - you have made the owner happy. 
That's good! 
- Slide change 
By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy. 
By treating the other person as you would like to be treated - 
you feel good. BEING FAIR feels good. 
- Slide change 
•Can you THINK of another way to get what you want without taking 
it? 
- Slide change 
"I will try another way" 
You say the missing words "I will --- another --- . 
Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking it. 
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Point to the way you would like to try. Keep pointing to it 
- and I will check so you can actually do it. 
EXIT 
Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the 
appropriate situation so that this child can act it out. 
YES Choice  
- Slide change 
THINK. You finish this word: TH--- 
- Slide change 
Think about not BEING FAIR to the owner. You finish these words, 
"I am not being f---". Because you were not fair to the owner 
and took what belonged to the owner you have made the owner 
unhappy. By NOT treating the owner as you would like to be 
treated you have made the owner unhappy. That's NOT BEING FAIR. 
- Slide change 
By not BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself unhappy. 
By NOT treating the other person as you would like to be treated 
you feel unhappy. NOT BEING FAIR does not make you happy. 
- Slide change 
Try again. 
- Slide change 
There you are in the picture. 
You are looking hard at what you want very much and say, "Will I 
take it or not?". You finish these words: "Will I t--- it or 
n--". Now before you decide say: THINK. 
- Slide change 
You •finish this word: TH--- . 
- Slide change 
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THINK about the owner and say: BE FAIR. You finish these 
words: "BE F---". Yes, you should BE FAIR. Being fair means 
saying to yourself, can keep what is mine but cannot take 
yours". By saying that you are following the RULE of treating 
others as you would like to be treated. You finish these words, 
"I will tr--- others as I would like to be tr ". Good. 
After all you would not like other people to take things that 
belong to you. So BE FAIR and treat others as you would like 
to be treated. 
- Slide change 
- TPS - There you are looking back at  what you 
want very much. 
This time decide not to take it. Press the NO button. That's 
the red one. 
PRESS NOW! 
NO Choice  
- Slide change 
Say THINK. You finish this word: "TH---". 
- Slide change 
THINK about BEING FAIR to the owner. 
Because you were fair to the owner and did not take his things - 
that has made him happy. By treating the owner as you would like 
to be treated - you have made the owner happy. That's good! 
- Slide change 
By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy. 
By treating the other person as you would like to be treated - 
you feel good. BEING FAIR feels good. 
- Slide change 
Can you THINK of another way to get what you want without taking 
it? 
- Slide change 
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"I will try another way". 
You say the missing words: "I will --- another ---. 
Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking it. 
Point to the way you would like to try. Keep pointing to it - 
and I will check so you can actually do it. 
EXIT 
Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the 
appropriate situation so that this child can act it out. 
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APPENDIX III-D  
(continued) 
DIRECT INSTRUCTION PROGRAM 
TRAINING SEQUENCE D  
Make yourself comfortable. Good. 
The boy/girl in the picture is YOU. 
So there you are in the picture - you are looking hard at what 
you want very much and say , "Will I take it or not?" 
What do you say? 
Now before you decide, say : THINK 
- Slide change 
What do you say? 
- Slide change 
Think about the owner and say BE FAIR. What do you say? 
Yes, you should BE FAIR. Being fair means saying to yourself, 
"I can keep what is mine but cannot take yours." By saying 
that, you are following the RULE of treating others as you would 
like to be treated. What is the RULE? What does it mean? 
Good. After all you would not like other people to take things 
that belong to you. So BE FAIR and treat others as you would 
like to be treated. 
- Slide change 
- TPS - Here you are looking back at  what you 
want very much . Now you make your decision. 
Did you take it or not? 
If you did take it - press the YES button - that's the green one. 
If you did not take it - press the NO button - that's the red one. 
PRESS NOW! 
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NO Choice  
THINK 
What do you say? 
Because you were fair to the owner and did not take the owner's 
things that has made the owner happy. 
By treating the owner as you would like to be treated - you have 
made the owner happy. 
That's good! 
By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy. 
By treating the other person as you would like to be treated - 
you feel good. BEING FAIR feels good. 
Can you THINK of another way to get what you want without taking 
it? 
"I will try another way" 
What do you say? 
Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking it. 
Point to the way you would like to try. Keep pointing to it - 
and I will check so you can actually do it. 
EXIT 
Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the 
appropriate situation so that this child can act it out. 
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YES Choice  
- Slide change x 6 
THINK 
What do you say? 
- Slide change 
Think about not BEING FAIR to the owner. Are you being fair 
taking it? What do you say? 
Because you were not fair to the owner and took what belonged to 
the owner you have made the owner unhappy. 
By NOT treating the owner as you would like to be treated you 
have made the owner unhappy. That's not being fair. 
- Slide change 
By not BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself unhappy. 
By NOT treating the other person as you would like to be treated 
you feel unhappy. NOT BEING FAIR does not make you happy. 
- Slide change 
Try again 
- Slide change 
There you are in the picture. 
You are looking hard at what you want very much and say, "Will I 
take it or not?" What do you say? 
Now before you decide say : THINK 
- Slide change 
What do you say? 
- Slide change 
THINK about the owner and say: BE FAIR. What do you say. 
Yes, you should BE FAIR. Being fair means saying to yourself, 
"I can keep what is mine but cannot take yours". By saying that 
you are following the RULE of treating others as you would like 
to be treated. 
What is the rule? Good. After all you would not like other 
people to take things that belong to you. So BE FAIR and treat 
others as you would like to be treated. 
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- Slide change 
- TPS - Here you are looking back at  what you 
want very much. Now you make your decision. 
Did you take it or not? 
If you did take it - press the YES button - that's the green one. 
If you did not take it - press the NO button - that's the red one. 
PRESS NOW! 
NO Choice  
- Slide change 
Say THINK 
What do you say? 
- Slide change 
THINK about BEING FAIR to the owner. Are you being fair not 
taking it? What do you say? 
Because you were fair to the owner and did not take his things - 
that has made him happy. By treating the owner as you would like 
to be treated - you have made the owner happy. 
That's good! 
- Slide change 
By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy. 
By treating the other person as you would like to be treated - 
you feel good. BEING FAIR feels good. 
- Slide change 
Can you THINK of another way to get what you want without taking 
it? 
- Slide change 
"I will try another way" 
What do you say? 
Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking it. 
Point to the way you would like to try. Keep pointing to it - 
and I will check so you can actually do it. 
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EXIT 
Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the 
appropriate situation so that this child can act it out. 
YES Choice  
- Slide change x 6 
THINK 
What do you say? 
- Slide change 
Think about not BEING FAIR to the owner. Are you being fair? 
What do you say? 
Because you were not fair to the owner and took what belonged to 
the owner - you have made the owner unhappy. 
By NOT treating the owner as you would like to be treated you 
have made the owner unhappy. That's not BEING FAIR. 
- Slide change 
By NOT BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself unhappy. 
By NOT treating the other person as you would like to be treated 
you feel unhappy. NOT BEING FAIR does not make you happy. 
- Slide change 
Try again 
- Slide change 
There you are in the picture. 
You are looking hard at what you want very much and say, "Will 
I take it or not?". What do you say? 
Now before you decide, say : THINK. 
- Slide change 
What do you say? 
- Slide change 
THINK about the owner and say BE FAIR. What do you say? 
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Yes, you should BE FAIR. Being fair means saying to yourself, 
"I,can keep what is mine but cannot take yours". By saying that 
you are following the RULE of treating others as you would like 
to be treated. 
What is the rule? Good. After all you would not like other 
people to take things that belong to you. So BE FAIR and treat 
others as you would like to be treated. 
- Slide change 
- TPS - There you are looking back at  what you 
want very much. 
This time decide not to take it. Press the NO button. That's 
the red one. 
PRESS NOW! 
NO Choice  
- Slide change 
Say THINK 
What do you say? 
- Slide change 
THINK about BEING FAIR to the owner. Are you being fair not taking 
it? What do you say? 
Because you were fair to the owner and did not take his things - 
that has made him happy. By treating the owner as you would like 
to be treated - you have made the owner happy. 
That's good! 
- Slide change 
By BEING FAIR to the owner you have also made yourself happy. 
By treating the other person as you would like to be treated - 
you feel good. BEING FAIR feels good. 
- Slide change 
Can you THINK of another way to get what you want without taking 
it? 
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- Slide change 
"I will try another way". 
What do you say? 
Here are some ways you could get what you want without taking 
it? 
Point to the way you would like to try. Keep pointing to it - 
and I will check so you can actually do it. 
EXIT 
Experimenter checks the child's choice and then sets up the 
appropriate situation so that this child can act it out. 
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APPENDIX III-E 
LEGITIMATE ALTERNATIVE TRAINING 
Point to the alternative you would like to try. 
SAVING  
Say to the child: "Now you act out your way of getting the 
eg. cake without taking it. 
By taking this money and putting it in your piggy bank you are 
saving up so that you can buy the cake when you save enough 
money. 
Pick up the money and move yourself - that's you - see your 
name there - and put the money in the piggy bank" 
Say: "I won't take it I will save up and buy it one day". 
Now you say: "I won't take it I will save up and buy it one day". 
COLLECTING BOTTLES  
Say to the child: "Now you act out your way of getting the eg. 
yo-yo without taking it" 
By taking these bottles to the shop you may get enough money 
so that you can buy a yo-yo. Pick up the bottles and move 
yourself - that's you - see your name there - and give the 
bottles to the shopkeeper - that's FRED. Good. 
Say, "I won't take it I will give these bottles to the shopkeeper 
so that I may have enough money to buy a yo-yo." 
Now you say: "I won't take it I will give these bottles to the 
shopkeeper so that I may have enough money to buy a yo-yo". 
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ASKING FOR A LOAN  
Say to the child: "Now you act out the way of getting the eg. 
lollies without taking them. By asking dad, or mother or even 
a friend who will give you a loan of some money you can then 
buy the lollies. 
Remember when you ask for a loan it means if you get the loan 
you can buy what you want but you MUST pay the money back to 
whoever you borrow it from, OK? 
Move yourself - that's you - see your name there - and ask 
mum/dad/friend for a loan of some money so you can buy the 
lollies. Good! 
Say: "I won't take the lollies I will ask mum/dad/friend for 
a loan of some money so I can buy some eg. lollies" 
Now you say: "I won't take the lollies I will ask mum/dad/ 
friend for a loan of some money so I can buy some eg. lollies." 
ODD JOBS  
Say to the child: "Now you act out your way of getting the 
eg. pump without taking it. 
By mowing this lawn (green sheet of paper) you can earn some 
money so that you may be able to buy a pump. Pick up the lawn 
mower yourself - that's you - see your name there - and push 
it along the lawn a few times. Good! 
Say: "I won't take the pump I will do some jobs like mowing 
the lawn to get the money so I can buy a pump". 
Now you say: "I won't take the pump I will do some jobs like 
mowing the lawn to get the money so I can buy a pump". 
APPENDIX IV 
A- R 
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APPENDIX IV-A  
Individual and group mean pre- post- and follow-up treatment 
resistance scores for subjects on the 'Did do' measure of the 
JHTST. 
Subject 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Post Only 
Control Group 
Follow 
Pre Post 
up 
Pre Post Pre Post Post 
1 41 3 8 8 4 6 8 
2 88 8 8 2 0 0 1 
3 65 7 1 3 0 0 5 
4 10 0 1 1 2 2 1 
5 68 8 1 1 4 3 4 
6 00 0 5 8 0 3 4 
7 02 2 2 1 4 5 0 
8 73 7 0 3 3 0 3 
9 08 - 5 7 3 3 2 
10 78 8 8 8 7 8 3 
11 08 8 2 3 7 5 4 
12 48 8 3 2 8 8 4 
13 58 8 7 3 3 4 2 
14 0 8 7 1 1 7 8 3 
328. 
APPENDIX IV-A  
(Continued) 
Subject 
DIP Group GIP Group No Treatment Control Group 
Post Only 
Control Group 
Follow Pre Post up Pre Post Pre Post Post 
15 11 1 5 1 2 1 3 
16 18 2 6 2 8 8 1 
17 02 6 2 5 8 8 5 
18 15 - 2 0 0 7 5 
19 22 2 3 2 3 2 1 
20 22 1 0 0 1 0 0 
21 22 - 5 8 1 1 8 
22 10 1 6 7 3 3 0 
23 88 8 1 0 2 2 3 
24 22 2 1 0 8 3 5 
25 28 4 0 2 1 1 3 
26 52 2 6 4 4 1 0 
27 34 - 3 1 2 2 2 
4ean(i) 2.89 4.48 4.48 3.41 3.07 3.52 3.48 2.96 
329. 
APPENDIX IV-B  
Individual and group mean pre- post- and follow-up treatment 
intrinsic resistance scores for subjects on the 'Did do' 
measure of the JHTST. 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Subject 
Pre Post 
Follow 
up 
Pre Post Pre Post 
1 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 
2 2 2 3 0 1 0 0 
3 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
5 3 0 5 0 0 0 0 
6 0 1 1 2 4 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
8 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
9 0 5 - 0 0 0 0 
10 1 8 3 0 1 1 2 
11 0 3 2 1 0 1 0 
12 0 6 1 0 0 1 1 
13 2 4 1 0 1 0 1 
14 0 2 1 0 0 0 2 
330. 
APPENDIX IV-B  
(Continued) 
DIP Group 
_ 
GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Subject 
Pre Post 
Follow 
up 
Pre Post Pre Post 
i 
15 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
16 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 
17 0 1 3 11 0 0 
18 1 2 - I 0 0 0 
19 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
20 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
21 1 1 - 0 1 1 0 
22 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 
23 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
24 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
25 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 
26 1 1 1 2 0 2 0 
27 1 1 - 2 0 0 1 
Mean (X) 0.63 1.56 1.43 0.48 0.67 0.48 0.56 
331. 
APPENDIX IV-C  
• Individual and group mean pre- post and follow-up treatment 
resistance scores for subjects on the 'Should do' measure 
of the JHTST. 
Subject 
DIP Group 
_ 
GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Post Only 
Control Group 
' Follow 
Pre Post 
up 
Pre Post Pre Post Post 
1 37 4 8 8 • 8 7 7 
2 88 8 8 8 7 7 7 
3 6 7 8 7 8 8 5 7 
4 88 8 7 8 2 1 7 
5 88 8 8 6 6 8 2 
6 77 8 7 8 8 8 7 
7 78 8 4 6 7 6 8 
8 88 8 8 8 5 1 8 
9 78 - 8 8 8 7 7 
1 
10 87 8 8 8 7 8 3 1 1 
11 7 8 8 8 8 7 7 8 
12 88 8 8 8 8 8 7 
13 88 8 8 8 8 6 8 
14 88 8 7 8 8 8 4 
332. 
APPENDIX IV-C  
(Continued) 
Subject 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Post Only 
Control Group 
Follow 
Pre Post 
up 
Pre Post Pre Post Post 
15 42 5 7 5 4 8 8 
16 87 8 6 5 8 8 7 
17 88 8 4 7 8 8 8 
18 88 - 8 8 8 8 8 
19 13 2 4 4 8 8 8 
20 28 8 7 8 8 8 8 
21 58 - 8 8 8 8 8 
22 88 8 6 7 8 3 8 
23 88 8 8 8 3 7 3 
24 67 8 8 8 8 8 5 
25 88 8 4 5 7 8 6 
26 76 8 7 5 8 8 4 
27 77 - 8 6 4 8 6 
Mean(R) 6.78 7.2 7.43 7.0 7.11 6.93 6.85 6.56 
333. 
APPENDIX IV-D  
Individual and group mean pre- post- and follow-up treatment 
intrinsic resistance scores for subjects on the 'Should do' 
measure of the JHTST. 
DIP Group GIP Group No Treatment Control Group 
Subject 
Pre Post Follow up Pre Post Pre Post 
1 0 1 0 0 5 1 0 
2 11 3 0 2 3 2 
3 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 
4 1 5 2 1 1 1 0 
5 3 4 3 3 1 0 0 
6 3 2 2 3 2 0 1 
7 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 
8 4 0 2 1 3 1 0 
9 2 4 _ 1 0 2 0 
10 4 7 4 0 0 1 1 
11 0 2 2 3 2 2 0 
12 1 3 2 1 5 1 1 
13 1 7 3 1 1 2 2 
14 2 2 1 1 1 0 2 
334. 
APPENDIX IV-D  
(Continued) 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Subject 
Pre Post 
Follow 
up 
Pre Post Pre Post 
15 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
16 2 4 1 0 0 4 1 
17 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 
18 1 1 - 1 1 1 0 
19 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 
20 1 1 1 3 1 2 8 
21 4 2 - 0 1 0 0 
22 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 
23 2 1 1 0 2 0 2 
24 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 
25 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
26 1 3 2 3 3 0 0 
27 1 2 - 0 0 1 3 
Mean(R) 1.52 2.3 1.87 11.04 1.3 1.07 1.15 
335. 
APPENDIX IV-E  
Individual and group mean pre- and post-treatment clumsiness 
and stealing scores for subjects on the General Moral Judgement 
measure. 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Subject 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
1 2.0 2.25 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 
2 2.25 2.25 2.5 2.25 2.0 3.0 
3 2.25 2.75 2.75 2.5 2.25 2.5 
4 2.0 2.0 2.25 2.0 3.0 2.5 
5 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.75 1.75 2.5 
6 2.0 2.25 2.0 2.25 2.25 2.75 
7 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.25 2.5 
8 2.25 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 
9 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.75 1.75 2.0 
10 2.0 2.25 3.0 2.25 2.0 2.0 
11 1.75 2.0 1.75 2.0 2.0 2.25 
12 2.25 2.25 2.0 2.25 2.0 2.0 
13 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 
14 3.0 3.0 2.75 2.5 2.5 2.5 
336. 
APPENDIX IV-E  
(Continued) 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Subject 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
15 1.75 2.5 1.5 2.25 2.0 2.25 
16 2.75 2.25 2.0 2.75 2.0 2.0 
17 2.5 2.25 1 ..5 2.0 2.0 2.0 
18 2.25 2.25 2.0 2.0 2.75 3.0 
19 2.0 2.0 2.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 
20 2.25 2.25 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 
21 2.5 2.5 2.75 3.0 2.75 2.75 
22 2.0 2.75 2.0 2.0 2.25 2.5 
23 2.0 2.25 1.5 2.0 1.75 2.5 
24 1.75 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.25 
25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.0 2.25 2.5 
26 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.25 2.0 2.0 
27 2.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 2.25 
Mean(X) 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 
337. 
APPENDIX IV-F  
Individual and group mean pre- and post-treatment collective 
responsibility scores for subjects on the General Moral Judgement 
measure. 
Subject 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
1 1.67 1.67 2.33 1.66 2.67 2.0 
2 2.66 3.0 1.66 1.0 2.33 2.33 
3 2.0 2.0 1.66 2.33 2.0 2.33 
4 2.0 1.33 3.33 2.33 1.33 2.33 
5 2.66 2.0 2.0 2.33 1.0 1.0 
6 3.0 2.0 2.33 2.66 1.33 2.0 
7 2.33 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.33 
8 2.5 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 1.67 
9 1.0 3.0 2.66 4.0 2.33 3.0 
10 3.0 2.33 4.0 4.0 1.0 2.67 
11 2.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 1.67 
12 3.0 1.0 2.66 3.33 4.0 2.0 
13 2.0 2.0 2.66 2.0 2.0 1.0 
14 2.0 4.0 2.66 2.33 2.0 2.33 
338. 
APPENDIX IV-F  
(Continued) 
Subject 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
 
Control Group 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
15 2.33 2.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 
16 2.33 2.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.33 
17 4.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
18 2.0 2.33 2.0 2.0 1.66 2.0 
19 2.0 1.66 1.66 3.0 1.66 1.66 
20 1.0 1.66 1.66 2.33 2.0 1.0 
21 2.66 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.33 
22 1.33 2.0 2.0 2.66 2.33 1.66 
23 4.0 4.0 1.66 3.0 1.0 1.0 
24 4.0 2.0 2.66 3.0 2.3 2.67 
25 2.0 3.0 3.66 3.0 1.0 1.33 
26 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 
27 1.66 3.0 3.66 4.0 2.0 2.0 
Mean(X) 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.6 1.9 1.9 
339. 
APPENDIX IV-G  
Individual and group mean pre- and post-treatment impulsivity 
scores for subjects on the KMFFT. 
Subject 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
1 3.23 0.59 0.40 0.00 -3.23 -2.16 
2 1.01 -1.69 -0.69 -0.67 -1.40 0.23 
3 1.45 1.68 0.92 0.40 -0.27 1.07 
4 -1.85 -1.28 -3.39 -1.13 0.90 0.03 
5 0.95 0.76 -0.83 1.92 1.71 2.48 
6 1.71 -0.08 -0.66 -0.58 -0.87 -0.74 
7 -1.16 -1.99 1.34 1.66 2.22 4.15 
8 0.57 0.10 -4.32 -4.55 1.67 1.83 
9 -2.23 -2.31 -0.52 -0.90 0.58 -0.26 
10 -0.1 -6.11 -1.28 0.60 3.07 1.95 
11 -3.0 -1.46 -0.95 -1.57 3.29 2.32 
12 0.08 -1.76 0.17 -1.39 -0.11 -0.16 
13 1.73 -0.27 -1.68 -0.09 0.98 0.12 
14 0.58 -0.28 -0.29 -0.13 0.53 2.08 
340. 
APPENDIX IV-G  
(Continued) 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Subject 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
15 2.53 1.31 2.94 -0.46 -1.72 -0.76 
16 2.20 1.07 0.79 2.51 1.24 -0.64 
17 -1.92 -0.02 0.75 0.75 1.49 1.25 
18 0.78 0.83 0.99 1.01 -0.47 -0.22 
19 -0.17 -0.44 1.86 2.44 -0.64 -0.84 
20 -0.28 1.09 -0.08 0.58 1.30 0.64 
21 -0.47 -2.29 -0.76 1.03 0.72 -1.10 
22 2.18 1.10 -1.81 -0.11 -0.75 0.67 
23 -4.43 -1.37 1.11 -0.08 -0.20 0.86 
24 -0.48 -0.18 -0.12 1.14 -2.66 -1.59 
25 -3.11 -0.06 0.37 1.43 -0.99 -1.36 
26 0.14 -1.28 0.54 0.80 -1.55 -1.91 
27 3.30 1.33 -0.93 2.10 -1.57 0.46 
Mean(R) 0.12 -0.48 -0.24 0.23 0.12 0.31 
341. 
APPENDIX IV-H  
Individual and group mean pre- and post-treatment efficiency 
scores for subjects on the KMMFT. 
342. 
Subject 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
1 0.97 -0.31 -1.84 -1.0 3.49 3.46 
2 -0.47 -0.87 -1.87 -0.85 -0.32 -0.73 
3 -1.19 0.40 0.46 0.40 0.25 -0.01 
4 -0.71 -0.59 0.25 1.67 -0.91 -0.77 
5 0.15 0.04 -0.89 0.42 1.93 1.14 
6 -0.05 -1.18 0.06 -0.94 -1.69 -0.78 
7 0.86 -0.81 0.6 0.42 0.58 2.57 
8 -0.03 0.18 2.32 1.23 0.85 0.77 
9 1.25 0.27 0.50 -1.40 -0.32 -0.48 
10 0.64 2.75 0.40 -0.34 1.41 0.65 
11 0.72 -0.32 -0.49 0.47 0.91 1.04 
12 0.96 0.24 -0.97 -0.39 -0.19 -0.34 
13 -0.07 -0.99 -0.32 -0.65 0.12 -0.10 
14 -0.04 0.98 -0.31 -0.37 -0.55 1.28 
APPENDIX IV-H  
(Continued) 
Subject 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
15 1.67 -0.01 0.14 0.23 -0.84, -0.50 
16 1.16 -0.01 -0.53 1.11 0.42 -0.88 
17 -0.08 0.30 0.91 0.81 -0.95 -1.23 
18 -0.80 -0.81 -0.45 -0.21 -1.53 -1.04 
19 0.43 0.20 0.94 2.48 -1.64 -1.20 
20 -1.72 -0.81 -1.92 -0.82 -0.48 -0.88 
21 0.17 -0.01 -0.40 0.53 1.81 -0.42 
22 -0.24 -1.08 -1.03 -0.63 -0.69 0.13 
23 1.59 1.13 -0.85 -1.18 -1.52 -0.58 
24 -0.96 1.34 -0.18 0.16 -1.04 1.09 
25 0.83 1.62 -0.39 -0.37 0.97 -0.94 
26 1.52 0.54 -0.56 0.50 0.11 -0.65 
27 1.18 -0.03 1.19 0.50 -0.71 -0.28 
Mean(i) 0.29 0.08 -0.19 0.07 -0.02 0.01 
343. 
APPENDIX IV-I  
Individual pre- and post- treatment real-life stealing scores 
for all subjects. 
Subject 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Post Only 
Control Group 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Post 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
3 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
344. 
APPENDIX IV-I  
(Continued) 
Subject 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Post Only 
Control Group 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Post 
15 1 1 1.0 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
24 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
26 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
345. 
APPENDIX IV-J  
Individual pre- and post-treatment real-life cheating scores 
for all subjects. 
Subject 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Post Only 
Control Group 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Post 
1 1 0 1 . 1 1 0 0 
2 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
3 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
6 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
7 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
8 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
9 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
12 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
13 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
14 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
346. 
APPENDIX IV-J  
(Continued) 
Subject 
DIP Group GIP Group 
No Treatment 
Control Group 
Post Only 
Control Group 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Post 
15 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
16 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
18 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
19 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
20 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
21 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
22 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
23 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
24 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
25 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
26 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
27 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
347. 
APPENDIX IV-K  
Analysis of Covariance on post test resistance scores on the 
'Did do' measure of the JHTST for the DIP, GIP, and no treatment 
control groups, using the pre-test scores as the covariate. 
Source MS df 
Groups 22.12 2 3.60* 
Error 6.15 77 
* p < .05 
348. 
APPENDIX IV-L  
Analysis of Covariance on post-test, intrinsic resistance scores 
on the 'Did do' measure of the JHTST for the DIP, GIP, and no 
treatment control groups, using the pre-test scores as the 
covariate. 
Source MS df 
Groups 7.66 2 3.82* 
Error 2.00 
* p c .05 
349. 
APPENDIX IV-M  
Analysis of Covariance on post-test resistance scores on the 
'Should do' measure of the JHTST for the DIP, GIP, and no 
treatment control groups, using the pre-test as the covariate. 
Source MS df 
Groups 1.80 2 0.89* 
Error 2.02 
*p> .05 
350. 
APPENDIX IV-N  
Analysis of covariance on post-test intrinsic resistance scores 
on the 'Should do' measure of the JHTST for the DIP, GIP, and 
no treatment control groups, using the pre-test scores as the 
covariate. 
Source MS df 
Groups 7.52 2 2.99* 
Error 2.51 
* P < .05 
351. 
APPENDIX IV-0  
Analysis of covariance on post-test clumsiness and stealing 
scores on the General Moral Judgement measure for the DIP, 
GIP and no treatment control groups, using the pre-test 
scores as the covariate. 
Source ME df 
Groups 0.04 2 0.51c 
Error 0.08 
* P > .05 
352. 
APPENDIX IV-P  
Analysis of covariance on post-test collective responsibility 
scores on the General Moral Judgement measure for the DIP, GIP, 
and no treatment control groups, using the pre-test scores as 
the covariate. 
Source ME df 
Groups 1.93 2 3.38* 
Error 0.57 
* p .‹ .05 
353. 
APPENDIX IV-Q  
Analysis of covariance on post-test impulsivity scores on the 
41FFT for the DIP, GIP, and no treatment control groups, using 
the pre-test scores as the covariate. 
Source ME df . 
Groups 6.28 2 3.89* 
Error 1.61 
* p < . .05 
354. 
APPENDIX IV-R  
Analysis of covariance on post-test efficiency scores on the 
KMFFT for the DIP, GIP, and no treatment control groups, using 
the pre-test scores as the covariate. 
Source MF df 
Groups 0.37 2 0.49* 
Error 0.75 
* p..05 
355. 
